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This thesis explores the connection between seapower, maritime strategy and 
national policy, and assesses the utility of a potential Maritime Strategy for 
Britain. Underpinning the analysis, and providing the skein of connecting thought 
throughout the thesis, is the question: what is the strategic utility of maritime 
forces? Specifically, the thesis first examines the development of maritime theory 
and its translation into practice within the context of contemporary British 
maritime thinking and doctrine. In order to do this, the thesis examines the 
development of the British maritime school of thought, focusing on its leading 
figures and core tenets and the extent to which such thinking is reflected in 
contemporary doctrine. The thesis proceeds to examine, as a case study, the 
debate on the rationale for, and design, development and procurement of, Britain’s 
future aircraft carrier capability in order to shed light on British thinking on the 
role and utility of maritime strategy. The analysis especially considers the debate 
on the configuration of aircraft carrier to be developed and the commensurate 
variant of aircraft to be acquired (that is, principally short take-off and vertical 
landing or catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery). This debate extends 
beyond a consideration of naval factors and considers wider military and national 
policy (notably military-industrial) factors. Proceeding from this, the thesis 
examines potential alternatives to a traditionally conceived aircraft carrier, 
including missile-armed surface and sub-surface naval forces and land-based 
aviation. The purpose of this is to shed further light on the utility of aircraft 
carriers relative to other options and assess their value to British maritime strategy 
and national policy. The thesis concludes with an assessment of the implications 
of the aircraft carrier debate for British defence and national policy and examines 
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This thesis examines the connection between seapower, maritime strategy and 
national policy, and assesses the utility of a maritime strategy for Britain. 
Underpinning the analysis, and providing the skein of connecting thought 
throughout the thesis, is the question: what is the strategic utility of maritime 
forces? Specifically, the thesis first examines the development of maritime theory 
and its translation into practice within the context of contemporary British 
maritime thinking and doctrine. In order to do this, the thesis examines the 
development of the British maritime school of thought, focusing on its leading 
figures and core tenets and the extent to which such thinking is reflected in 
contemporary doctrine. The thesis proceeds to examine, as a case study, the 
debate on the rationale for, and design, development and procurement of, Britain’s 
future aircraft carrier capability in order to shed light on British thinking on the 
role and utility of maritime strategy. This debate extends beyond a consideration 
of naval factors and considers wider military and national policy (notably 
military-industrial) factors. Proceeding from this, the thesis examines potential 
alternatives to a traditionally conceived aircraft carrier, including missile-armed 
surface and sub-surface naval forces and land-based aviation, in order evaluate the 
utility of aircraft carriers relative to other options and assess their value to British 
maritime strategy and national policy. The thesis concludes with an assessment of 
the implications of the aircraft carrier debate for British defence and national 
policy and examines the rationale for, and implications of a Maritime Strategy for 
Britain.                 
The central question for the thesis is: What light does the debate on the 
development and procurement of the future aircraft carriers shed on contemporary 
British thinking on the nature and utility of maritime strategy? This question 
provides the central aim of the thesis. That is, to evaluate the debate on the design, 
development and procurement of the future aircraft carriers within the context of a 
discussion of contemporary British maritime thinking and doctrine, in order to 
assess the nature and utility of British maritime strategy. The future aircraft carrier 
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programme is one of the Ministry of Defence’s principal investment projects and 
thus provides a significant case study for the examination of what Britain views as 
the primary roles for maritime power; how maritime power can be utilised; and 
why maritime power is valuable both in a defence and wider grand strategic 
setting.      
In order to answer the central question, the thesis examines the following 
secondary questions: How does the debate in the literature on the nature of 
seapower and maritime strategy shed light on the utility of maritime forces?   
What is the connection between seapower, maritime strategy and national policy? 
What was the rationale for developing the future aircraft carriers? What need are 
they seen as meeting? Has this remained consistent or has it changed in response 
to evolving strategic circumstances?  What was the debate concerning the 
procurement of (a) any aircraft carriers, (b) aircraft carriers of this specific design? 
What was the case for and against? What alternatives were considered? What 
alternatives could or should have been considered? Finally, what options / 
variations of maritime strategy are possible? How do they reflect British maritime 
thinking and thinking on, and options for, national policy?  
Research Method and Design 
The research is principally based on secondary literature and interviews with key 
individuals. The secondary literature is subject to a qualitative content analysis 
and thematic analysis for its review. This approach focuses on the analysis and 
interpretation of key concepts and themes in the surveyed literature. 1  This 
literature covers three strands; the first relating to maritime strategy, seapower and 
national policy; the second, contemporary British maritime thinking and doctrine; 
and the third, the debate on the future aircraft carriers.  
The first strand of literature is analysed using a deductive approach (analysing the 
meanings of concepts and theories) as the first stage of the research to establish a 
conceptual framework for the thesis (see below). Sir Julian Corbett explained the 
importance of theoretical study in the following terms: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘Online QDA - Glossary’, http://onlineqda.hud.ac.uk/glossary.php/. Accessed 22 September 
2013.  
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That the factors are infinitely varied and difficult to determine is true, but that, it 
must be remembered, is just what emphasises the necessity of reaching such firm 
standpoints as are attainable. The vaguer the problem to be solved, the more resolute 
must we be in seeking points of departure from which we can begin to lay a course, 
keeping always an eye open for the accidents that will beset us, and being always 
alive to their deflecting influences. And this is just what the theoretical study of 
strategy can do. It can at least determine the normal. By careful collation of past 
events it becomes clear that certain lines of conduct tend normally to produce 
certain effects; that wars tend to take certain forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; 
that these forms are normally related to the object of the war and to its value to one 
or both belligerents; that a system of operations which suits one form may not be 
that best suited to another.2   
 
The second strand is analysed within this framework, using a historiographical 
approach (that is, ‘... the scrutiny of the purveyors of historical knowledge, of the 
processes by which one comes to understand historical events, rather than the 
events themselves’) 3  and inductive analysis (historical and or comparative 
analysis), to examine how and why British maritime thinking and doctrine has 
developed. This also involves the analysis of primary sources, including 
Government policy documents and doctrinal and conceptual publications (see 
‘Literature Overview’). The purpose of this is to identify key themes and trends in 
British defence, and specifically maritime, thinking and policy. It must be noted 
that specific aspects of the decision-making process concerning the formulation of 
naval and wider defence policy, and the development of the future aircraft carriers 
are not available due to security classification. This is not however an impediment 
to the research the focus of which is conceptual and at the strategic level. The 
thesis is for the most part concerned with the general trajectory of thinking, rather 
than detailed insight into the specifics of technical detail. An extensive series of 
interviews with academics, serving and retired senior officers (including former 
Service Chiefs), civil servants and industrial officials closely involved in this 
process and the future aircraft carrier programme form part of this, and the 
following stage of the research. A semi-structured approach to interviews is 
utilised in order to enable key themes to be discussed but for the specifics of the 
discussion to be free-ranging and maximise the input from each contributor.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (reprinted with ‘Introduction’ by Eric 
Grove (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988)), pp.8-9. 
3 Oliver J. Daddow, ‘British Military Doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s’, Defence Studies, Vol.3, 
No.3 (Autumn 2003), pp.103-113, quotation, p.104.  
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The third strand of literature serves as the case study for the thesis. It builds upon 
the previous two sections of research by providing a specific context within which 
to examine the application of the theoretical and doctrinal concepts that form the 
basis of British maritime thinking. It also considers the implications of the latter 
for British national policy, and considers the nature and utility of a notional 
maritime strategy. This strand principally draws upon British sources but also 
examines literature concerning foreign thinking on maritime airpower. This for 
the most part, draws upon US experience. Although the US may operate on a 
different, and much larger scale than that the UK aspires to, its experience is 
relevant for three reasons: first, the US utilises both main approaches to maritime 
aviation that Britain has considered (short take-off and vertical landing vis-à-vis 
catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery); second, the UK seeks to 
maximise interoperability with the US Armed Forces, including the Navy and 
Marine Corps and thus, US thinking on maritime air operations is directly relevant 
to British developments; third, the aircraft that the UK is acquiring to operate from 
the future aircraft carriers is under development as part of a US-led programme to 
develop a common aircraft, spanning three variants, for primarily the US Air 
Force, Navy and Marine Corps. This strand of literature also draws significantly 
upon the outputs of official auditing bodies, namely the House of Commons 
Defence Committee and National Audit Office in the UK and the US Department 
of Defense.  
The thesis focuses on two overarching themes: the strategic utility of maritime 
forces and the relationship between national policy and seapower. The latter has 
formed a significant component of the discourse on maritime strategy; for 
example, being addressed by authors including Sir Julian Corbett,4 Admiral Sir 
Herbert Richmond,5 Admiral Sergei Gorshkov,6 Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton,7 
and Professor Geoffrey Till.8 The former is a concept that the thesis seeks to 
examine and develop as a means of providing a conceptual framework within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Corbett, Some Principles.  
5 Sir Herbert Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength and Other Essays (Modern Revivals 
in Military History), (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1993) [new edition of 1928 original]. 
6 Sergei Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd, 1979).  
7 Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, Maritime Strategy: A Study of British Defence Problems 
(London: Cassell, 1965). 
8 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Second Edition (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009). 
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which to assess the development and acquisition of the future aircraft carriers and 
the role of a potential British maritime strategy. This approach is influenced by 
General Sir Rupert Smith, formerly a British officer and NATO Deputy Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe, who has written on the importance of understanding 
the utility of force.9  
Underpinning the analysis in this thesis is the use of historical example to inform 
and guide the development of the assessment of the strategic utility of maritime 
forces, including aircraft carriers, and whether a maritime strategy would be of 
value to British national policy. Professor Andrew Lambert describes the role of 
history in strategic analysis thus: 
History does not give us answers; it helps us by providing the evidence from which 
we develop our own ideas. Strategy, by imposing system and order on that evidence, 
speeds up the process of absorption: it allows the many to access the experience and 
understanding of a truly unique mind. The process is dialectic, history informs 
strategic questions, which in turn, can direct historical research, and ensure the 
strategist has a more secure foundation in fact as they proceed. The constant 
dialogue between history and strategy that deployed to such great effect is difficult 
to sustain, but vital.10  
Significance of the Research 
The analysis in this thesis is intended to serve three principal purposes. First, the 
study of the contemporary development of British maritime thinking and doctrine, 
its links with wider British thinking on national policy, and the particular case 
study of the future aircraft carrier programme is designed to assess the role and 
contribution of seapower to the attainment of British national policy objectives. 
This is important as the relative role and contribution of maritime versus 
continental approaches (for example, land-centric, Euro-centric and or 
stabilisation/constabulary-based force concepts)11 to British national policy has 
been, and continues to be an enduring aspect of British strategic debate.12 Thus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin 
Books, 2006). 
10 Andrew Lambert, ‘Sir Julian Corbett and the Naval War Course’, in Peter Hore (ed.), 
Dreadnought to Daring: 100 Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in The Naval Review, 
(Barnsley: Seaforth, 2012), pp.37-52, quotation, p.51. 
11 See, for example, Institute for Public Policy Research, ‘Shared Responsibilities: A National 
Security Strategy for the United Kingdom’, Final Report of the IPPR Commission on National 
Security in the 21st Century (London, 2009).  
12 See, for example, David French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1990).  
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the analysis within this thesis, in particular chapter six – ‘The Future Aircraft 
Carrier Programme and British Maritime Strategy’ – which is explicitly designed 
to compare the utility of maritime and non-maritime approaches to British 
strategy, is of potential significance to this debate.     
Second, the examination of the development and procurement of the future 
aircraft carriers is aimed at improving understanding of the contribution of aircraft 
carriers to British strategy and whether investment in such platforms is 
appropriate. The examination of the debate on aircraft carriers, the capabilities 
they are intended to provide, and potential alternative options, is intended to 
enhance knowledge on the utility, or otherwise, of aircraft carriers to British 
defence and national policy. The thesis particularly asks whether such ships are an 
essential component of a British maritime strategy, a discretionary ‘nice to have’ 
capability, or an inappropriate allocation of resources where their opportunity cost 
exceeds their utility.  
Third, the thesis examines the strategic utility of maritime forces. This evaluates 
the value of the use of maritime power; that is, how and why do maritime-based 
approaches to the application of armed force serve the objectives of the state? This 
is via an approach based on an analysis of ends, ways and means, examining the 
development, deployment and employment of maritime forces. The rationale for 
determining the utility of maritime forces is to enhance the understanding of its 
value within the broader context of national power and especially national 
budgetary priorities. From this, analysis of the potential policy implications – both 
in defence and wider national policy terms - of choices concerning the 
development, deployment or employment of maritime capabilities can be 
enhanced. This can aid in improving the process of policy development and 
implementation. 
Literature Overview  
The research for this thesis focuses principally on the examination of secondary 
sources. This includes a core of ‘key texts’ within the maritime discourse, that is, 
the texts constituting the underlying knowledge base and terminology13 for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ‘Online QDA - Glossary’. 
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study of seapower and maritime strategy. This includes contributions by Corbett,14 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, 15  Gorshkov, 16  Rear Admiral Raja Menon, 17  Edward 
Luttwak,18 Sir James Cable,19 and Till;20 plus the edited volume The Development 
of British Naval Thinking.21 Selected contributions from the wider canon of 
literature on strategic thought are also of particular value; these include works by 
Carl von Clausewitz,22 and General Sir Rupert Smith.23 The aforementioned texts 
are labelled as ‘key’ for two reasons. Firstly, as in the cases of, for example, 
Mahan and Corbett, their contributions are defining works and thus essential to 
the understanding of seapower and maritime strategy. Secondly, the texts are 
significant to the thesis because of the particular concepts, themes or approaches 
to seapower, maritime strategy and/or national policy they evaluate. For example, 
Luttwak, Cable and Smith address the political aspect of the application of force; 
Menon seeks to assess the contribution of maritime strategy to the needs of 
continental powers (thus linking what are often perceived as conflicting 
requirements); and Till evaluates the interaction of seapower, maritime strategy 
and national policy. These texts are thus linked by a strand of thought concerned 
with the broader utility of maritime power (with the exception of Smith who is 
concerned with the general utility of force) and its link to wider national policy.                
 
The doctrinal and conceptual documents published by the Ministry of Defence, in 
particular by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), provide a 
significant insight into the intellectual development and evolution of British 
military thinking. For the purposes of the thesis, the following documents have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and England in the Seven Years’ War: A Study in 
Combined Strategy (2 Vols) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [reprint of the 
original Longmans, Green, and Co. 1907 edition].  
15 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (Mineola, New 
York: Dover Books, 1987) [unabridged republication of the fifth edition (1894); originally 
published by Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1890].   
16 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State.  
17 Raja Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 1998).  
18 Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power.  
19 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force, 
Third Edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999), and The Political Influence of Naval 
Force in History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998) 
20 Till, Seapower.  
21 Geoffrey Till (ed.), The Development of British Naval Thinking (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).  
22 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Edited and Translated by Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976).  
23 Smith, The Utility of Force.  
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provided particular value; British Defence Doctrine, 24  the Future Maritime 
Operational Concept, 25  the Littoral Manoeuvre Concept, 26  Global Strategic 
Trends, 27  the Future Character of Conflict, 28  the Future Land Operating 
Concept29 and UK Air and Space Doctrine.30 In addition, the Strategic Defence 
Review,31 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review,32 and Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National 
Security Strategy33 constitute a body of primary sources that provide the context 
for the development of British Defence Policy from 1998 to the present.  
British Maritime Doctrine34 is an especially useful publication. It provides an 
authoritative statement on the British view of the application, and utility of 
maritime power at principally the strategic (and to a lesser extent, the operational) 
level. This makes it particularly valuable for the thesis in that it explains the role 
of the maritime environment in relation to the grand strategic context and the joint 
campaign. It also provides From Trafalgar to Today: A Bibliographical Essay on 
Doctrine and the Development of British Naval Strategic Thought which discusses 
the broad range of contributions to the development of naval and maritime 
thinking and can thus aid in the further development of the thesis. Further, British 
Maritime Doctrine itself provides a means of evaluating the development of 
British naval and maritime thinking through the evolution of successive iterations 
of the document. BR1806 was originally promulgated in 1995 as The 
Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine,35 subsequently reissued in 1999 as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 MoD/DCDC, British Defence Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 2011). 
25 MoD (UK), Future Maritime Operational Concept (2007).  
26 Royal Navy, Littoral Manoeuvre Concept (2003).  
27 MoD/DCDC, Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040 (Fourth 
Edition, 2010). 
28 MoD/DCDC, Future Character of Conflict (2010).  
29 MoD/DCDC, ‘Future Land Operating Concept’, (Joint Concept Note 2/12, 2012). 
30 MoD/DCDC, UK Air and Space Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30, 2013). 
31 MoD, The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999 (London: The Stationery Office, 1998). 
32 Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (SDSR), Cm 7948 (London: The Stationery Office, October 2010). 
33 Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security 
Strategy (NSS), Cm 7953 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010).  
34 MoD (UK), British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806), Third edition (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2004). 
35 MoD (UK), The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806), (London: HMSO, 
1995). 
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British Maritime Doctrine,36 further updated via in 2004, and was succeeded in 
2011 with the promulgation of British Maritime Doctrine as a joint doctrine 
publication.37      
The principal focus for the thesis is the role and utility of a potential British 
maritime strategy. This requires an analysis and understanding of the development 
of British thinking on the role, utility and wider position of maritime power within 
British national strategy. This is examined in The Development of British Naval 
Thinking, an edited volume including contributions from Rear Admiral Richard 
Hill, Professors Geoff Till, Andrew Lambert and Eric Grove. Of particular note 
are two chapters by Till that examine the evolving context of British naval 
thinking and wider debates on the maritime contribution to British strategy, for 
example, Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s notion of a ‘British way in warfare’.38 
The Development of British Naval Thinking also includes a contribution from 
Grove on the development of British maritime doctrine in the late 1990s.39 This 
provides a valuable insight into the formulation of The Fundamentals of British 
Maritime Doctrine and the subsequent second edition of BR1806, including the 
translation of academic thought into doctrine. It warrants mention that Eric Grove 
was along with (then Commander, Royal Navy) Michael Codner, a principal 
author of The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine.      
A major influence on the development of the thinking for this thesis is the 
intention to assess the utility of maritime forces. This is based on three points 
raised by General Sir Rupert Smith. Smith states, with regard to the utility of force 
that: ‘for force to be effective the desired outcome of its use must be understood in 
such detail that the context of its use is defined as well as the point of 
application’.40 He also states, more importantly: ‘military force is a valid option, a 
lever of intervention and influence, as much as economic, political and diplomatic 
levels, but to be effective it must be applied as part of a greater scheme focusing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 MoD (UK), British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806), Second Edition, (London: The Stationery 
Office, 1999).  
37 MoD/DCDC, British Maritime Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10, 2011).  
38 Till, ‘Richmond and the Faith Reaffirmed: British Naval Thinking Between the Wars’, in Till 
(ed.) The Development of British Naval Thinking, p.109.  
39 Eric Grove, ‘The Discovery of Doctrine: British Naval Thinking at the Close of the Twentieth 
Century’, in Till (ed.) The Development of British Naval Thinking, pp.182-191.  
40 Smith, p. 398. 
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all measures on the one goal’.41 That is, within the context of a wider national 
strategic objective.  
In addition to the aforementioned, the Journal and other publications of the Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies provide a significant 
contribution to the on-going debates in Britain on national and international 
defence, foreign and national security policy and strategy issues. Moreover, the 
Royal United Services Institute provides a highly useful conduit through which it 
is possible to access subject-matter experts and both retired and serving officials 
with knowledge directly applicable to the thesis.  
A particularly valuable journal is The Naval Review. This is the professional 
journal of the Royal Navy and via the arrangements governing contributions to the 
journal, provides an especially insightful perspective into British naval thinking 
and debates within the Royal Navy. An additional journal of merit is Defence 
Studies. This is the official journal of the Joint Services Command and Staff 
College and is intended to provide a discussion of all aspects of defence. The June 
2008 edition of the journal is especially useful as it marked the launch of the 
King’s College London Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. This edition 
includes contributions from Dr Tim Benbow,42 Professor Eric Grove,43 Dr Ian 
Speller,44 and Professor Geoffrey Till45 that have contributed to the development 
of the thesis. The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies own series of papers 
(Corbett Papers) also provide a valuable source of insight, in particular Corbett 
Paper No.6 by Professor Geoffrey Till on British strategy post-Afghanistan46 and 
Corbett Paper No.9 by Tim Benbow, which provides an historical survey of 
British uses of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships since 1945.47 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid., p. 399. 
42 Tim Benbow, ‘Naval Power and Technological Change’, Defence Studies, Vol.8, No.2 (June 
2008), pp. 207-226. 
43 Eric Grove, ‘The Naming of the Parts: Corbett’s Theory of the Means Reconsidered’, Defence 
Studies, Vol.8, No.2 (June 2008), pp. 180-189. 
44 Ian Speller, ‘Corbett, Liddell Hart and the “British Way in Warfare”’, Defence Studies, Vol.8, 
No.2 (June 2008), pp. 227-239. 
45 Geoffrey Till, ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: What’s New? What’s Next? 
A View from Outside’, Defence Studies, Vol.8, No.2 (June 2008), pp. 240-257.  
46 Geoffrey Till, ‘Back to Basics: British Strategy After Afghanistan’, Corbett Paper No. 6 
(Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, July 2011). 
47 Tim Benbow, ‘British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships: 1945-2010’, Corbett 
Paper No. 9 (The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, March 2012). 
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Chapter Overview 
In order to answer the core question, the thesis employs the following approach. 
First, chapter one examines the maritime discourse from which to develop the 
theoretical basis for the study; this is applied in chapter two to the particular 
context of the evolution of British maritime thinking and doctrine. Second, and 
building upon the theoretical and conceptual content of chapters one and two, the 
thesis examines the application of theory to practice by means of the case study on 
the future aircraft carrier programme. The analysis of contemporary British 
maritime thinking and doctrine from chapter two serves as the basis for examining 
the rationale for the future aircraft carrier programme in chapter three. In this 
regard, the purpose of this chapter is to examine both in theoretical terms and with 
reference to historical experience, the strategic roles and utility of aircraft carriers 
in order to inform the analysis of the rationale underpinning Britain’s decision to 
invest in the Queen Elizabeth-class. Chapter four will examine the design and 
development of the carriers and debate on the variant of fixed wing aircraft to be 
embarked: whilst chapter five will consider potential alternatives to the aircraft 
carrier and the role of maritime aviation within wider British airpower. Third, the 
thesis examines the role and utility of maritime strategy at the national policy 
level. Chapter six examines the impact of countervailing factors on the debate 
concerning the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, before proceeding to 
consider the rationale for, and utility of a maritime strategy for Britain.    
 
Thesis Structure 
! Conceptual Analysis 
1. Defining the Context: Seapower, Maritime Strategy and National Policy 
2. The Development of Contemporary British Maritime Thinking and 
Doctrine: An Overview 
! Case Study on the Development of the Future Aircraft Carrier Programme 
3. The Rationale for the Future Aircraft Carrier Programme 
4. The Future Aircraft Carrier Programme: Design, Development and 
Debate 
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5. The Future Aircraft Carrier Programme and British Strategy: An 
Examination of Potential Alternatives 
! National Policy and the Role and Utility of Maritime Strategy  
6. The Future Aircraft Carrier Programme and British Maritime Strategy 
Conclusion 
 
The following is a brief synopsis of each chapter.   
     
Chapter one, ‘Defining the Context: Seapower, Maritime Strategy and National 
Policy’, sets out the conceptual basis for the thesis. It critically evaluates the 
maritime discourse in order to define the principal concepts for the thesis; that is, 
seapower, maritime strategy and grand strategy; how the three concepts relate to 
each other; and the key principles, themes and ideas underpinning each of the 
three. It also considers how thinking on seapower and maritime strategy in 
particular has evolved. From this, the chapter proceeds to examine how seapower, 
maritime strategy and grand strategy serve as the basis for constructing a 
conceptual framework within which to analyse the utility of maritime forces.  
Chapter two, ‘The Development of Contemporary British Maritime Thinking and 
Doctrine: An Overview’, assesses the development of contemporary British 
thinking on the roles and utility of maritime forces. It considers the translation of 
maritime theory, as discussed in the preceding chapter, into practice within the 
specific context of British naval, defence and national policy. The chapter 
includes a review of the British school of maritime thought and its core tenets in 
order to link the theoretical content of the preceding chapter with the analysis of 
contemporary British maritime thinking and doctrine in this chapter. As a case-
study, the chapter examines the evolution of British maritime doctrine as 
promulgated in The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine,48 the subsequent 
second and third editions, re-titled as British Maritime Doctrine, published in 
1999 and 2004 respectively and the fourth edition published as a joint doctrine, 
rather than single Service, publications in 2011. This chapter is particularly 
concerned with identifying the principal concepts, themes and ideas within British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 MoD, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR1806) (London: HMSO, 1995).  
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naval thinking and their influence on the development of British maritime forces. 
It also establishes the context within which the decision to acquire the future 
aircraft carriers was made and their intended contribution to British defence and 
national policy formulated.    
Chapter three, ‘The Rationale for CVF’, examines the background to the decision 
to replace the current Invincible-class aircraft carriers and considers the evolving 
operational-strategic context for British maritime airpower and its implications for 
the future aircraft carrier programme. This will particularly consider the shift from 
North Atlantic-based anti-submarine warfare to expeditionary, power-projection 
operations as the principal objective for British maritime strategy. That is, a shift 
in thinking from ‘at sea’ to ‘from the sea’ as the primary role for British seapower. 
From this analysis, which builds upon the discussion from the preceding chapter, 
the rationale for developing the future aircraft carrier programme can be assessed, 
including whether it has remained consistent or has shifted as the strategic 
situation has changed. This establishes the framework for the two subsequent 
chapters that evaluate the debate on the design, development and procurement of 
the future carriers.  
Chapter four, ‘The Future Aircraft Carrier Programme: Design, Development and 
Debate’, examines the design and development of what become the Queen 
Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. It particularly focuses on the debate concerning 
whether to build the ships in a short take-off and vertical landing or alternatively 
catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery configuration, and the associated 
debate on the variant of fixed-wing combat aircraft to be acquired to operate from 
the carriers. The preceding chapter examined the roles and utility of, and rationale 
for aircraft carriers in general strategic terms. This chapter builds upon that 
analysis and considers the development of what would become the Queen 
Elizabeth-class within the context of British strategic and operational 
requirements and seeks to evaluate whether the developmental path chosen for the 
future aircraft carrier programme constituted the most effective (in terms of cost 
and capability) option for Britain. 
Chapter five, ‘The Future Aircraft Carrier Programme and British Strategy: An 
Examination of Potential Alternatives’, examines whether the opportunity cost of 
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investing in the Future Aircraft Carrier programme is justified by the capabilities 
that will be provided by the Queen Elizabeth-class, or whether potential 
alternative systems or approaches could equally or more effectively provide the 
capability required by British defence policy. This chapter, through a comparative 
analysis of potential alternatives, seeks to shed further light on the utility of 
aircraft carriers relative to the other options and assess their value to British 
maritime and grand strategy, and consider whether such platforms are a vital 
capability for Britain. It is also intended that the discussion within this chapter of 
the requirements of maritime strategy and British airpower will assess the wider 
role and utility of maritime forces to British strategy. This will form the basis for 
the analysis in the following chapter of the connection between maritime strategy 
and national policy.  
Chapter six, ‘The Future Aircraft Carrier Programme and British Maritime 
Strategy’, considers the potential utility of a maritime strategy to British national 
policy. In order to do this, the chapter first examines the debate concerning the 
procurement of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers within the context of 
wider British defence policy, in particular with regard to the impact on the 
programme of growing external pressures, namely, those relating to the 
implications of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the politico-economic 
context for the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Proceeding 
from this, the chapter examines the rationale for, and utility of a potential 
maritime strategy for Britain. It does this by first considering Britain’s strategic 
context and the evolving international environment. This provides the context for 
considering the military utility of a maritime strategy and its implications for 
maritime and wider force development and British national policy.  This chapter 
builds upon the analysis in chapters one and two, which considered the definition 
and British interpretation of maritime strategy, and the analysis in the following 
chapters of the debates concerning the rationale for and design and development 
of the Future Aircraft Carriers, in particular with regard to the wider role and 
contribution of the carriers to British defence and national policy. 
The Conclusion examines three principal issues underpinning the analysis 
throughout the thesis; the role of aircraft carriers in British strategy; the strategic 
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utility of maritime forces and whether there is a requirement for a Maritime 
Strategy; and the connection between British national policy and maritime 
strategy. Those issues are considered via three questions: to what extent are 
aircraft carriers an essential component of British strategy and what would be the 
implications of foregoing the capability they provide? Why would a Maritime 
Strategy be of utility to the UK, and what would be the implications for British 
national policy? Finally, how does national policy influence the development of 
strategy and the requirement for particular military capabilities?   
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The overarching context for this chapter, and the thesis as a whole, is that 
provided by the interaction of seapower, maritime strategy and national policy and 
the influence of each on the other. The purpose of this chapter is to define the 
theoretical basis for this relationship within which to consider the concept of the 
utility of maritime force. This concept is founded on the question: what value do 
armed forces operating at or from the sea have in terms of contributing toward the 
attainment of national political objectives? Professor Geoffrey Till defines 
strategic theory as ‘thinking about strategy, trying to “put it all together” through 
the development of a skein of connected thought about the nature, conduct and 
consequences of naval power’.1 In this context, examining the utility of maritime 
force would provide this ‘skein of connected thought’. This is because, as General 
Sir Rupert Smith states: 
...To apply force with utility implies an understanding of the context in which one 
is acting, a clear definition of the result to be achieved, an identification of the 
point or target to which the force is being applied – and ... an understanding of the 
nature of the force being applied.2 
That is, to determine the utility of maritime force, the nature and conduct of the 
force and the consequences of its use, in relation to an overarching objective and 
the context within which it is operating, require definition. In order to do this, the 
respective meanings of seapower, maritime strategy and national policy require 
examination. In the case of seapower and maritime strategy, their meaning as 
individual concepts needs defining but also their meaning in respect of each other. 
The meaning of national policy, in particular vis-à-vis the concept of grand 
strategy, also requires discussion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Second Edition (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009), p.41.  
2 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin 
Books, 2006), p.6. 
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The term ‘maritime force’ is used in this thesis, as opposed to ‘naval force’; the 
former term is concerned with forces whose primary purpose is the conduct of 
military operations at and from the sea (including warships, submarines, organic 
aircraft, auxiliaries plus shore-based maritime aircraft, aircraft assigned to 
maritime tasks, and batteries) in contrast to the latter which refers to seaborne 
forces (ships, submarines, organic aircraft, etc.).3 This is because the focus for the 
thesis is not on the role, conduct or nature of naval forces. Rather, the focus is on 
the role of the sea as a means by which to utilise the armed instrument in support 
of national objectives; naval forces are a key actor within this but the term 
encompasses the armed forces in general. Further, in referring to the utilisation of 
the armed instrument, this does not refer solely to the use of the sea for combat 
purposes. The literature on seapower refers to a range of non-combat tasks for 
maritime forces including as elements of a politico-diplomatic mechanism;4 a 
means for providing humanitarian and disaster relief;5 and as a means of ensuring 
good order at sea. 6  For example, British Maritime Doctrine divided the 
application of maritime power into three categories; military, constabulary (such 
as peacekeeping and maritime counter-terrorism) and benign (such as search and 
rescue and the provision of military assistance to allies), on the basis of degree, 
and or relevance, of combat power required.7  
This nuanced approach to the understanding of the application of maritime power 
is significant as it sheds light on the broader context within which maritime force 
functions beyond a purely military setting. This is valuable for assessing the wider 
contribution of maritime force to national objectives. It also aids in examining the 
relationship between seapower and maritime strategy; this in turn sets the context 
for evaluating the maritime contribution to national policy. However, in order to 
do this, there needs to be a clear understanding of what is meant by the term 
‘seapower’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 MoD (UK), British Maritime Doctrine (BR1806), Third edition (London: The Stationery Office, 
2004), p.271 and p.277.  
4 For example, see Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1974) and Sir James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: 
Political Applications of Limited Naval Force, Third Edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994).  
5 For example, see Till, Seapower, pp.250-252 and pp.339-340.  
6 For example, see ibid., pp.286-321.  
7 British Maritime Doctrine (BR1806), p.90.   
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Defining Seapower 
In examining the concept of seapower, its constituents and consequences are 
fundamentally a reflection of the nature of broader state power and how it 
interacts with the maritime domain. In his preface and introduction to The 
Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, Alfred Thayer Mahan suggests, 
respectively, sea power to be ‘putting maritime interests in the foreground, 
without divorcing them, however, from their surroundings of cause and effect in 
general history, but seeking to show how they modified the latter, and were 
modified by them’;8 and ‘largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of 
contests between nations, of national rivalries, of violence frequently culminating 
in war’.9 Mahan does not however, explicitly define the term ‘sea power’; the 
meaning has to be inferred from his writing. The above quotations from The 
Influence of Sea Power provide insight into Mahan’s thinking on the nature of 
seapower. In particular, he refers, in the first quotation, to ‘maritime interests’ in a 
general sense, and in the second, his description of the history of seapower as a 
‘narrative of contests between nations’ is akin to realist thinking in international 
relations. This latter point is especially significant as a means of providing insight 
into Mahan’s conception of the international system. Realism is summarised by 
Scott Burchill of Deakin University in the following terms: 
… the world is revealed … as a dangerous and insecure place, where violence is 
regrettable but endemic… realists give high priority to the centrality of the 
nation-state in their considerations, acknowledging it as the supreme political 
authority in the world…. The international realm is characterised by conflict, 
suspicion and competition between nation-states…10 
In this context, a state’s influence, that is, the ability to effect positively or 
negatively other actors’ (such as states, inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organisations) thinking, policies and actions, is, to a significant degree, 
determined by its martial potency. Further, although Mahan refers to national 
rivalries becoming violent and often resulting in war, he does not explicitly define 
seapower as a military concept; the military element of seapower is provided by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (Mineola, New 
York: Dover Books, 1987) [unabridged republication of the fifth edition (1894); originally 
published Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890], p.vi.   
9 Ibid., p.1.  
10 Scott Burchill, ‘Realism and Neo-realism’ in Scott Burchill, et al, Theories of International 
Relations, 2nd Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.70. 
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naval strategy. This, Mahan defines as ‘... for its end to found, support, and 
increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country’.11  
This definition of naval strategy is important as it suggests naval force is an input 
from which seapower emerges as an output. It also raises the broader question of 
what constitutes seapower. Mahan dedicates the first chapter (‘Discussion of the 
Elements of Sea Power’) of The Influence of Sea Power to this question. Three 
key points emerge from this chapter. The first, and a critical component of 
understanding the utility of the maritime environment, is that the sea constitutes a 
means of communication; Mahan describes it as a ‘great highway ... a wide 
common’.12 The latter word is especially valuable with regard to assessing the 
utility of maritime forces. This is because, as a common, the high seas are not 
subject to restriction from a sovereign authority. That is, military forces can 
operate without restriction and the need for host-nation support, over-flight 
permissions, etc.. This is in contrast to land and air forces (with the exception, to 
an extent, of strategic platforms such as long-range bombers)13, which are 
dependent on host-nation support, which even within an established alliance, for 
example NATO, can require protracted negotiation. In this regard, Till cites the 
example of the time taken to deploy tactical airpower in support of operations in 
the Former Yugoslavia in 1992; ten days for an aircraft carrier to take up station 
versus three months for airbases in Italy (a NATO member) to become 
operational.14     
The second key point to emerge is that of the multi-dimensional character of 
seapower. This is evident in Mahan’s six principal conditions influencing the 
seapower of a state: geography; physical conformation; extent of territory; 
population; character of the people (also referred to as national character); and 
character of the government. Of these, within ‘national character’, Mahan states 
‘The tendency to trade, involving of necessity the production of something to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., p.23.  
12 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p.25.  
13 A notable example in this regard is the US Air Force’s use of B-52H, B-1B and B-2A bombers 
in intercontinental sorties from bases in the continental United States in operations against Iraq on 
a number of occasions in the 1990s and Yugoslavia in 1999.  
14 Till, Seapower, p.127.  
 24 
trade with, is the national characteristic most important to the development of sea 
power’.15  
This leads to the third key point of the chapter and The Influence of Sea Power 
more generally, and that is the input of primary importance to seapower is 
economic. In his analysis of Colbert’s reforms of the French State under Louis 
XIV, Mahan refers to Colbert’s policy of developing French productive capacity, 
overseas trade and commerce, and a navy to support French commerce as 
developing ‘the chain of seapower’.16 That is, the basis for naval strength is 
founded upon, to use modern parlance, a developed industrial base and 
international trade. This conception of seapower as a chain is again used in 
reference to its role in developing the wealth of the state: ‘the dual use and control 
of the sea is but one link in the chain of exchange by which wealth accumulates; 
but it is the central link...’17 In this context, the ‘chain’ extends beyond the 
constituents of seapower to include the foundation of state power. This is 
significant and along with Mahan’s analysis of Colbert’s reforms, the rise and fall 
of Dutch maritime strength and the growth of British seapower, the role of 
government in either promoting the growth of, or neglecting seapower is 
emphasised. For example, in concluding his analysis of the impact of Louis XIV’s 
national policy, in particular with regard to his abandonment of Colbert’s policies, 
Mahan states: ‘[The simplicity of form in an absolute monarchy thus brought out 
strongly] how great the influence of government can be upon both the growth and 
the decay of sea power’.18    
In light of the above, a Mahanian definition of seapower would be based on the 
following principles. Maritime interests broadly defined, but focusing particularly 
on its commercial, trade and military aspects, constitute the context for a state’s 
interactions with the sea. The sea constitutes a means of communication, 
especially with regard to the conduct of trade. The conduct of maritime trade 
generates wealth ‘from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully 
springs, and on which it securely rests’.19 This provides the basis for naval 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p.53.  
16 Ibid., p.70.  
17 Ibid., pp.225-226.  
18 Ibid., p.74.  
19 Ibid., p.28.  
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strategy. In addition, a core of natural and human inputs shape the development of 
a state’s seapower, which is itself is an output and can be consciously influenced 
by the conduct of national policy. Finally, seapower is a relative concept: it is a 
component of a state’s wider international position and subject to the influences of 
a dynamic international context. For example, Mahan in The Influence of Sea 
Power examines the evolving European regional system and its implications on 
the seapower of its principal actors in the latter 17th and 18th centuries. 
The above five points provide the contours within which to develop the concept of 
seapower. In varying degrees and forms, the aforementioned characteristics of 
seapower recur subsequently through the literature and shape approaches to the 
application of maritime force. The roles and means by which (to use Mahan’s 
term) naval strategy is applied will be discussed subsequently in this chapter.  
The economic aspect of seapower is centrally placed within Admiral Sergei 
Gorshkov’s The Sea Power of the State. Gorshkov’s definition of seapower is 
illustrative of this: ‘in the definition of the sea power of the state we include as the 
main components possibilities for the state to study (explore) the ocean and 
harness its wealth...’;20 further, he states ‘the character of the use of the ocean and 
the degree of development of these components are ultimately determined by the 
level of economic and social development reached by the state and by the policies 
it pursues’.21  The utility of seapower is defined by Gorshkov as ‘one of the 
important factors for strengthening its economy [the Soviet Union], accelerating 
scientific and technical development and consolidating the economic, political, 
cultural and scientific links [of the Soviet people with the peoples and countries 
friendly to it]’. 22  This quotation highlights two important points. Firstly, it 
emphasises the connection between seapower and economic development, and 
second, the reference to ‘consolidating the economic, political, cultural and 
scientific links’ resonates with Mahan’s invocation of the sea as the central link 
between states. Gorshkov does not ignore the role of naval forces as a component 
of seapower but emphasises the economic foundation for sea-, military and state 
power. Thus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Sergei Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd, 1979), p.1.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid., p.2.  
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It must be regarded primarily as the capacity of the state to place all the resources 
and possibilities offered by the ocean ... and make full use of them to develop the 
economy, the health of which finally determines all facets of the life of our 
country including its defence capability. In this context the concept of sea power 
to a certain degree is identified with the concept of the economic power of the 
state. Accordingly sea power may be regarded as a constituent part of economic 
power ... sea power, mediated by the economy of the state and exerting an 
influence on it, carries within it an economic and military principle.23 
This remains an important point. The development of a state’s instruments of 
power is substantially dependent on its economic capabilities. The principal 
driver, arguably, for the 2010 British Strategic Defence and Security Review was 
that of determining defence requirements within the constraints of a reduced 
economic base and poor public finances.24 This has a concomitant effect on 
British maritime capabilities.25    
The conception of seapower Gorshkov elucidates places it within the broader 
context of state power and national policy. The latter has to be noted albeit against 
the context within which Gorshkov was writing; that is, as a senior member of the 
Soviet elite and thus actively promulgating communism and a high degree of state 
control. This does not detract however, for the most part from Gorshkov’s 
approach to seapower, which is to an extent, similar to that of Mahan.26 It is 
important to note in the last part of the above passage from Gorshkov, the phrase 
describing seapower as: ‘mediated by the economy of the state and exerting an 
influence on it [emphasis added]’. That is, seapower is both influenced by, and is 
an influence on, the trajectory of a state’s national policy.  Mahan, for example, 
highlights the role of the British governing classes in continuing to maintain and 
expand British seapower on the premise that it constituted the basis for British 
national power.27 In other words, a favourable national policy context for the 
development of seapower was in part engendered by the influence of seapower on 
the wealth and power of the state as a whole. Till puts this into the context of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., p.2.  
24 Dr Liam Fox, then Secretary of State for Defence, ‘The Need for Defence Reform’, Speech 
delivered at the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, 13 August 2010, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2010-08-13-the-need-for-defence-reform. Accessed 9 
September 2013. 
25 Jeremy Blackham and Gwyn Prins, ‘Why Things Don’t Happen: Silent Principles of National 
Security’, RUSI Journal, Vol.155, No.4 (August 2010), pp.14-22.  
26 Till in Seapower, p.55, cites a response by Gorshkov to a US admiral’s suggestion that he 
sounded Mahanian in which he said: ‘And why not? The man was eminently sensible’.   
27 Mahan, p.66.  
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‘virtuous maritime circle’ based on maritime trade leading to increased maritime 
resources, leading to increased naval strength, which leads to maritime supremacy 
and thus to more maritime trade, and so on.28    
The notion of a virtuous maritime circle aids in conveying the multifaceted nature 
of seapower. The approach Till employs to the defining of seapower is 
particularly valuable. Till bases his definition on four key attributes of the sea: its 
role as a resource; as a medium of transportation and exchange; as a medium for 
information and the spread of ideas; and as a medium for dominion.29 This has 
continuity with enduring ideas concerning the use of the sea; for example, its role 
as a means of communication, its value in resource terms and its role in 
international competition and confrontation. Notably, only one of the attributes of 
seapower relies on the use of force. Moreover, Till suggests that ‘seapower can 
best be represented as a tight and inseparable system in which naval power 
protects the maritime assets that are the ultimate source of its effectiveness’.30 
This is significant as it links the naval aspect of seapower with the broader 
maritime setting.  This is important because, as Till states: 
‘Maritime’ activity for example is sometimes taken to concern only navies, 
sometimes navies operating in conjunction with the ground and air forces, 
sometimes navies in the broader context of all activities relating to the 
commercial, non-military use of the sea, and sometimes inevitably the word 
‘maritime’ covers all three possibilities!31 
He also suggests the interchangeable usage of ‘maritime power’ and ‘seapower’ to 
‘incorporate naval interactions with the civilian/marine dimension on the one hand 
and with air and ground forces on the other...’32 The emphasis on the maritime 
aspect is to establish the link between the sea and land; that is, seapower is ‘about 
the sea-based capacity to determine events both at sea and on land’.33 Two of the 
four aforementioned attributes of the sea are particularly indicative of this 
maritime approach: the sea as a medium for information and the spread of ideas, 
and as a medium for dominion. This is because to spread ideas to, and or achieve 
dominion over, other peoples requires interaction in one respect or another with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Till, Seapower, p.34.  
29 Ibid., pp.24-31.  
30 Ibid., p.34.  
31 Ibid., p.20.  
32 Ibid., p.23.  
33 Ibid., p.21. 
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those peoples, thus necessitating interaction with the land environment. This 
highlights a key element of Till’s perspective: ‘the real point of seapower is not so 
much what happens at sea, but how that influences the outcome of events on 
land’.34    
The capacity of seapower to influence is inherently multidimensional, for 
example, Till suggests ‘Seapower also includes the non-military aspects of sea use 
(merchant shipping, fishing, marine insurance, shipbuilding and repair and so on) 
since these contribute to naval power and since they can also influence the 
behaviour of other people in their own right’.35 This description of the non-
military components of seapower again emphasises its multifaceted nature and 
varied constituents. Till defines the constituents of seapower as a state’s military 
maritime capabilities, its civilian maritime capabilities plus naval operations and 
commercial operations.36 The distinction between military maritime capabilities 
and naval operations is significant; the former are defined as including ‘navies, 
coast guards ... and, where relevant, the contribution of land and air forces’; 
whereas the latter refers to seaborne operations. This distinction highlights a key 
point made by Till: 
Seapower is not simply about what it takes to use the sea (although that is 
obviously a prerequisite). It is also the capacity to influence the behaviour of 
other people or things by what one does at or from the sea. This approach defines 
seapower in terms of its consequences, its outputs not the inputs, the ends not the 
means.37 
In this context, seapower can be defined both as an input and an output. It is 
however, the latter which is most important; that is, the consequences of its 
application, or the utility of seapower. Further, Till explicitly sets seapower as a 
distinct entity within the broader context of national policy.38  This enables 
seapower to be considered in a holistic sense in relation to national policy, but 
also its specific components (such as military maritime capabilities) as derivatives 
of seapower and their relation to the broader national policy level.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid., p.22.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid., p.21.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., figure 2.1.  
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The reference to two constituents of military seapower – military maritime 
capabilities and naval operations, is in contrast to, for example, Mahan’s single 
naval strategy-based approach. This is because in referring to both naval 
operations and military maritime capabilities as constituting the military 
component of seapower, Till is including the armed forces as a whole, and not just 
naval forces, as forming the state’s military maritime power.39 This approach to 
thinking about the military uses of seapower is a reflection of the influence of Sir 
Julian Corbett. His approach, as defined in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 
delineated the roles of a maritime strategy and a naval strategy: 
The paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual 
relations of your army and navy in a plan of war. When this is done, and not till 
then, naval strategy can begin to work out the manner in which the fleet can best 
discharge the function assigned to it.40  
That is, maritime strategy combines the military maritime capabilities of the state 
with its naval operations; this equates to the military component of seapower. This 
sets maritime strategy within the context of, as defined by Corbett, major strategy: 
Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province the plan 
of the war, and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be 
aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., 
it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces.41 
It also links seapower and maritime strategy to national policy. This is due to 
Corbett’s emphasis on the ‘ulterior object’, that being ‘every operation must be 
regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to 
the end of the campaign or war’.42 This is in contrast to Mahan who was critical of 
the pursuit of ulterior objectives in naval operations,43 and had a more narrowly-
focused naval conception of seapower as opposed to the broader maritime 
perspective of Corbett.44 This difference in emphasis on the ends of seapower is 
significant for both the defining of seapower and the utility of maritime force. 
This is because a key element of defining the utility of force is, to reiterate 
Smith’s point, having ‘a clear definition of the result to be achieved ... and an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid., p.21.  
40 Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (reprinted with ‘Introduction’ by Eric 
Grove (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988)), p.16.  
41 Ibid., p.308.   
42 Ibid., p.307. 
43 See, for example, Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p.537.  
44 Till, Seapower, p.59.  
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understanding of the nature of the force being applied’. In this context, the 
contrasting viewpoints of Mahan and Corbett influence the definition of required 
results and the nature of the force being applied. The following section concerning 
the defining of maritime strategy will examine more closely the differences in 
perspective concerning the naval versus maritime approaches and the implications 
for the application of seapower. 
In light of the above literature survey, seapower can be defined on the basis of the 
following. Seapower is the output derived from the combination of natural, human 
and state-influenced factors that provide the context for the state’s ability to 
exploit the sea in support of national policy objectives. It is based on the economic 
power of the state and that provides the foundation for the development of a 
state’s military maritime capabilities.45 Seapower is derived from the attributes of 
the sea itself;46 in particular, the sea constitutes a means of communication in both 
the tangible (such as tradable goods) and intangible (for example, ideas). This 
provides the means to exert influence. Maritime strategy provides the means to 
apply a state’s military maritime capabilities, in conjunction with the wider 
military capacity of the state, in order to attain national strategic objectives. In 
short, seapower constitutes the state’s capacity and capabilities to utilise the sea in 
its broadest terms in support of national political objectives.   
Defining Maritime Strategy 
In order to set the context for the following discussion, a point of terminology 
requires clarification. This concerns the use of the phrase ‘maritime strategy’. At 
this point, the use of the phrase ‘maritime strategy’ should not be taken as a bias 
towards Corbett’s particular approach. The use of the word ‘maritime’ is to 
establish that the environmental context is ‘of the sea’ but not limited to ‘at sea’. 
The word ‘strategy’ is used to connote, as defined by Captain Sir Basil Liddell 
Hart, ‘The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Correlli Barnett in Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War 
(London: Penguin Books, 2001), p.880, eloquently suggests, using the analogy of a warship, that 
‘A navy is no more than the armour and the weapons-system of seapower. The hull, providing 
essential buoyancy, is the national wealth. The propulsion is commercial and industrial success, 
which creates the national wealth.’   
46 Till, Seapower, p.23.  
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policy’.47 The term ‘maritime strategy’ is used by different authors to convey 
different meanings. For example, Rear Admiral Raja Menon defines ‘maritime 
strategy’ as: 
For countries that are involved in a war in one theatre only – wars in which the 
army, navy and air force are employed as one composite whole – the definition of 
maritime strategy becomes easy. It is the strategy for using an entire navy. Where 
it becomes impossible to use an entire navy and it perforce has to split its forces 
into separate geographic entities, the war is assumed to have separate theatres. 
The use of a navy in a theatre could then also require a maritime strategy.48 
This quotation defines ‘maritime strategy’ as the strategic application of naval 
forces; it does not mention the contribution of relevant land or air forces. Menon 
does subsequently refer to Corbett’s approach to the defining of maritime strategy, 
and uses it as the benchmark for the development of his approach.49 This section 
is thus concerned with how to define ‘maritime strategy’, its relation to seapower, 
and the position of maritime strategy within the wider context of military strategy 
and national policy.    
From the preceding discussion of the constituents of seapower, there emerges a 
point of difference concerning the ends of seapower, that is, a narrowly-focused 
naval conception versus a broader maritime view. In this context, Admiral Sir 
Cyprian Bridge (1839-1924), the second Director of Naval Intelligence in the 
Admiralty and close friend of Professor Sir John Knox Laughton,50 made the 
following significant point: 
Sea power, at any rate in the narrow sense of naval strength, has, as should 
always be remembered, its limits ... Most maritime states are continental and are 
not likely to be conquered unless land forces are used against them ... This brings 
out the importance of including plans for joint expeditions in a scheme of 
belligerent action. The mere act of looking at the problems raised will enforce the 
doctrine that in any great war in which insular and maritime state may be 
involved, co-operation between the land and sea-services must be frequent.51   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 
1967), p. 335 cited in Till, Seapower, p.41. 
48 Rear Admiral Raja Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 
1998), pp.22-23.  
49 Ibid., p.23.  
50 Andrew Lambert, ‘The Development of Education in the Royal Navy: 1854-1914’, in Geoffrey 
Till (ed.) The Development of British Naval Thinking (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp.34-59, 
specifically, p.48. 
51 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, The Art of Naval Warfare (London: Smith, Elder, 1907), cited in 
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Naval Thinking, pp.60-88, specifically p.72.  
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This quotation is notable in two respects. First, Admiral Bridge distinguishes 
between ‘maritime’ and ‘insular’ states. This is interesting as an ‘insular’, or 
island, state is a ‘maritime’ state, but Bridge states ‘most maritime states are 
continental’; this would thus add an additional distinction between a ‘maritime’ 
power such as France and an ‘insular’ power such as Great Britain. The French 
naval officer and thinker Admiral Raoul Castex (1878-1968) also differentiated 
between ‘an island or semi-insular belligerent’, and Eugenia Kiesling, the editor 
and translator of Castex’s principal five-volume work Théories stratégiques 
(Strategic Theories), notes that Castex ‘several times repeats this typology of 
island, coastal, and continental states’ within his analysis of the defining of 
command of the sea.52    
Second, it is also in distinct contrast to the perspective of Mahan; ‘the sphere of 
the fleet is on the open sea, its object offence rather than defence, its objective the 
enemy’s shipping wherever it can be found’.53 That is, Mahan advocated a blue-
water approach that placed naval power at the centre of seapower, and as 
previously mentioned, defined the military element of seapower as naval strategy. 
The core aim of naval power was to attain command of the sea: ‘Control of the sea 
by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means a predominant influence in 
the world ... [and] is the chief among the merely material elements in the power 
and prosperity of nations’.54 Mahan’s aforementioned criticism of ulterior objects 
in naval operations was based on his emphasis on securing military command of 
the sea as the prerequisite to follow-on operations. For example, in the context of 
the value of commerce-raiding, Mahan states: ‘Only by military command of the 
sea by prolonged control of the strategic centres of commerce, can such an attack 
be fatal; and such control can be wrung from a powerful navy only by fighting and 
overcoming it’.55 Mahan does not ignore the influence of seapower upon the land, 
but at the same time does not explicitly examine or describe the link between 
success (or failure) at sea and success (or failure) on land. He alludes to, in The 
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, the British naval weakness in the American 	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1994), p.41.   
53 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p.453.  
54 Cited in Till, Seapower, p.52.  
55 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, pp.539-540.  
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War of Independence and its implications for the Yorktown campaign, implying 
that French control of the sea around the American eastern seaboard denied an 
effective British use of seapower to aid the campaign onshore, for example, via 
the relief of Cornwallis’s besieged force at Yorktown.56 The implications of this 
failure - the defeat of the British force at Yorktown, were the loss of the American 
colonies.   
Corbett, in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, does explicitly establish the 
linkage between seapower and the land: 
Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations 
at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases – either by what your 
army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of 
what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.57 
However, Corbett in this quotation, arguably, understates the importance of action 
at sea. This is because Corbett emphasises the role of the land environment in 
attaining strategic effect and the role of maritime forces as, at most, aiding in 
creating a more favourable situation for ground forces to operate within. This does 
not explicitly consider the potential strategic impact of decisive action at sea and 
its influence on the wider politico-strategic situation, including perceptions on the 
course of the conflict.  This resonates with Mahan’s analysis of the Yorktown 
campaign. The Royal Navy was, due to its relative weakness at sea, prevented 
from providing or enabling support from the sea to the army ashore; it also 
permitted the provision of French support, both material and political, to the 
American revolutionary forces.  
In marked contrast to Mahan, Corbett emphasises a nuanced, pragmatic approach 
to the conduct of maritime operations. On the subject of command of the sea, 
Corbett states:  
It may be that the command of the sea is of so urgent an importance that the army 
will have to devote itself to assisting the fleet in its special task before it can act 
directly against the enemy’s territory and land forces; on the other hand, it may be 
that the immediate duty of the fleet will be to forward military action ashore 
before it is free to devote itself whole-heartedly to the destruction of the enemy’s 
fleets.58   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid., pp.388-400. 
57 Corbett, Some Principles, p.16.  
58 Ibid.   
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Corbett’s flexible mind-set is based on his perspective, particularly influenced by 
Clausewitz, that force is a means to an ends, the ends being a national policy 
objective: war being described as ‘an exertion of violence to secure a political end 
which we desire to attain...’59 Corbett’s notion of command of the sea is also more 
nuanced and relative than that of Mahan: ‘Command of the sea, therefore, means 
nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or 
military purposes’.60 Furthermore, command of the sea can be general (akin to the 
Mahanian conception) or local; the latter is significant because, as Corbett 
elucidates with regard to the nature of maritime communications: 
At sea the communications are, for the most part, common to both belligerents ... 
The strategical effect is of far-reaching importance, for it means that at sea 
strategical offence and defence tend to merge ... Since maritime communications 
are common, we as a rule cannot attack those of the enemy without defending our 
own.61 
Corbett cites the example of US strategy against Cuba in the Spanish-American 
War of 1898 to illustrate the ‘evil influence’ of pursuing decisive battle as the 
prerequisite to all other maritime operations. In this example, Corbett highlights 
that the US possessed ‘ample naval force to secure such a local and temporary 
command of the Gulf of Mexico’ as to allow the US to safely undertake an 
expedition against Cuba and maintain communications with the force once 
deployed.62 However, due to the presence of an undefeated Spanish fleet at sea, 
the US hesitated and nearly failed (for further discussion of a ‘fleet in being’ see 
chapter two, pages 64 to 65). In this regard, Corbett is highlighting the merging of 
the strategic offence and defence. That is, the act of undertaking a strategic 
offensive (the despatch of an expeditionary force) combined with the defence of 
that force (protecting its sea lines-of-communication), is sufficient to attain a 
requisite level of local command vis-à-vis the adversary.    
To illustrate a variant of this approach, Corbett cites the example of Japanese 
maritime operations in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, where Japan 
undertook an amphibious operation against Korea despite the presence of an 
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61 Ibid., p.100.  
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undefeated Russian fleet in the theatre of operations.63 Corbett suggests that the 
Japanese were content to proceed even though they did not possess sufficient 
command to cover their entire line of communication but were of sufficiently 
strength to deny the adversary effective control.64 In this context, the Japanese 
fleet possessed a degree of local command sufficient to exert (in modern 
terminology) sea denial, that is, ‘the condition short of full sea control that exists 
when an opponent is prevented from using an area of sea for his purposes’.65  
The term Gorshkov attributes to Soviet naval thinking of the 1930s regarding ‘sea 
dominance’ is useful in this regard. This term, ‘favourable operational regime’ 
was taken to mean ‘the conditions promoting successful solution of the tasks set 
before the fleet’.66 This notion of creating a favourable operational regime follows 
in a similar vein to Corbett’s thinking and stresses the use of seapower as a means 
to achieving a certain ends. Regarding Soviet naval thinking, Gorshkov stated:   
It always saw the gaining of dominance at sea not as an end in itself but merely a 
way of creating certain conditions enabling the forces and resources of the fleet to 
solve successfully particular tasks in specific areas of the theatre in a defined 
period of time.67  
The definition of maritime communications forwarded by Corbett, and the Soviet 
notion of a favourable operational regime, focuses on the notion of attaining 
control of maritime communications to enable the exploitation of those 
communications for another purpose. Corbett put it thus:  
Naval warfare does not begin and end with the destruction of the enemy’s battle-
fleet, nor even with breaking his cruiser power ... We are concerned with the 
exercise of command. We are using the sea, or interfering with its use by the 
enemy...68  
This highlights the key difference between the narrower, Mahanian naval 
perspective vis-à-vis the maritime perspective of Corbett. Mahan’s emphasis is on 
fighting the enemy at sea and destroying his shipping; securing command of the 
sea is the ends for Mahanian naval strategy, the purpose of which is the expansion 
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67 Ibid.  
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of a state’s power at sea.69 In contrast, Corbett emphasises using the sea as a 
means to an end. This focuses on securing and exploiting control of maritime 
communications as a means by which to influence the wider military-strategic 
situation.  
To an extent, the differences between Mahan and Corbett are, an issue of 
emphasis. As Till states:  
It is important, however, not to exaggerate the extent of Corbett’s scepticism 
about ‘command of the sea’ and ‘decisive battle’. He acknowledged that the 
concerted pursuit of these two central objectives of ‘Mahanian’ maritime strategy 
was usually valid. It was only his willingness to say that sometimes it might not 
be that got him into trouble...70   
The trouble Till refers to was a significant disagreement with Corbett’s 
perspective on the importance of attaining command through battle from some 
quarters within the Admiralty. In this regard, Till cites the note inserted by the 
Admiralty Board into the final volume of Corbett’s account of the Battle of 
Jutland in the semi-official History of the First World War stating:  
Their Lordships find that some of the principles advocated in the book, especially 
the tendency to minimise the importance of seeking battle and of forcing it to a 
conclusion, are directly in conflict with their views.71 
This difference is based on Corbett’s aforementioned flexible mind-set and 
emphasis on the maritime dimension of warfare, whereby naval strategy is 
considered alongside land strategy in the context of the political aims determining 
the application of force. Corbett defined naval strategy as ‘... that part of it which 
determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined 
what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces...’; and 
maritime strategy itself is defined succinctly as ‘the principles which govern a war 
in which the sea is a substantial factor’.72 The consideration of sea- and land 
power together and in the context of wider policy aims is significant for as Major 
General Sir Charles Callwell elucidated: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p.23.  
70 Till, Seapower, p.62. 
71 Till, ‘Richmond and the Faith Reaffirmed: British Naval Thinking between the Wars’ in Till 
(ed.), The Development of British Thinking, pp.103-133, quotation, p.114. 
72 Corbett, Some Principles, p.15. 
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There is an intimate connection between command of the sea and control of the 
shore. But if the strategical principles involved in this connection are to be put in 
force to their full extent, if the whole of the machinery is to be set in motion, 
there must be co-ordination of authority and there must be harmony in the council 
chambers and in the theatre of operations...73    
This relates back to Smith’s definition of the utility of force and his emphasis on 
understanding the context, target and intended result regarding its use. Corbett 
said in this regard; ‘In short, the Staff must ask of them [Ministers of State] what 
is the policy which your diplomacy is pursuing, and where, and why, do you 
expect it to break down and force you to take up arms?’74 As discussed in the 
preceding section, seapower constitutes a distinct entity within the broader 
configuration of national power, encompassing the maritime elements of the 
economic and military instruments of power. Thus, the strategic application of 
seapower broadly defined ideally requires coordination at the national political 
level. The military application of seapower, that is, the conduct of naval and or 
wider maritime operations, could be coordinated at the lower military operational 
level for the purposes of a particular campaign or operation, albeit with an eye on 
the national policy level. In this context, Corbett explained: 
We require for the guidance of our naval policy and naval action something of 
wider vision than the current conception of naval strategy, something that will 
keep before our eyes not merely the enemy’s fleets or the great routes of 
commerce, or the command of the sea, but also the relations of naval policy and 
action to the whole area of diplomatic and military effort.75          
That is, a Maritime Strategy. The relationship between naval strategy and a 
maritime strategy can be explained using Corbett’s differentiation between minor 
and major strategy. Minor strategy thus: 
 
... Has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with - (1) The selection of 
the “objectives”, that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical 
points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation. (2) 
The directing of the force assigned for the operation.76   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Major General Sir Charles Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their 
Relation and Interdependence (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) cited in Till, ‘Corbett and 
the Emergence of a British School?’ p.73.  
74 Corbett, Some Principles, p.18.  
75 Sir Julian Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War: A Study in Combined Strategy, Volume 1, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [reprint of the original Longmans, Green, and Co. 
1907 edition], p.5. 
76 Corbett, Some Principles, p. 308. This quotation is from the ‘Green Pamphlet’ – ‘Strategical 
Terms and Definitions used in Lectures on Naval History’ and was issued to students attending 
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Minor strategy can be naval (the objective is to be attained by the fleet); military 
(to be attained by the army); or combined (army and navy operating jointly). In 
contrast, major strategy: 
In its broadest sense has also to deal with the whole resources of the nation for 
war. It is a branch of statesmanship. It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one 
force, to be handled together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep 
in view constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which 
depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and financial 
position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained).77 
This distinction is of major importance, in particular with regard to the defining 
and formulation of a maritime strategy. The above definition of minor strategy 
places it, within the levels of war, between the operational78  and military-
strategic79 levels due to its focus on the objective(s) and planning of an operation 
and the direction of the force assigned to it. Thus, although Corbett refers to minor 
strategy as being potentially combined (or joint, to use the modern lexicon), this 
would not be a maritime strategy per se, but would rather be a strategy concerning 
the employment of maritime forces alongside other military forces. This is 
because a Maritime Strategy is defined in the context of relating the application of 
military force, alongside the other instruments of state power, to national policy. 
This is the domain of major strategy. The aim of minor strategy is to attain an 
‘immediate object’ which are ‘the ends of particular operations or movements’ 
and contribute to the attainment of ulterior objectives;80 the attainment of ulterior 
objects (the overall objective) is the aim of major strategy. Proceeding from this, 
major strategy is to an extent, equivalent to the national military strategy of a 
state. This was defined in British Defence Doctrine as: 
Strategy is particularly concerned with the political consequences and advantages 
of the threat and use of force; it gives meaning and context to all operational and 
tactical actions. Its purpose is to balance the ways and means required to achieve 
stipulated ends, conditioned by the environment and prospective opponents. 
Military strategy links political aspiration, expressed in Government policy, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Corbett’s lectures at the Royal Naval War College before the First World War. See ibid., pp.305-
306 for Professor Eric Grove’s note on the pamphlet, and pp.307-345 for the pamphlet itself.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Defined as ‘the level at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained, to accomplish 
strategic objectives and synchronize action, within theatres or areas of operation’. MoD (UK), 
British Defence Doctrine (JDP 0-01), Third Edition, 2008, p.38.  
79 Defined as being ‘concerned with the allocation, prioritization and balancing of military 
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80 Corbett, Some Principles, p.307.  
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military feasibility. It is derived from national strategy and determines how the 
Armed Forces should be configured and employed, in conjunction with the other 
instruments of national power, to achieve favourable outcomes.81 
Rear Admiral Raja Menon, proceeding from Corbett’s definition of major 
strategy, states with regard to defining a Maritime Strategy: ‘we may conclude 
that the benchmark of acceptance for any maritime strategy is that it must affect 
the national political purpose’.82 Using this quotation and the above definitions of 
national military strategy and major strategy, a Maritime Strategy can be defined 
as a maritime approach to national military strategy. This is because the definition 
of military strategy in British Defence Doctrine, in particular with regard to the 
point ‘[military strategy] is derived from national strategy and determines how the 
Armed Forces should be configured and employed, in conjunction with the other 
instruments of national power...’, corresponds with the parameters of maritime 
strategy. That is, both focus on the role and application of the armed forces as a 
single instrument, alongside the other instruments of power and in relation to the 
national policy goals of the state. Further, both national military strategy and 
Corbett’s approach to maritime strategy are concerned with the allocation, 
prioritisation and balancing of military resources. In this regard, Corbett states:  
... Embracing them [naval and minor military strategy] both is a larger strategy 
which regards the fleet and army as one weapon, which co-ordinates their action, 
and indicates the lines on which each must move to realise the full power of both. 
It will direct us to assign to each its proper function in a plan of war; it will enable 
each service to realise the better the limitations and the possibilities of the 
function with which it is charged, and how and when its own necessities must 
give way to a higher or more pressing need of the other.83 
This constitutes the basis for a Corbettian maritime strategy, and effectively 
equates a Maritime Strategy to national military strategy. Thus, a Maritime 
Strategy constitutes more than the strategic application of seapower: it serves as 
the basis for a distinct approach to the development and employment of a state’s 
armed forces. This does not mean that naval power would constitute the core 
determinant of a state’s military power; Corbett stresses that the land constitutes 
the ultimate deciding point of conflict; rather, a Maritime Strategy would use the 
attributes of seapower and the maritime capabilities of the state, as the major 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 MoD (UK), British Defence Doctrine, p.15. 
82 Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars, p.23.  
83 Corbett, Some Principles, pp.10-11.  
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shaping influence on its wider military posture. This is in contrast to ‘maritime 
strategy’ which focuses on the utilisation of maritime forces alongside military 
strategy and air strategy. Further, this conception of a maritime strategy, in 
particular with regard to ‘each must move to realise the full power of both’ 
provides the context for referring to the role of the other services in contributing to 
the development and enhancement of seapower; what Till refers to as ‘seapower 
by other means’.84 For example, the maritime geography of a state – a constituent 
of seapower - could be significantly influenced via the advance or retreat of its 
army; the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on Russian access to 
particularly the Baltic and Black Seas is indicative of this.  
From the preceding discussion, it is however also discernible that the term 
‘maritime strategy’, as alluded to in the introduction to this section, can be used to 
convey different meanings. Table one provides a brief summary of the three 
principal military uses of ‘maritime strategy’. Till includes in his constituents of 
seapower, a state’s civilian maritime capabilities and commercial operations;85 it 
would thus be possible to conceive of a civilian ‘maritime economic strategy’ 
relating national economic policy objectives to maritime industrial and 
commercial means.  
The applicability of a maritime strategy is not limited to only those states that 
would be commonly defined as ‘maritime’; as the aforementioned quotation from 
Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge states, most maritime states are also continental. 
Thus, could a basically land-oriented state have a maritime strategy? Russia, 
traditionally perceived as a continental power, provides an example of a state with 
maritime strategy-based influences at the service, operational, military strategic 
and, to an extent, grand strategic levels. Russia has a grand strategic level 
maritime doctrine; naval development is increasingly set in a broader maritime 
context; wider military strategy incorporates some maritime influences (in 
particular concerning naval and air force strategic aviation cooperation); and the 
increasing importance of the Arctic to Russian national policy is significantly 
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85 Ibid., p.21, figure 2.1.  
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based on maritime interests.86 However, despite the naval component accounting 
for 40 per cent of the total defence budget,87 Russia does not have a Maritime 
Strategy as the maritime dimension does not constitute the determining factor in 
Russian grand strategy.   
 






The utilisation of the attributes of 
seapower and the maritime capabilities of 
the state as a major shaping influence on 
the development and employment of its 
armed forces. 
The Corbettian conception of 
maritime strategy (Some 




The utilisation of a maritime approach to 
the planning and conduct of a campaign 
or major operation. 
Operation Corporate: the 
British campaign to liberate 
its South Atlantic territories 
in 1982.  
Service-level 
‘maritime strategy’ 
The utilisation of a maritime approach to 
the defining and formulation of an 
individual armed service’s strategy for 
development and employment.  
Contemporary British Naval 
Service strategy as expressed 
in British Maritime Doctrine.  
Table 1. The Uses of 'Maritime Strategy'  
Finally, the possession of significant maritime forces does not inherently mean the 
state will have a Maritime Strategy. It may be that the overarching national policy 
objectives of the state, including non-military factors such as diplomatic 
considerations, point to an alternative military strategic approach. For example, 
despite possessing a maritime preponderance, the Allies in the First World War 
were guided by a continental strategy focusing on the Western Front as the 
principal area for military operations against Imperial Germany.88 This is not to 
say that the Allies did not utilise maritime strategy for the development, 
deployment and employment of their maritime forces but that the principal 
shaping influence on the conduct of the war as a whole was land-centric.       
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87 Ibid., p.32.  
88 Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars, pp.59-61.  
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In order to conclude this section, a definition of maritime strategy is required. At 
the start of this section, a working definition was suggested combining the 
meanings of the two component parts; maritime being ‘of the sea’ and strategy 
being, as suggested by Liddell Hart, ‘The art of distributing and applying military 
means to fulfil the ends of policy’. The subsequent examination of the literature 
on maritime strategy has endeavoured to convey the debate on what constitutes 
maritime strategy; in particular whether to conceive of it in a narrower naval sense 
or broader maritime sense. Further, maritime strategy can be defined at differing 
levels within the hierarchy of strategy and the levels of war. However, Corbett, 
although analysing the various facets of naval and maritime operations, the role of 
strategy in relation to policy and differentiating between the levels of strategy and 
their relation to the strategic requirements of a maritime power, does offer a 
fundamentally clear and concise definition of maritime strategy: ‘By maritime 
strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a 
substantial factor’.89 For the purposes of this thesis, the utility of a maritime 
approach to British national military strategy (that is, maritime strategy at the 
military-strategic level) is the principal focus for analysis.    
National Policy, Grand Strategy and Seapower 
A core tenet of the literature on maritime strategy and one emphasised in the 
preceding discussion, is the importance of national policy in the development of 
maritime strategy. This is to provide an overarching context for the formulation of 
strategy and ensure that the employment of armed force is consciously related to 
the attainment of defined national policy objectives. National policy provides the 
rationale for employing force, as Smith states: 
Military force when employed has only two immediate effects: it kills people and 
destroys things. Whether or not this death and destruction serve to achieve the 
overarching or political purpose the force was intended to achieve depends on 
the choice of targets or objectives, all within the broader context of the operation. 
That is the true measure of its utility.90 
Commodore Steve Jermy, Royal Navy (retired), a former Strategy Director at the 
British Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, suggests the following definition of 
policy: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Corbett, Some Principles, p.15. 
90 Smith, Utility of Force, p.6. Emphasis added. 
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A government’s (or an organization’s) formed position on an issue, situation or 
problem, including what political objective the government seeks to achieve, 
what resources it is prepared to commit to the pursuit of that objective and what 
course of action it intends to follow... policy is how a government approaches an 
issue in terms of ways, ends and means... strategy is the ways component of that 
policy...What ways should we employ to deliver the ends that our policy seeks 
within the means that our policy has allocated?91 
This definition is valuable as it provides a framework within which the links 
between national policy, grand strategy and (an) instrument(s) of state power (for 
example, seapower) can be understood. It also indicates the importance of the 
political dimension to the formulation of strategy; that is, foreign policy provides 
the aims and trajectory from which the requirements and objectives for defence 
policy and strategy are deduced.92  
In this regard, Castex suggests the following questions for relating the formulation 
of strategy to the foreign and wider national policy objectives of the state: 
What are France’s interests? What is the best direction in which to focus French 
effort? How should we pursue our historic development and the work of our 
predecessors? Where should we struggle for profit, to improve the present 
situation? Where, on the other hand, should we resist to conserve what we have? 
Whence are the mostly dangerous threats likely to come? To what attacks are we 
particularly exposed? What should we do to meet our needs, be they positive or 
negative, expansionist or conservative? What specific plans stem from these 
needs? What are the appropriate political, military, maritime, colonial, economic, 
moral, etc., plans for the situation?93   
This quotation is significant as it seeks to link fundamental national policy 
objectives (what is/are the national interest(s)?), political, economic and military 
strategic factors and the formulation of specific plans of action deriving from the 
answers to the preceding questions. Castex seeks to establish the framework 
within which core national objectives and the means to attain them can be 
identified and favourable outcomes achieved.  
The importance of the link between the political dimension and the use of the 
force is explained by Edward Luttwak in The Political Uses of Sea Power: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Steven Jermy, Strategy for Action: Using Force Wisely in the 21st Century (London: Knightstone 
Publishing Ltd, 2011), p.18.     
92 Interview with Commodore Steve Jermy, London, 9 March 2011. See also Till, Seapower, p.21, 
figure 2.1 for a diagrammatic articulation of the setting for seapower in the context of the wider 
policy-strategy relationship.  
93 Castex, Theories Strategiques, pp.252-253. Emphasis added. For contemporary circumstances, 
perhaps ‘colonial’ factors should be replaced with ‘alliance’.  
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It is only a continuous re-evaluation of the political goals pursued which can 
make warfare a rational activity, in the formal sense of ends-means alignment; 
and second, that if the political dimension of war is not accorded an overriding 
priority, the use of force will often be ineffectual, and may even be perverted to 
the advantage of the very enemy against whom force was applied in the first 
place.94  
The importance of the political dimension is even more pronounced with regard to 
the application of limited force in contingencies other than, or short of war. Sir 
James Cable, a former British diplomat and a leading maritime strategic thinker of 
the late 20th century, emphasises the difference between the use of force as an act 
of war and the use of limited force as an element of coercive diplomacy. An act of 
war is defined as: 
... The use of armed force against or in a foreign state for the primary purpose of 
injuring that state, whether as part of an existing policy of injuring the other state 
as and when opportunity serves, or to initiate such a policy, or and this is a new 
and important point, without regard to the risk that the reaction of the victim state 
will go beyond mere self-defence to a reciprocal adoption of injury rather than 
profit as the prime motive for policy.95 
In contrast, Cable defines an act of coercive diplomacy as: 
Intended to secure some specific advantage from another state and forfeits its 
diplomatic character if it either contemplates the infliction of injury unrelated to 
obtaining that advantage or results in the victim attempting the infliction of injury 
after the original objective has been either achieved or abandoned. Coercive 
diplomacy is thus an alternative to war and, if it leads to war, we must not only 
hold that it has failed: we may even doubt whether it ever deserved that name.96 
That is, coercive diplomacy is an avowedly limited use of force for limited 
specific objectives. This is put into the maritime context by Cable as the basis for 
his definition of gunboat diplomacy: 
Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as 
an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the 
furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the 
territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.97 
Cable explicitly defines limited naval force as being a political instrument: ‘The 
purpose ... is to consider ... applications of limited naval force as one of the 
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96 Ibid., pp.12-13. Emphasis added. 
97 Ibid., p.14.  
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instruments of foreign policy’.98 In this context, the elucidation of a clear political 
objective is particularly important as the use of force is being contemplated, not as 
a component of a state’s military strategy but as an element of its foreign policy.      
Smith suggests in a similar vein: 
Without an aim firmly linked to the political purpose it is difficult to use force to 
advantage, because the commander does not know what outcome or effect must 
be achieved in order to support the achievement of the overall political purpose.99 
The determining of outcomes is, as Corbett stated ‘questions which lie in the lap 
of Ministers charged with the foreign policy of the country’,100 that is, national 
policy provides the rationale for the use of force – it provides the aim governing 
the application of force. The aim provides the basis from which to derive 
objectives at the strategic level, from which operational and tactical objectives are 
developed.  
This was alluded to by Corbett in his definition of major strategy, where he refers 
to the ‘politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective 
action of the instrument)’. In the preceding discussion, major strategy was 
considered in the context of the defining and placing of maritime strategy within 
the hierarchy of strategy. However, in his definition of major strategy, Corbett 
describes it as being, in its broadest terms, concerned with the whole resources of 
the state for war and a branch of statesmanship. This links major strategy to the 
concept of grand strategy. Professor Edward Mead Earle (1894-1954), principally 
associated with the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University,101 
defined the latter as: 
Strategy, therefore, is not merely a conception of wartime, but is an inherent 
element of statecraft at all times ... In the present-day world, then, strategy is the 
art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation – or a coalition of nations 
– including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests should be effectively 
promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. The 
highest form of strategy – sometimes called grand strategy – is that which so 
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integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that resort to war is either 
rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.102 
The concept of grand strategy is interesting as it contains synergies with ideas 
developed by both Mahan and Corbett, including for example; the former’s six 
principles influencing a state’s seapower (encompassing the resources of a 
nation); and the latter’s thinking on the nature of strategy and the links between 
policy and strategy (in particular regarding major strategy). In addition, Till 
suggests ‘Seapower is clearly a larger concept than landpower or airpower, neither 
of which encompasses the geo-economic dimensions of human activity to the 
extent that seapower does’103. As discussed in the preceding sections, Mahan, 
Gorshkov and Till stress the economic basis for seapower, and Corbett in his 
definition of major strategy refers to the ‘commercial and financial position’ of the 
state ‘by which the energy for working the instrument [the armed forces] is 
maintained’. This points to a potential synergy with grand strategy.  
Professor Sir Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford 
University, with regard to Mahan’s concept of seapower, refers to ‘a symbiotic 
link between sea power, liberal democracy and ideas of grand strategy. All three 
elements seemed to have been required to achieve synergy...’104 The reference to 
liberal democracy warrants further discussion. As defined by Mahan, the character 
of the people constitutes a key component of seapower and thus the style of 
government of the state itself constitutes a potentially critically factor in the 
development of seapower. Till summarises the argument thus: 
Seafaring and trade produce merchants. Merchants accumulate wealth and 
political power in order to defend and develop it. Often they will prevail in 
government, and enforce their ideas on others. These are the ideas that 
encouraged trade in the first place: freedom of information and therefore of 
opinion, open and responsive government, fair taxation, social enterprise – all the 
liberal values so familiar today.105  
Till adds, citing Professor Nicholas Rodger, Senior Research Fellow at All Soul’s 
College, Oxford;  	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Navies need consensus because they require the maximum involvement of 
seafarers, shipowners, urban merchants, financiers and investors. Autocracies 
manage armies well enough, because that is much more a matter of simply 
mobilising manpower and the equipment it needs.106  
However, Till also highlights two caveats: 
... It seems not so much to be a question of whether government and society are 
democratic and libertarian, as to whether they are efficient. Mahan himself, no 
great democrat, was worried that government by the people for the people would 
rather spend its money on things other than defence ... Moreover, some of the 
most effective navies in history have emerged from countries and regimes hardly 
noted for their adherence to democratic principles ... The German Kriegsmarine 
of the Second World War ... was highly committed and, given its circumstances, 
very effective even though it operated in perhaps the most barbarous of all 
modern dictatorships.107  
Till concludes by stating: 
To summarise, it is not liberalism and democratic principles in themselves that 
were, and are, decisive in the long-term development of seapower, but rather 
administrative efficiency in raising money and other resources, and in spending it 
wisely. But, as a very general rule, these qualities do seem to have been 
particularly associated with freer, stable, more mercantile-styles of society and 
government.108 
In this context, the relationship that Strachan describes between seapower, liberal 
democracy and grand strategy can be deduced: that is, seapower requires a system 
of governance that is administratively efficient and conducive to the development 
of trade and a wider maritime community (the associated land-based support 
structures, for example, shipowners, insurance, etc.).109 Furthermore, seapower is 
not restricted to one component of a state’s power – it is a factor in the three 
principal instruments – economic, military and politico-diplomatic – thus its 
effective utilisation is arguably inherently synergistic with the comprehensive 
approach to the use of state power covered by grand strategy. This is not to equate 
seapower to grand strategy. Seapower is a holistic conception of the state’s ability 
to exploit the sea as a means toward the attainment of national objectives; whereas 
grand strategy seeks to control and utilise the whole range of the instruments of 
state power to fulfil national objectives.  
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The relationship between grand strategy and seapower can be interpreted using the 
general parameters of the minor-major strategy relationship as elucidated by 
Corbett. That is, minor strategy is concerned with the planning of operations, the 
selection of objectives and the direction of the assigned force; and major strategy 
is concerned with the national-level primary objective and selection of the force to 
be utilised. In the context of the seapower-grand strategy synergy, seapower could 
be viewed as a form of minor strategy, concerned with the ‘operationalising’ of a 
state’s maritime capabilities (or an aspect thereof); whilst grand strategy would be 
concerned with the national objective and the selection of the instrument of power 
to be utilised (or combination thereof). This would thus enable, for example, the 
political application of seapower to be analysed vis-à-vis a grand strategic 
objective. In essence, the maritime capabilities encompassed by seapower provide 
‘ways’, grand strategy sets the desired ‘ends’ derived from national policy, from 
which the ‘means’ can be selected. In the context of the military application of 
seapower, the preceding discussion of maritime strategy indicates a potential 
means (thereby linking the ways and ends).  
The concept of a ‘British Way in Warfare’ provides an example of the conceived 
application of seapower at the grand strategic level. Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart 
developed the ‘British Way in Warfare’ as a generalised approach to British grand 
strategy based on his reading of history from the Elizabethan period. This was first 
promulgated in an address to the Royal United Services Institute in 1931110 and 
subsequently published in a book entitled The British Way in Warfare.111 Liddell 
Hart defined the British approach to warfare on the basis of: 
Our historic practice, as we have seen, was based on economic pressure exercised 
through sea-power. This naval body had two arms; one financial, which embraced 
the subsidising and military provisioning of allies; the other military, which 
embraced sea-borne expeditions against the enemy’s vulnerable extremities.112 
The application of seapower forms the core principle of Liddell Hart’s concept of 
the ‘British Way in Warfare’. Till summarises Liddell Hart’s concept and this 
points to the influence of seapower: 
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! The importance of securing command of the sea; 
! The effectiveness of sea-based economic pressure; 
! The need to avoid Continental commitments while securing the aid of allied   
landpowers; 
! Generous expenditure on the Navy; 
! A focus on maritime areas of operation; 
! Developing synergy between the Army and the Navy; 
! The value of expeditionary operations; 
! Limited, modest objectives, cost-effectively sustainable; 
! The need to project power ashore.113 
This approach combined the utilisation of the economic power, a military strategy 
focusing on maritime power projection, and the securing of allies to undertake 
continental operations, that is, the use of the politico-diplomatic instrument. 
Liddell Hart was motivated to develop the notion of a ‘British Way in Warfare’ 
emphasising a maritime strategic approach as an alternative to continental 
operations due to his opposition to mass mobilisation and the slaughter of the 
Western Front in the First World War.114 However, David French, an eminent 
British military historian, in The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000 demonstrates 
that contrary to Liddell Hart’s analysis, the continental commitment of the First 
World War did not mark a significant departure for British strategy; Britain had 
been substantially engaged in Europe since the late 17th century and by virtue of 
the Indian Empire was also a continental power.115 Conversely, an alternative to 
the ‘British Way in Warfare’ advocated by G. S. Graham, Professor Sir Michael 
Howard and Professor Paul Kennedy, combining elements of the maritime case 
and a recognition of the weakness of naval power operating in isolation against a 
continental power, termed by French the ‘mixed paradigm’116 did not constitute a 
more appropriate conception of British strategy. French suggests thus: 
Throughout the period examined by this book [1688-1989] British policy-makers 
did not consistently prefer isolation to engagement in Europe in peacetime nor in 
wartime did they consistently adopt either the “British way in warfare” or the 
mixed paradigm outlined in the Introduction.117    
The concept of a ‘British Way in Warfare’ is nonetheless valuable as it provides a 
framework within which to analyse the interaction of seapower and maritime 
strategy at the grand strategic level. It also, by broaching the question of a ‘British 	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Way in Warfare’, establishes the basis from which the particular influence and 
implications of national strategic culture and perspective can be incorporated into 
the analysis of strategy. Correlli Barnett, a former keeper of the Churchill 
Archives and military historian, suggests that national power and the constituents 
of ‘total strategy’: 
... By no means consists only in its armed forces, but also in its economic and 
technological resources; in the dexterity, foresight and resolution with which its 
foreign policy is conducted; in the efficiency of its social and political skills, 
energy, ambition, discipline, initiative; their beliefs, myths and illusions... [and] 
the way all these factors are related to one another ... National power has to be 
considered not only in itself ... but relative to the state’s foreign or imperial 
obligations ... relative to the power of other states.118  
This quotation includes reference to the aforementioned importance of economic 
factors and foreign policy alongside the military instrument in the composition of 
state power but also significantly, refers explicitly to the relevance of ‘beliefs, 
myths and illusions’. This adds a valuable component to the analysis of strategy; 
that is, an enhanced understanding of the specific national context within which 
strategy development is undertaken. Professor Colin Gray, Director of the Centre 
for Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, states with regard to the 
interaction of sea, land and air power at the grand strategic level: 
Sea power, land power, and air power are partners rather than foes. Each needs 
the others if success in war is to be achieved. And they are always specific to 
country, strategic context, and tactical feasibility. Sea power ever is about the 
performance of particular missions in particular places with an actual quantity 
and quality of force and ancillary services, in face of a particular enemy.119   
In this regard, the value of examining the connection between national policy, 
grand strategy and seapower is to establish the context within which maritime 
force functions, and contributes toward the attainment of national objectives. 
From this, the utility of maritime force can be assessed, thus aiding in the design 
and formulation of potential maritime strategies in light of the specific factors 
pertaining to ‘country, [and] strategic context’.      
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The Utility of Maritime Force 
In seeking to define the concept of ‘the utility of maritime force’, one is posing the 
question: what value do armed forces operating at or from the sea have in terms of 
contributing toward the attainment of national political objectives? This question 
is intended to be applicable in a general sense and not limited to an evaluation of a 
potential maritime strategy, but would also be applicable to a discussion of the 
role of maritime forces in a land-centric approach. The overarching approach to 
the defining of this concept is influenced by Smith’s approach to the general 
utility of force (see the introduction to this chapter). This is based on the 
understanding of the following parameters: Context: why are we acting? 
Objective: what do we seek to achieve? Target: Whom do we wish to influence? 
Nature of the force: what are the available means / how are we to attain the 
objective?  
The foundation deriving from the above set of parameters can be further 
developed with the use of Jermy’s concept of the ‘Strategic Estimate’. This is 
derived from the Commander’s Estimate - ‘a set of structured questions used by a 
commander and his staff to add rigour to the command team’s thinking when 
confronted with an operational or tactical situation’.120 Jermy has utilised this 
approach to tactical and operational level decision making as the basis of a 
structure for strategic analysis and strategy making.121 The ‘Strategic Estimate’ is 
based on seven questions intended to ‘help structure an iterative analysis and 
debate’;122 
1. What is the overarching political context? 
2. What is the political issue (or issues) at contest? 
3. What is the political objective and why? 
4. What are the resources available? 
5. What courses of action could we adopt? 
6. What course of action should we adopt? 
7. What should be the spirit of our approach?123 
The ‘Strategic Estimate’ therefore provides the means to approach the analysis 
and formulation of strategy in a manner that addresses the need to understand the 
context, objective, target and nature of the force as the basis for applying force 	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with utility. Thus, in order to determine the utility of maritime force, one is 
concerned with the ends, ways and means governing its development, deployment 
and employment. The framework for this ends-ways-means analysis is provided 
by the interaction of grand strategy, maritime strategy and seapower. This triad 
provides the components corresponding to the aforementioned parameters for 
determining the utility of maritime force. Grand strategy provides the context and 
objective for action; it sets the desired ends. Maritime strategy, constituting the 
military-strategic application of seapower, provides potential ways to attain the 
objective. Seapower, encompassing the maritime (military and civilian) 
capabilities of the state, provides the potential means by which to attain the 
defined grand strategic objective.  
This latter point would appear to contradict the previously cited quote from Till: 
‘... This approach defines seapower in terms of its consequences, its outputs not 
the inputs, the ends not the means’.124 However, the two points are compatible. 
This is because the former point, although stating seapower provides a means, it is 
one based on the output and consequences of the application of seapower toward 
the attainment of a defined ends.  
By examining the nexus of grand strategy, maritime strategy and seapower, in 
particular with regard to how the application of maritime capabilities serves 
national objectives, an increased insight into the functioning of maritime power 
should be discernible. In addition, by shifting the analysis from how maritime 
capabilities contribute toward the attainment of grand strategic objectives, to how 
the defining of grand strategy shapes the generation of maritime power, further 
insight into the utility of maritime force should be garnered. The method by which 
to examine the utility of maritime force can be developed via two broad 
approaches. First, via a ‘bottom-up’ maritime capability-based approach that asks 
how and by what means does seapower and maritime strategy contribute to grand 
strategy? Or, secondly via a ‘top-down’ approach that considers the grand 
strategic level and its implications for, and influence on, seapower and maritime 
strategy and examines why maritime force would be of potential utility.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Till, Seapower, p.21.  
 53 
The above method addresses the context, objective and nature of the force and to 
an extent can be undertaken using theory derived from the literature. However, the 
analysis of the target, in particular with regard to how it responds to maritime 
force, requires analysis based on the use of historical precedent. For example, 
Menon utilises case histories as part of his analysis into the role and utility of 
maritime strategy vis-à-vis continental powers.125 This is because as Professor 
Andrew Lambert, Laughton Professor of Naval History at King’s College 
London, states (albeit in the context of the development of naval education):  
.... Only history could contribute hard evidence to the process ... In the absence of 
personal experience the only way to learn the business of modern war was to 
profit from the experience of others, in earlier ages and other navies.126 
In the ‘Green Pamphlet’, Corbett refers to the use of deductive and inductive 
evidence. Deductive evidence is defined as analysing the meaning of a term; for 
example, Corbett asks, ‘We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of 
the sea. What does this mean?’127 In contrast, inductive evidence is defined as 
being ‘from history or past experience’.128 Mahan also based his analysis of 
seapower on the study and use of history: 
A study of the military history of the past ... is enjoined by great military leaders 
as essential to correct ideas and to the skilful conduct of war in the future ... while 
many of the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, 
there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and ... 
can be elevated to the rank of general principles. For the same reason the study of 
the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of the 
general principles of maritime war...129  
The value of the consideration of historical experience alongside the examination 
of theory is succinctly described by Till:  
Sometimes, after all, theoretical conceptions (about the protection of shipping for 
example) only become clear when they are ‘realised’ or put into practice in 
training, procurement or the conduct of operations. Naval theory and practice, 
past and present, can have a relationship that is truly symbiotic.130 
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Further, and deriving from the use of history as a means of studying the utility of 
maritime force, the analysis of the development of thinking concerning the role 
and utility of seapower and maritime strategy in their strategic context is 
important. This is especially so with regard to the development of doctrine (the 
evolution of contemporary British maritime doctrine is examined in the following 
chapter), which Till defines as ‘the application of maritime theory in a particular 
time and place’.131 This enables the perceived utility of maritime force to be 
examined via the analysis of the particular context of a national application of 
seapower. Rear Admiral Richard Hill, Royal Navy (retired) and formerly editor of 
The Naval Review, in effect asks this question in the context of reviewing British 
naval thinking in the Cold War: 
What did seapower consist of in the nuclear age: were the classical constituents 
still valid, and what elements if any had to be added? Why was seapower (and 
naval power in particular) important, desirable or necessary? ... If so, how was it 
to be exercised? And, in a Britain whose relative economic position was 
declining, was the wherewithal achievable?132 
Within this passage, the questions of ‘why was seapower important, desirable or 
necessary’ and ‘how was it to be exercised’ are of most importance with regard to 
determining the utility of maritime force, and contribute toward the answering of 
Hill’s last question concerning whether the wherewithal is achievable. This is 
because, by determining the utility of maritime force, its value within the broader 
context of national power and, importantly, national budgetary priorities, can be 
better assessed. This emphasises a valuable aspect of the study of maritime 
thinking, that is, as Till suggests ‘it may be intended to help others understand the 
role of naval power, past, present and future’.133 The above set of questions posed 
by Hill also illustrates the basic constituents of a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the 
analysis of the utility of maritime force.  
In contrast, the ‘top-down’ approach which considers the grand strategic level and 
how it influences the trajectory and development of the instruments of national 
power, would pose questions focusing on particularly foreign and defence policy 
objectives and how those shape the overall requirements for national military 	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strategy. In the British case, the debates between the maritime and continental 
schools of strategy; the former emphasising a maritime-centric basis for British 
strategy, the latter a land-power-centric conception;134 provide an example of this 
type of analysis.  
As previously stated, the central question underpinning the examination of the 
utility of maritime force is: what value do armed forces operating at or from the 
sea have in terms of contributing toward the attainment of national political 
objectives? The preceding discussion has raised the issue of maritime thinking and 
relating it to a specific context; the specific context for this thesis is the 
contemporary British setting. It is thus valuable to examine British thinking on the 
role and nature of maritime power to gain insight into perspectives concerning the 
utility of maritime force and its specific relation to the evolving requirements of 
British grand strategy and vice-versa. This includes the examination of the 
aggregate of British maritime thinking and whether it constitutes a discernible 
British ‘school’. In other words, is there a sufficient coherency in the themes, 
ideas and principles addressed in British maritime literature to constitute a distinct 
British approach to maritime thinking? Till suggests that the British body of 
thought that emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did have sufficient 
coherence to be regarded as a school.135 The core tenets of the British maritime 
school will be discussed in the following chapter as a means by which to link 
contemporary British conceptual thinking and the formulation of doctrine with 
longer term trends in British maritime thinking. The salience of this is illustrated 
by Professor Eric Grove, Professor of Naval History at Liverpool Hope University 
and co-author of BR 1806 The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, on the 
writing of the latter with Commander Michael Codner, Royal Navy: ‘I represented 
what might be called the “English School” of maritime strategy handed down 
from Corbett to his successors’.136 The role of the British maritime school is yet 
more succinctly described by Till as being ‘the pens behind the fleet’137 and thus a 	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valuable introduction to the development of contemporary British maritime 
thinking and doctrine.    
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to outline the theoretical basis forming the conceptual and 
analytical framework for the subsequent development of the thesis. That is, the 
interaction of national policy, grand strategy, seapower and maritime strategy or, 
the ends, ways and means of utilising the sea for military purposes in support of 
national political objectives. Two points of elaboration regarding this statement 
are required. First, the reference to ‘military purposes’ is to distinguish from the 
broader use of the sea by the state for civilian (broadly defined) purposes – it 
should not be taken solely as a reference to the use of force at sea or from the sea, 
but as also including the constabulary and benign applications of maritime power. 
Second, the reference to ‘national political objectives’ should not be taken as 
excluding involvement in coalition or alliance operations – such involvement 
being a product of national policy.  
In light of the preceding discussion in this chapter, and for clarity, a brief 
reiteration of the definitions of key terms – seapower, maritime strategy and grand 
strategy – to be used in this thesis, is provided. Seapower constitutes the state’s 
capacity and capabilities to utilise the sea in its broadest terms in support of 
national political objectives. Maritime strategy, as defined by Corbett, constitutes 
‘the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor’.138 
Grand strategy seeks to control and utilise the whole range of the instruments of 
state power to fulfil national objectives as defined by national policy. The 
definition of policy proposed by Jermy (see pages 42-43) will be used in this 
thesis.  
The nexus of seapower, maritime strategy and grand strategy constitutes the 
overarching context for this thesis. This nexus provides the conceptual foundation 
from which it is intended to analyse and deduce the utility of maritime force, that 
is, what value do armed forces operating at or from the sea have in terms of 
contributing toward the attainment of national political objectives? This question 	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is intended to provide that ‘skein of connected thought about the nature, conduct 
and consequences of naval power’.139 This is in order to link the strategic theory 
discussed in this chapter to the development of British thinking on maritime 
power, via the implementation of that thinking in the decision to structure British 
maritime forces around a particular vision of an aircraft carrier capability, to the 
role of maritime strategy in British grand strategy examined in the following 
chapters.  
Underpinning all this, and the theory examined in this chapter, is a yet more 
fundamental question: why does seapower matter? This is especially significant to 
an island state such as the UK, and one that transcends the bounds of discussion 
set by issues of policy and strategy, and forms a component of the much wider 
subject of national identity. In regard to the analysis in this chapter, a major factor 
in explaining why thinkers such as Mahan and Gorshkov sought to explain what 
constituted seapower in its broadest context, as well as the aspects pertaining to 
naval strategy, as opposed to, for example, Corbett’s focus on maritime strategy, 
is that being from an island nation, the audience Corbett was addressing already 
understood the basic premise of seapower. The audiences for Mahan and 
Gorshkov were conversely the policymakers of large continental powers – they 
had to be told why the sea mattered, before how to exploit it.140 Thus, the analysis 
of the influence of national identity on the understanding of seapower is required 
alongside that of the factors relating to policy and strategy in the development of 
maritime thinking, and as alluded to by Gray (see page 50), will be dependent on 
national context. This constitutes the basis for the following chapter; an 
examination of the development of contemporary British maritime thinking and 
doctrine.        
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2. The Development of Contemporary British Maritime 
Thinking and Doctrine: An Overview 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to link the theoretical discussion of the preceding 
chapter with the applied analysis to be undertaken in the following chapters. In 
order to do this, this chapter examines the development of British maritime 
thinking and doctrine, that is, the specifically British thought on the roles and 
application of maritime power and the doctrine guiding its application. Doctrine in 
this regard constitutes ‘a framework of principles, practices and procedures, 
understanding of which provides a basis for action. Maritime doctrine fulfils this 
function for the use of military power at and from the sea to achieve policy 
objectives.’1 This provides the basis for what is defined in British thinking as the 
conceptual component of fighting power. British Defence Doctrine defines 
fighting power as consisting ‘of a conceptual component (the thought process), a 
moral component (the ability to get people to fight), and a physical component 
(the means to fight)’.2 The conceptual component includes the Principles of War 
(the overarching guidelines concerning the application of military power), 
Doctrine and conceptual innovation. It is of significant importance because, as 
British Defence Doctrine explains: 
The conceptual component provides the coherent intellectual basis and theoretical 
justification for the provision and employment of Armed Forces. It has relevance 
at all levels of warfare, not least the strategic level, where it provides the 
intellectual material needed for effective decision-making at the political-military 
interface. The conceptual component also serves an important role in preserving 
and taking forward corporate memory, experience and wisdom. In doing so, it 
reflects accumulated historical experience, improvements to existing operational 
practice (gained through lessons, analysis and experimentation) and continuous 
projections about the future security environment.3 
The value of doctrine is summarised by Air Vice-Marshal (Ret’d) Michael 
Harwood in the following terms: 
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Train relentlessly, rigorously and repeatedly for the known. Drills should be 
second-nature, not learning by rote but certainly by heart. This means that 
published military doctrine, standard operating procedures, checklists and mission 
rehearsals have inherent value, but only when they are committed to memory in 
such a fashion that they free the spirit to think, “What is different about the 
situation before my eyes right now?” Dogma stifles, doctrine enlightens.4 
The analysis within this chapter is thus concerned with constructing the 
conceptual framework for the subsequent development of the thesis. It is 
principally focused on the contemporary development of British maritime thinking 
and doctrine. This encompasses the period since 1995 and the publication of 
BR1806 The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine – the first official 
statement of doctrine published by the Royal Navy since the classified Naval War 
Manual (last published in 1969).5 However, it is necessary to set this analysis 
within the longer-term context provided by history; as The Fundamentals of 
British Maritime Doctrine states: ‘Doctrine has its foundation in history; the 
study, analysis and interpretation of experience. It provides a shared interpretation 
of that experience which can be taught, in order to provide a common starting 
point for thinking about future action.’6 Professor Andrew Lambert has described 
doctrine as ‘a dialogue between the past and the present for the benefit of the 
future.’7 The historic development of British maritime thinking, effectively dating 
to the latter quarter of the 19th century8 and the work of figures such as Professor 
Sir John Knox Laughton9 and Vice Admiral Philip Colomb, via Sir Julian Corbett, 
Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Captain Stephen Roskill and Vice Admiral Sir 
Peter Gretton through the 20th century to the present, provides such a dialogue. 
This dialogue serves to shed light on the evolving analysis and interpretation of 	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5 BR 1806, The Naval War Manual (Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Naval Tactical and 
Weapons Policy, TW 271/1/63, January 1969). 
6 BR1806, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, p.12.  
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Common Doctrine”: the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, and Doctrine Development down to 
BR1806’ in Andrew Dorman, et al. The Changing Face of Maritime Power (London: Macmillan, 
1999), pp.33-56, quotation, p.54.  
8 For detailed discussion of the genesis of British maritime thinking in the second half of the 19th 
century, see Andrew Lambert, ‘The Development of Education in the Royal Navy: 1854-1914’, in 
Geoffrey Till (ed.) The Development of British Naval Thinking (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); 
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British Naval Strategic Thought 1867-1914 (London: Cassell, 1965).  
9 For example, see John Knox Laughton, ‘The Scientific Study of Naval History’, RUSI Journal, 




maritime thinking, its response to the changing strategic environment and enables 
the enduring principles of British maritime strategy to be deduced. Moreover, this 
on-going dialogue and the development and promulgation of doctrine serves to 
educate; The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine states a role of doctrine 
as being to establish:   
... A core understanding of the nature of maritime power both within and outside 
the Naval Service. Within the Royal Navy and Royal Marines it provides a 
platform upon which all teaching, training and tactical development will build. 
Outside the Service it will generate wider understanding of the particular and 
distinctive nature of the maritime environment, and the ways in which maritime 
forces operate.10  
Thus, this chapter sets out to shed light on the foundations of that thinking upon 
which the contemporary platform of British maritime doctrine is built. From this, 
the enduring principles of British maritime strategy and concepts governing the 
roles and application of maritime power and their implications for the 
development of the physical component of British maritime fighting power can be 
deduced. In order to do this, the chapter will first consider the development of the 
British maritime school of thought. This provides the basis and historical context 
for the examination of the evolution of British maritime doctrine and associated 
key concepts from 1995 and the publication of The Fundamentals of British 
Maritime Doctrine to 2011 and the publication of the fourth edition of British 
Maritime Doctrine. The chapter will conclude with a consideration of the 
implications of British maritime thinking for capability development, in particular 
with regard to the Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) programme. As will be discussed 
below, and in the following chapters, the substantial geopolitical and thus 
military-strategic changes heralded by the end of the Cold War, and with it a 
concomitant shift in emphasis in maritime roles from securing sea control to 
power projection, was reflected in British maritime doctrine, and in the rationale 
for the CVF programme.  
The British Maritime School and the Principles of British Maritime Strategy 
The concluding discussion in the preceding chapter emphasised the importance of 
national context and identity in the development of maritime thinking, especially 
with regard to the relative emphasis on broader notions of seapower or a more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




specific focus on maritime strategy (see pages 56-57). In this context, the 
evolution of thinking and trajectory of intellectual trends within the British 
maritime school provides significant and valuable insight into the development of 
British maritime strategic thought.  
The difference in national context and its implications for the development of 
maritime, or more narrow naval thought, is discernible in comparing the influence 
and legacy of the principal works of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, US 
Navy, and Vice Admiral Philip Colomb, Royal Navy (1831-1899); the Influence 
of Sea Power Upon History 1660-178311 and Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles 
and Practice Historically Treated12 respectively. Mahan’s book was the first to be 
published (in 1890) and achieved seminal status as the classical exposition of 
seapower theory. Colomb’s book was published the following year and achieved 
much recognition,13 albeit not to the same extent as The Influence of Sea Power.  
However, the nature of the texts and the audiences they were written for must be 
taken into account when considering the impact of the respective texts. Mahan’s 
audience, as noted on page 57, were the policy-makers of a large continental 
power and had to be educated in why seapower mattered at all before debating 
how it could be exploited. In contrast, Naval Warfare built upon the lectures 
Colomb was giving at the Royal Naval College Greenwich (six lectures per year 
from 1887 to 1895),14 and was thus addressed to an audience already familiar with 
the concept of seapower, that is, the officers of the Navy of a maritime state. 
Professor Sir John Knox Laughton described the significance of Naval Warfare in 
his obituary of Admiral Colomb:15 
In 1891 he published his most elaborate and most instructive work on “Naval 
Warfare,” [sic] in which, almost for the first time in modern naval literature, he 
enunciated and illustrated from history the true principles and conditions of sea 	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power and its exercise. It is true that Captain Mahan was working at the same 
subject simultaneously, perhaps with a broader and more philosophical 
outlook...16  
The above quotation contains two significant points. The first, and relevant to the 
development of the British maritime school, is the reference to ‘the true principles 
of sea power and its exercise’. A particular emphasis of Naval Warfare is ‘Attacks 
on Territory from the Sea’ – chapters 10 to 18 (out of 20) are under this heading – 
this follows on from seven chapters which are dedicated to ‘The Struggle for the 
Command of the Sea’ and ‘Attempts to Gain Command of the Sea’ (chapters two 
to nine: chapter one is entitled ‘The Nature of Naval War’ and chapter five ‘The 
Differentiation of Naval Force). That is, excluding the first and fifth chapters and 
the two case studies (chapters 19 and 20 on ‘Recent Illustrations of the Principles 
of Naval Warfare’ and ‘The Spanish-American War’ respectively)17 more than 
half (nine out of 16 chapters) are dedicated to examining the exploitation of 
seapower via the projection of power from the sea. This is in distinct contrast to 
Mahan, who concentrated on action at sea and only implicitly referred to the 
impact of seapower on events on land.18 The second point reinforces the first and 
the preceding discussion concerning the difference in outlook between Mahan and 
Colomb, namely the point that Mahan had ‘perhaps ... a broader and more 
philosophical outlook’. In other words, Mahan was concerned more with the 
general theory of seapower whereas Colomb was much more concerned with the 
effective application of seapower, especially in order to project power ashore.  
Colomb’s work, in particular Naval Warfare, constitutes a significant contribution 
to the early development of the British maritime school. This is especially with 
regard to firstly his making ‘naval history a respectable and relevant subject of 
enquiry for naval officers’.19 This also reflects the influence of Laughton20 - an 
influence which is clearly visible in Naval Warfare, most prominently in chapter 
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In describing the events surrounding the sailing, voyage, and dispersal of the 
Armada, I have found that I cannot possibly do better than to quote largely from a 
paper by Professor Laughton...entitled “The Invincible Armada, a Tercentenary 
Retrospect”. In preparing his paper, Mr. Laughton has consulted the best 
authorities, and its value is of no passing character.21  
Colomb incorporated some 15 pages of Laughton’s analysis into his chapter.22 
Secondly, and most significantly, Colomb was the antecedent of Sir Julian 
Corbett. The latter read Naval Warfare and this is reflected in his work, for 
example, with regard to the use of the term ‘command of the sea’ and enthusiasm 
for ‘fleet in being’.23 The following are four particular areas that shed light on this 
connection. First, with regard to ‘command of the sea’, Colomb writes: 
The term “command of the sea,” [sic] as applied to denote power to prevent the 
passage of an enemy intending to descend upon the land, is necessarily indefinite. 
Command may be absolutely complete, not only for that, but for all other 
purposes. It may be sufficiently complete to secure an expedition proceeding over 
sea for the attack of territory, from any sort of interruption either then, or at the 
point of attack; and yet it may not be sufficiently complete to make 
communications with the base from the point of attack absolutely secure. It may 
then be found by fine gradations, less and less complete, until command of the 
sea is wholly lost...24   
Furthermore, Colomb defines three levels of command in the context of the utility 
of the sea, that is:  
We see, therefore, these three states of the sea considered as a strategic surface or 
medium for transport: the state of Indifference, of Disputed Command, and of 
Assured Command. And evidently there must be a continual passing from one 
state into a higher, and back again.25    
In comparison, Corbett states the following regarding command of the sea: 
If the object of the command of the sea is to control communications, it is 
obvious it may exist in various degrees. We may be able to control the whole of 
the common communications as the result either of great initial preponderance or 
of decisive victory. If we are not sufficiently strong to do this, we may still be 
able to control some of the communications; that is, our control may be general or 
local.26    
In addition:  
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.... It must be taken that command may exist in various states or degrees, each of 
which has its special possibilities and limitations. It may be general or local, and 
it may be permanent or temporary. General command may be permanent or 
temporary, but mere local command, except in very favourable geographical 
conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as more than temporary, since 
normally it is always liable to interruption from other theatres so long as the 
enemy possesses an effective naval force.27 
Although Colomb and Corbett both use the term ‘command of the sea’, the 
meaning each conveys is different: Colomb regards the sea as ‘territory’ in 
contrast to Corbett’s conception of the sea as a means of communication.28 This is 
evident in the second quotation above from Colomb in which he refers to the sea 
‘as a strategic surface’. In addition, in the opening chapter of Naval Warfare, 
Colomb states: 
...if we look back to what may be called the early days of naval warfare under 
sail, we shall observe that there was little or no contention for occupation of, or 
command over, the sea...29 
The second example concerns the concept of a ‘fleet in being’. Colomb dedicates 
chapter six of Naval Warfare to the analysis of French attempts to invade England 
between 1690 and 1692 and particularly the efforts of Lord Torrington as 
commander of the Home Fleet in 1690 to deny the French sufficient command of 
the sea to undertake such an endeavour. In this regard, Colomb cites Torrington: 
...Had I fought otherwise, our fleet had been totally lost, and the kingdom had lain 
open to an invasion...As it was, most men were in fear that the French would 
invade; but I was always of another opinion; for I always said, that whilst we had 
a fleet in being, they would not dare to make an attempt...whilst we observe the 
French, they can make no attempt either on sea or shore, but with great 
disadvantages; and if we are beaten all is exposed to their mercy...30 
Colomb summarised Torrington’s approach thus: 
While if he could altogether avoid fighting, and merely wait and watch, he would 
render the great French armament powerless, and entirely defeat its end. It could 
do absolutely nothing if Torrington declined to be drawn into a battle, because the 
moment it attempted anything by way of a landing, or an attack upon the shore, it 
would give to the British admiral exactly that advantage which was required to 
made [sic] his attack successful.31 
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Corbett also cited Torrington’s example in his analysis of a ‘fleet in being’ within 
the wider context of discussing methods of disputing command. The opening 
paragraph of the chapter examining methods of disputing command in Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy provides valuable insight into both how Corbett 
conceived of the utility of the defensive in naval warfare and his intellectual 
approach: 
In dealing with the theory of sea command, attention was called to the error 
assuming that if we are unable to win the command we therefore lose it. It was 
pointed out that this proposition, which is too often implied in strategical 
discussion, denies in effect that there can be such a thing as strategical defensive 
at sea, and ignores the fact that the normal condition in war is for the command to 
be in dispute. Theory and history are at one on the point. Together they affirm 
that a Power too weak to win command by offensive operations may yet succeed 
in holding the command in dispute by assuming a general defensive attitude.32   
The above quotation affirms the value of the defensive as a means of disputing 
command of the sea – a point also stressed by Colomb with regard to Torrington. 
In addition, Corbett cites the role of theory and history as the means by which to 
deduce the principles of maritime warfare – the core tenet of Corbett’s intellectual 
approach (see below).   
The third example concerns the purpose of naval operations, that is, both Colomb 
and Corbett stress the exploitation of command of the sea to enable other 
activities. As noted above, Colomb especially emphasised the projection of power 
from the sea and Corbett developed his analysis of British naval affairs and their 
relation to national strategy within the context of espousing the value of maritime 
strategy.33 It must be noted that Colomb does not explicitly advocate a maritime 
approach; rather, he focuses on the naval aspects of power projection, but this 
nonetheless does explicitly go beyond defining attaining command of the sea as 
the principal ends of naval warfare.   
The fourth example concerns the notion of limited war; this was an area 
significantly developed by Corbett but there are indications of thought on this by 
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Colomb. In the concluding chapter of Naval Warfare – a case study of the 
Spanish-American War of 1898, Colomb in his introduction states: 
In both these wars [also referring to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 covered in 
the preceding chapter] there was a particular objective to which attention was 
directed, and which gave a certain colour to what was done, differing from that 
which has generally controlled and modified the conduct of naval war when 
nation has been set against nation with only a general struggle for the mastery.34   
Colomb also cited the American War of Independence in the above context, and 
referring to the French involvement in that conflict, stated:  
The peace naturally followed [the British defeat at Yorktown], because the 
French had attained the chief object [the removal of the revolting American 
colonies from British imperial control] for which they went to war, and because 
its continuation might – after such a victory – have proved wholly 
disadvantageous to them.35  
The contexts Colomb discussed are similar to the criteria Corbett highlighted as 
constituting the basis for limited war: 
To satisfy the full conception of a limited object, one of two conditions is 
essential. Firstly, it must be not merely limited in area, but of really limited 
political importance; and secondly, it must be so situated as to be strategically 
isolated or to be capable of being reduced to practical isolation by strategical 
operations.36 
The examples provided by Colomb – the American War of Independence, the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 (also referred to as the Korean War due to the focus 
of the conflict) and the Spanish-American War of 1898 – shared aspects of both 
conditions articulated by Corbett: the potential for strategic isolation of the 
objective by one of the belligerents (for example, the American seaboard from 
Europe, Cuba from Spain and the Korean peninsula) and limited political 
importance.  
Colomb did not however further develop a line of thinking pertaining to notions of 
limited war in Naval Warfare, rather his analysis concentrated on the naval aspect 
of the Spanish-American War. This reflects Colomb’s approach, succinctly 
described by Lambert as: ‘a synthesis between naval history and strategic ideas’.37 
In contrast, Corbett developed a more sophisticated and multi-faceted approach 	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which extended beyond the use of naval history, and incorporated theoretical 
study. Lambert describes Corbett’s approach thus: 
While the influence of Professors John Knox Laughton and Samuel Rawson 
Gardiner 38  was obvious in his handling of evidence, Corbett’s intellectual 
approach was original. He placed the study of naval affairs in the broad context of 
national policy, locating dramatic passages of combat in the development of 
national aims. The ability to draw out the larger patterns and ideas that informed 
past events would be his greatest asset. With forensic skill Corbett fashioned 
coherent, persuasive strategic studies from fragmentary evidence. 39 
In considering the contribution of Colomb to the development of the British 
maritime school and his influence on Corbett, his role in the creation of the Navy 
Records Society must be noted. The Navy Records Society was created in 1893 by 
Laughton and Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge;40 Colomb was a member of the 
original provisional committee (holding its first meeting on the 27 June 1893) 
established to determine the name and rules of the society.41 Corbett joined the 
society in July 1893,42 and would thus have regularly met Colomb within the 
context of Navy Records Society meetings until the latter’s death in 1899.43  
The most important and enduring contribution to the development of British 
maritime thinking and doctrine (see below) was that made by Corbett. It is 
valuable by means of an introduction to briefly note Corbett’s personal 
background. Lambert, describing Corbett as ‘an Edwardian gentleman of leisure’, 
establishes Corbett’s personal context thus: ‘Despite obtaining a good degree and 
qualifying for the Bar, he spent his days travelling, fishing and writing novels and 
plays...’44 The implications of this for Corbett’s writing of naval history and 
strategy is effectively summarised by Donald Schurman (born 1925), the eminent 
Canadian naval historian and biographer of Corbett: 
Mahan’s approach had been to link detailed history of the tactics of important 
naval actions to meaningful but general accounts of diplomatic activity. Corbett, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 An eminent 19th century British historian, principally associated with the study of the English 
Civil War. ‘Samuel Rawson Gardiner (British Historian), Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/225892/Samuel-Rawson-Gardiner. Accessed 25 July 
2014. 
39 Ibid. pp.219-220. 
40 Lambert, ‘The Development of Education in the Royal Navy’, p.49.  
41 Captain A. B. Sainsbury, ‘The Centenary of the Navy Records Society 1893-1993’, The Navy 
Records Society (previously available online). 
42 Schurman,, p.149.  
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however, traced the growth and use of naval strategy and from the first based his 
interpretations on extensive documentary research. More detailed than Mahan and 
less dogmatic than Richmond, Corbett brought to his subject the training of the 
Bar, the temperament of a novelist and the charm of a cultured mind.45 
The significance of Corbett’s work was its foundation in the nexus of naval 
history, national policy, the theoretical study of war and from 1903 onwards, the 
requirements of professional service education via his involvement with the Naval 
War Course.46 Furthermore, by developing a theoretical approach inspired by 
Clausewitz, Corbett further enhanced the coherence and quality of his work.47 
Schurman states with regard to Some Principles of Maritime Strategy: 
Whatever its general merit, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy did two things 
very competently: it adapted Clausewitzian thought to fit the needs of a sea power 
and to conform to the special idiosyncrasies of sea warfare; and it took past 
practice and codified it. Corbett wrote this strategy book as a result of rather than 
as a key to historical study. That is why the careful historian must prefer him, 
with all his misty outlook, to the downright plain-speaking Mahan who learned 
his principles first and then went to history for his examples.48 
The continuing value of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and reflecting 
Corbett’s influence past and present, is its role either as unofficial strategic 
doctrine or as a source of inspiration for contemporary doctrine. Professor Eric 
Grove, co-author of BR1806 The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, 
states firstly with regard to the role of Some Principles as ‘doctrine’:  
It is quite clear from contemporary sources that Corbett’s ‘theory’ was what we 
should now call ‘doctrine’. French officers visiting the Grand Fleet in the First 
World War were referred to Some Principles when they enquired about British 
naval doctrine.49 
The enduring influence of Corbett and his providing a source of inspiration for 
contemporary doctrine is also made explicit by Grove: 
Corbett’s insistence that naval strategy was but part of a larger maritime whole 
and the consistent teaching of this basic doctrinal point by at least three 
generations of lecturers at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, made it certain 
that 1806 should be regarded as the fundamentals of maritime doctrine. 50 
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48 Schurman, p.182.  
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This influence also extended beyond the UK; for example, Till states:  
…. The British set a standard in doctrinal formulation that others have responded 
to. One of the most interesting such responses is Australian Maritime Doctrine, 
which appeared in 2000. Similar in approach to, and obviously influenced by, 
British doctrinal formulations it covers much the same ground but of course gives 
it an Australian spin reflecting their own particular national context.51 
A further illustration of Corbett’s influence is provided by Schurman: 
It may help to gauge the impact of Corbett’s strategic thought on the naval mind, 
to realize that in 1916 Lord Sydenham52 of Coombe saw in Corbett’s doctrines, as 
they had been given to the War College before 1914, one reason for the lack of 
spectacular British naval success at sea...Whatever the truth of such allegations 
they do indicate that Corbett’s ideas influenced naval officers.53 
This quotation also provides insight into a key aspect of the debate concerning the 
utility of doctrine, in particular with regard to the publication of BR1806 The 
Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine. Grove describes the problem thus: 
The Royal Navy...was a little reluctant to go down the ‘doctrinal’ route...The 
reason was an understandable reluctance for the Royal Navy to become too 
dogmatic in its professional approach. The essence of the naval profession was 
deemed to be flexibility of mind and a willingness to think ‘out of the box’. The 
contrast between the perception of Nelson as a (good and successful) tactical 
innovator compared to the apparently sclerotic and over-centralised Grand Fleet 
of Sir John Jellicoe (that failed to achieve another Trafalgar at Jutland) was a 
potent one.54 
Lord Sydenham’s critique of Corbett and the previous reluctance of the Royal 
Navy to promulgate a written doctrine serves to illuminate the value of Corbett’s 
Clausewitzian-based approach to the theory of war: 
The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of what it is 
that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the 
field: it claims no more than to increase the effective power of conduct. Its main 
practical value is that it can assist a capable man to acquire a broad outlook 
whereby he may be the surer his plan shall cover all the ground, and whereby he 
may with greater rapidity and certainty seize all the factors of a sudden 
situation...Its practical utility; however, is not by any means confined to its effects 
upon the powers of a leader. It is not enough that a leader should have the ability 
to decide rightly; his subordinates must seize at once the full meaning of his 
decision and be able to express it with certainty in well-adjusted action. For this 
every man concerned must have been trained to think in the same plane; the 
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chief’s order must awake in every brain the same process of thought; his words 
must have the same meaning for all.55 
That is, Corbett did not advocate the theoretical study of war as a means by which 
to inculcate a certain mode of thinking; rather, the approach advocated by Corbett 
is to engender a flexible mind-set and enhance individual and collective 
effectiveness through self-education. Corbett in this context cited Clausewitz: ‘It 
should educate the mind of the man who is to lead in war, or rather guide him to 
self-education, but it should not accompany him on the field of battle.’56 The 
above quotation from Corbett was cited by Grove as part of the justification for 
BR1806 The Fundamentals of British Maritime Strategy,57 and with relevance to 
Lord Sydenham’s critique, Lambert makes the significant observation concerning 
the Naval War Course, of which Corbett was so prominently involved, that: ‘The 
tragedy of the War Course was that John Jellicoe, the one officer who really 
needed to attend, was by far the most conspicuous of those who did not.’58   
The influence of Corbett, direct and indirect, on the subsequent development of 
British maritime thinking is multi-faceted, covering his intellectual approach, the 
core tenets of his thought (discussed in chapter one), and via those who have 
followed Corbett and were influenced by his thinking. The latter include Admiral 
Sir Herbert Richmond, Captain Stephen Roskill and Vice Admiral Sir Peter 
Gretton, and are examined below. Further, in September 2007, the Corbett Centre 
for Maritime Policy Studies was established within the King’s College London 
Defence Studies Department at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, 
with the intention to:  
...inform national and international debates on maritime policy issues. It will do 
so by fostering policy-relevant research and providing a forum for debate and 
analysis in which academics, policy-makers and practitioners can interact.59  
The connection between academia, policy-makers and the Royal Navy has and 
will remain central to the development of British maritime thinking. The 
contribution to the body of British maritime thought by those who have both seen 	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uniformed service and worked academically is particularly interesting. This 
includes the above-mentioned Richmond, Roskill and Gretton who all served in 
the Royal Navy, but it also includes notable contributions from those who had 
served outside of the naval service. The aforementioned Donald Schurman served 
in the Royal Canadian Air Force during the Second World War as a navigator on-
board B-24 Liberators;60 and Professor Bryan Ranft (1917-2003) who served in 
the Royal Artillery during the Second World War.61 Ranft was both a member of 
the teaching staff at the Royal Naval College Greenwich and Visiting Professor of 
Naval History at King’s College London.62 In addition, he served as a connection 
between two generations of maritime thinkers, having been sent by Gretton 
(whilst Commandant at Greenwich) to undertake a PhD (examining why the UK 
gave up convoy) at Oxford63 and would subsequently supervise amongst others, 
Andrew Lambert at King’s College London.64  
Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (1871-1946) was a key figure within the British 
maritime school, and constituted a leading example of a ‘sailor-scholar’. 65 
Richmond’s naval career was mixed. Before the First World War he had enjoyed 
accelerated promotion, serving in 1906 as Naval Assistant to the First Sea Lord 
Admiral Sir John Fisher and in 1908, was promoted to Captain and given 
command of the revolutionary battleship HMS Dreadnought.66 Richmond also 
went through periods when he was out of favour and consigned to minor roles. 
This was due to him being ‘increasingly regarded by those he tended to criticise 
[in the Admiralty], perhaps too freely, as that dangerous kind of naval officer who 
read and thought too much.’67 Following retirement from the Royal Navy in 1929, 
Richmond dedicated himself to academia: in 1934, he was appointed to the Vere 
Harmsworth Chair of Imperial and Naval History at Cambridge and in 1936 was 
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made Master of Downing College, Cambridge.68 Richmond made a significant 
contribution to the development of British maritime thinking, especially with 
regard to further raising awareness of the importance of naval history (including 
its role in the education of officers),69 emphasising the role of maritime power at 
the grand strategic level, and as a founder of The Naval Review, the independent 
professional journal for Royal Navy officers. Further, he served as an ‘inter-
generational’ link between maritime thinkers. Richmond was a ‘disciple’ of 
Corbett (Corbett knew Richmond’s father and Richmond before he joined the 
Royal Navy)70 and Richmond’s first book, The Navy in the War of 1739-1748, 
was written with the encouragement of Corbett.71 In addition, Richmond would 
himself be a major influence on historians such as Professor Arthur J. Marder, 
author of such works including The Anatomy of British Sea Power and a 
biography of Richmond – Portrait of an Admiral – The Life and Papers of Sir 
Herbert Richmond, and Captain Stephen Roskill.72 
In February 1923, Richmond gave the Raleigh Lecture on History (named after Sir 
Walter Raleigh) at the British Academy on ‘National Policy and Naval Strength 
XVIth to XXth Century’. The lecture, subsequently reprinted in the Naval 
Review, 73  provides valuable insight into the general tenets of Richmond’s 
approach and thinking and is also significant for shedding light on Richmond’s 
contribution to the development of the notion of the ‘British way in warfare’ 
particularly associated with Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Four key elements of 
Richmond’s thinking can be deduced from his Raleigh Lecture. First, Richmond, 
in order to demonstrate the core tenet of his argument, that is, the essential 
connection between British national policy and naval strength, utilised history as a 
tool to shed light on and explain his argument. This approach is evident from the 
title of Richmond’s lecture, but it is also explained thus:  	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Many threads run through that great fabric, the National Policy of England of the 
last three centuries, and none will take so narrow a view as to say that any single 
thread has dominated it throughout all those years ... I do not pretend to make a 
survey of Policy in all its transitions ... but only to make some slight examination 
of the degree to which that part of it relating to the maintenance of strength at sea 
– by which I mean the combination of all its elements, commercial and fighting 
strength – has actually dictated or influenced its course.74  
Till has stated with regard to Richmond’s utilisation of history that ‘Richmond 
was using its “lessons” not to inform a general theory of maritime strategy, as 
Mahan and Corbett did, but simply to explain the complex role of seapower in 
Britain’s security past and present’.75 This establishes the foundation for the 
following three points. Richmond, as indicated in the above quotation, used a 
broad conception of seapower encompassing both its economic and military 
dimensions and this was emphasised throughout his analysis of the connection 
between national policy and naval strength from the 16th to the 20th centuries. In 
this regard, he cited examples including Raleigh’s thinking on the constitution of 
the English national interest and the context within which the Navigation Acts 
were developed.76 The enduring importance of seapower in British history was 
used by Richmond to illustrate the third element of his thinking: the symbiotic link 
between British national policy and maritime strategy. The introductory paragraph 
of ‘National Policy and Naval Strength XVIth to XXth Century’ suggests that: 
We are all familiar with the idea that naval strength is essential to the security of 
this kingdom of ours, and for the support of its external policy. To this there is a 
corollary which is, perhaps, less familiar; that external policy itself aims at the 
maintenance of our naval strength. Indeed, we may go even further and say that 
the attitude taken up by this country in many of the great international situations 
and movements has been determined finally by the effect one or another course of 
action would have upon our strength at sea.77   
By considering the corollary of the maritime contribution to national policy, that 
is, the requirement(s) for national policy to maintain the state’s maritime 
capabilities, Richmond brings to the fore a most important point: the development 
and sustainment of seapower is predicated upon a national policy that seeks the 
former as an objective.78 In ‘National Policy and Naval Strength XVIth to XXth 
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Century’, Richmond concludes his analysis by highlighting, in historical context, 
the influence of national policy on the maintenance of seapower: 
Thus, through different periods, we can trace at least one definite aim running 
with slight, very slight, interruption through our external policy: that by its efforts 
it shall contribute to supplement the internal efforts to maintain supremacy at sea. 
At one time we see our statesmen concluding alliances with an eventual aim of 
diverting a prospective rival’s money from his navy to his army; at another to 
procure active naval assistance, when the resources of the rivals appear capable of 
outstripping us alone; our alliances aim also, at other times, at preventing the 
principal hostile state from seizing territory of naval importance – the Low 
countries, Dunkirk, Sicily, the Dardanelles; and we view the occupation of such 
commanding points unfavourably or favourably according to whether it will or 
will not weaken our security at sea ... that is to say, we esteem such territory in 
terms of its influence upon our strength at sea.79 
Richmond’s focus on the operation of seapower at the grand strategic level also 
sheds light on, and this is evident in the above quotation, his influence on the 
development of the notion of a ‘British way in warfare’. The references, for 
example, in the above quotation to securing alliances in order to divert a rival’s 
attentions from the sea to the land is one facet of the ‘British way in warfare’. 
Moreover, elsewhere in the paper, references to the ‘Municipal effort’, that is, the 
provision of money to allies to sustain them,80 and the use of sea-based economic 
pressure to enforce compliance upon an adversary,81 combined with a general 
focus on naval strength, further highlight key components of the ‘British way in 
warfare’.82 Richmond’s influence on the development of the concept of a ‘British 
way in warfare’ constitutes one of his most important contributions to the 
development of British strategic thinking.83  
Captain Stephen Roskill (1903-1982) is a second example of an eminent sailor-
scholar; he was recognised both as a very good officer and technically competent 
but also clever.84 This was reflected in his latter postings: first to the British 
Admiralty Delegation in Washington and then as Senior British Observer at the 
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Bikini Atoll atomic tests;85 and following his early retirement from the Royal 
Navy in 1949 on health grounds,86 as the official historian of the Royal Navy in 
the Second World War. Roskill, like Richmond before him, would enjoy an 
association with Cambridge University, becoming in 1961 a Senior Research 
Fellow, and in 1971, a Pensioner Fellow – both held at Churchill College where 
he was involved in the early development of the Churchill Archives Centre.87 The 
publication of the official history, the three volume The War at Sea 1939-1945 
(published between 1954 and 1961), established Roskill’s reputation as a naval 
historian and marked an important contribution to the development of British 
maritime thinking. This is particularly with regard to the first chapter of the first 
volume entitled ‘Maritime War and Maritime Strategy’ which details the 
conceptual basis for the subsequent historical account. It also indicates the 
influence of Corbett on Roskill’s thought; the basis for Roskill’s definition of 
maritime strategy is that enunciated by Corbett: ‘the principles which govern a 
war in which the sea is a substantial factor’.88 Roskill places the control of sea 
communications at the core of his conception of maritime strategy and adds, in 
terms that are reflected in contemporary doctrine, that: 
.... Control of sea communications in the modern sense necessitates a large 
measure of control of the air over those communications as well as control of the 
waters beneath... If either control of the air over the sea or control of the water 
beneath the surface of the sea is inadequate, then we should not possess sufficient 
control of the communications which pass on its surface. The aim of maritime 
strategy is therefore not so much to establish complete control of all sea 
communications, which would be an ideal hardly attainable until final victory was 
almost won, as to develop the ability to establish zones of maritime control 
wherever and whenever they may be necessary for the prosecution of the war in 
accordance with the directions of the Government.89 
The above quotation is significant because it essentially provides a modern 
statement of the requirements of maritime strategy: it is Corbettian in principle but 
also speaks of the three-dimensional nature of the maritime environment and 
control, rather than command, of communications. By means of a comparison, the 	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following is the definition of sea control as given in the current edition of British 
Maritime Doctrine: 
Sea control is the condition that exists when there is freedom of action to use an 
area of the sea for one’s own purpose for a period of time and, if necessary, deny 
its use to an opponent. ‘Sea control depends upon control of the surface and sub-
surface environments...and the air above the area in which is required’ [quotation 
from Allied Joint Publication 3.3.3 Air Maritime Coordination]...The 
geographical extent of sea control may vary from local control of a strategic 
choke point or concentration of forces, to domination of very large sea areas...90  
Roskill also significantly accounted for the impact of aircraft on the nature of 
maritime power. In this regard, Roskill states: 
It seems, therefore, justifiable to attempt a redefinition of the elements comprising 
maritime power, and the chief reason why this has become necessary is that 
shore-based and carrier-borne aircraft have shown themselves to be capable of 
carrying out a part, and in some circumstances the whole, of the duties borne for 
so long by one or other class of fighting ship.91 
It is valuable to note that Roskill referred to both shore-based and carrier-borne 
aircraft as elements comprising maritime power: this is an especially important 
element of British strategic debate and will be discussed in detail in subsequent 
chapters.  
In addition to The War at Sea, Roskill also authored books including The Strategy 
of Sea Power (derived from the Lees-Knowles lectures he gave at Cambridge in 
1961),92 Naval Policy Between the Wars (two volumes) and contributed to the 
Navy Records Society by editing Documents Relating to the Royal Naval Air 
Service; Roskill was also a regular contributor to The Naval Review.93 As with 
Corbett and Richmond, part of Roskill’s contribution to the development of 
British maritime thinking was via his influence on other scholars, a notable 
example being Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton.94 
Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton (1912-1992) served with distinction in the Second 
World War, particularly as an escort group commander in the Battle of the 
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Atlantic,95 and would in the course of his naval career be appointed to positions 
including Senior Naval member of Directing Staff at the Imperial Defence 
College, Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty and finally, Deputy Chief of the 
Naval Staff and Fifth Sea Lord.96 Following retirement from the Royal Navy, 
Gretton, like Richmond and Roskill before him, moved into academia, becoming 
domestic bursar at University College Oxford from 1965-1971.97 He contributed 
to The Naval Review and published books on the Battle of the Atlantic, a 
biography of Sir Winston Churchill and Maritime Strategy: A Study of British 
Defence Problems. 98  Maritime Strategy marked an important contribution to 
British maritime thinking; it articulated a realistic conception of the requirements 
for British maritime strategy, as a component of wider grand strategy, based on 
the lessons of history (including a chapter dedicated to convoy, deriving from the 
author’s personal experience) and the thinking of Corbett, Richmond and Roskill. 
Gretton cites Corbett’s basic definition, and Roskill’s confirmation, of maritime 
strategy as ‘the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial 
factor’ but adds ‘But while it is accurate, this definition does not seem to me to go 
far enough and needs amplification’.99 In order to do this, Gretton stated: 
So I have preferred to borrow, and slightly to amend Richmond’s definition of sea 
power and thus to describe maritime strategy as ‘that which enables a nation to 
send its armies and commerce across those stretches of sea and ocean which lie 
between its country and the countries of its allies and those territories to which it 
needs access in war, and to prevent its enemy doing the same’.100  
Gretton, influenced by Roskill, stated ‘The ultimate object of a maritime strategy 
is to establish such control that the sea can be used whenever and wherever 
desired and to deny its use to the enemy’;101 this control deriving from the 
instruments of seapower as defined by Roskill ‘with great clarity’. 102  The 
instruments of sea power, encompassing three elements – Strength (consisting of 	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maritime forces), Security (comprising bases and infrastructure) and Transport 
(including the Merchant Navy and maritime industrial base) were defined by 
Roskill as ‘comprising maritime power in a modern context; and each of them 
must be present in adequate form if the nation’s maritime strategy is to be 
fulfilled’.103 Gretton utilised this definition of the constituents of seapower rather 
than the six elements stated by Mahan, ostensibly due to a greater clarity of 
Roskill’s definition.104 The influence of Roskill is also apparent in Gretton’s 
discussion of sea control; like Roskill, Gretton uses the term ‘maritime zones of 
control’ and discusses the attainment of control in terms that would not be amiss 
in current doctrine. The requirements and extent of maritime control needed is 
defined thus: 
The core of the problem of sailing a ship or ships from one port to another in war 
is to control the slice of water in which the ships float, as well as the air above 
and the depths below. Any wider degree of control is welcome but not essential, 
and it can be shown that with formidable opposition from aircraft and submarines, 
it became increasingly difficult to control any greater area than that immediately 
around the ships or convoys being protected...One cannot be dogmatic about 
zones of control and a flexible approach to the question is essential.105  
Importantly, Gretton defined maritime strategy, as had Corbett, as not just 
consisting of naval forces:  
…. A maritime strategy is the method of employing all arms of all services. It 
should not be looked upon in any way as a purely ‘naval’ venture; the inter-
dependence of armies, navies and air forces is total and each should integrate its 
efforts with complete precision if success is to be achieved.106  
This was especially important considering the context of the British defence 
debate when Gretton wrote Maritime Strategy: that is, a period of intense rivalry 
and competing visions as regards the future of British military strategy. This was 
particularly with regard to the contrasting perspectives developed by the Royal 
Navy and its espousal of joint service task forces vis-à-vis the Royal Air Force’s 
vision of an island strategy for the global deployment of RAF airpower.  
The 1960s saw the publication of the final iteration of the ‘first generation’ of 
British maritime doctrine, The Naval War Manual. The purpose of the manual was 
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principally the education of junior Naval officers.107 The first edition of the Naval 
War Manual was promulgated in 1921 and revised in 1925, but as Professor 
Arthur Marder suggests, there ‘was little in it beyond a few catchwords pertaining 
to the “principles of war” and generalities on “naval policy,” the “functions of the 
Navy,” “war plans,” and so on’.108 Significantly, the Naval War Manual at this 
stage reflected the wider debate and contrasting perspective on the centrality of 
offensive action against an adversary’s main fleet (see chapter one, page 36). The 
manual placed great emphasis on the importance of offensive action in contrast to 
the views of, for example, Corbett, Richmond and Roskill.109  
The manual was substantially revised in 1938 by Commander John Creswell at the 
Royal Naval College Greenwich;110 Creswell represented what Till has described 
as the ‘orthodox British line’ on maritime thinking.111 The final iteration of the 
Naval War Manual, promulgated in 1969 (superseding a 1958 version), reflected 
the then contemporary thinking of the British maritime school. For example, the 
manual defined the basis for a country’s maritime strategy as: ‘a. A strong Navy. 
b. A prosperous Merchant Service [and] c. An efficient shipbuilding and ship 
repair organisation’. 112  This corresponds to Roskill’s elements of seapower, 
subsequently utilised by Gretton. Moreover, the manual defined the defence of 
trade and maritime communications, power projection, and linking maritime 
power to wider military and national objectives as the ‘fundamental aims of 
British maritime strategy’.113 Further, it drew on historical experience as a guide 
for the development of knowledge and preparation for the future.114           
It is also important to note the impact of Britain’s changing strategic context on 
maritime thinking, in particular from the mid-1960s onward. Rear Admiral 
Richard Hill summarises this succinctly: 
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The period when NATO topics dominated British naval thinking 
stretched...between 1965 and 1990. Before the earlier date, a more traditionalist 
and certainly more national view had prevailed. Up to the Suez debacle of 1956 
Britain had taken a largely great-power attitude aspiring to the worldwide 
application of maritime strength, and after Suez it had quite rapidly adopted a 
more realistic policy aimed at containing ‘brush fires’...115  
Furthermore, this marked a period of increasing external influence on British 
maritime development as Britain based its national policy on being a member of 
and contributor to NATO. This had resulted by the late 1980s in British thinking 
being focused on what Hill terms ‘A single scenario for conflict; force provision 
based upon a single threat; a “contributory” strategy, if it could be called a 
strategy; dubious assumptions on the likely duration of conflict; [and] a 
constricted and strategically unrealistic sea area...’;116 that is, operations focusing 
primarily on anti-submarine and surface warfare in the North-East Atlantic against 
the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 and emergent security 
challenges in the Persian Gulf and Balkans thus marked a transition away from the 
aforementioned focus described by Hill and a reinvigoration for British maritime 
thinking, culminating with the publication of BR1806 The Fundamentals of 
British Maritime Doctrine in 1995.  
The preceding discussion of the development of British maritime thought via an 
analysis of the respective approach and or core aspects of the thinking of key 
members of the British maritime school – Colomb, Corbett, Richmond, Roskill 
and Gretton – has sought to shed light on the principles underpinning British 
thinking on maritime strategy and its connection to national policy. It must be 
noted that the discussion has had to be necessarily selective and brief due to the 
range and depth of the subject. However, three key points emerge from the 
preceding discussion, which to varying extents and degrees of emphasis recur 
through the works of the above-named thinkers; a span of time covering the period 
from 1891 to 1965 (the dates of publication of Colomb’s Naval Warfare and 
Gretton’s Maritime Strategy respectively), and continue to feature in 
contemporary works.  
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Thus, it could be argued that the following constitute enduring aspects of British 
maritime thought. First, the British maritime school has emphasised a maritime, 
rather than naval, approach to the military application of seapower. This approach 
places the control of maritime communications as the primary means of securing 
‘command of the sea’ (understood in a limited sense), emphasising a pragmatic 
and flexible approach to utilising the sea for national purposes, in particular, the 
projection of power. Second, the highlighting of the link between seapower, 
maritime strategy and national policy, that is, an emphasis on the strategic and 
grand strategic utility of maritime power for Britain. Third, a recognition of the 
value of the study of history as a means of aiding the development of thinking and 
theoretical study (individually and collectively), which in turn has a practical 
utility.117  
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the purpose of doctrine is to provide a 
framework of principles, practices and procedures as the basis for action.118 
Having examined the principles underpinning British thinking on maritime 
strategy, it is to the evolution of contemporary British maritime doctrine that the 
chapter now turns.   
The Evolution of Contemporary British Maritime Doctrine: 1995-2011 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to provide an overview of the 
evolution of British maritime doctrine between 1995 and 2011. In this context, 
doctrine includes the officially promulgated BR1806 series (The Fundamentals of 
British Maritime Doctrine and its second and third editions renamed as British 
Maritime Doctrine), the fourth edition of British Maritime Doctrine (published as 
a Joint Doctrine Publication) and associated concepts. These are the Maritime 
Contribution to Joint Operations (MCJO), The Future Navy and Future Navy 
Operational Concept (FNOC), the Versatile Maritime Force (VMF) and the 
Future Maritime Operational Concept (FMOC). The latter are included because 
they were either incorporated into formal doctrine (MCJO, the Future Navy and 
VMF) or stand alongside doctrine (that is, FMOC). This will provide the 
conceptual framework for the following chapters within which the subsequent 	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examination of the CVF programme will be undertaken, and will also illustrate the 
continuity of British maritime thinking, as discussed in the preceding section.     
It is important to note briefly the strategic context within which The Fundamentals 
of British Maritime Doctrine was developed and the implications for the overall 
purpose for which it was written. The early 1990s were a period of strategic flux 
as the international system adjusted in response to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the end of the Cold War and increasing instability in areas such as the 
Balkans, the Middle East and Africa. In military terms, the changing strategic 
environment implied a shift away from the focus on the Euro-Atlantic theatre of 
operations, in particular the North German Plain and hence the North-eastern 
Atlantic, toward responding to crises in, for example, the Persian Gulf, that is, a 
shift from a static territorial defence posture to an expeditionary posture.119 The 
end of the Cold War prompted a so-called ‘peace dividend’ that provided 
justification for substantial reductions in defence expenditure, including 
significant cuts to the Royal Navy - both in terms of manpower and equipment.120 
It also required and served to stimulate renewed conceptual thinking regarding the 
roles and utility of the Armed Forces in light of the evolving strategic context; the 
enduring constabulary operations in the Balkans and Middle East (enforcing the 
no-fly zones over Iraq and operations in the Persian Gulf) being the most notable 
examples of the changed operating environment. Furthermore, due to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and with it, the Soviet Navy, Western maritime supremacy 
was confirmed; this in some quarters raised questions concerning the extent to 
which money should be spent on navies.121 In addition, the apparent ‘victory 
through air power’ in the 1991 Gulf War and the prominence of air and ground 
forces in operations in the Balkans appeared to place the role of naval forces in the 
margins.122 This was reflected in the British 1993 Long-term Costings process 
where investment in maritime capabilities, including for a dedicated Landing 	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Platform Helicopter (LPH, commissioned in 1998 as HMS Ocean), was set 
against spending on the NATO Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps 
(ARRC) and thereby continuing the Continental Commitment.123 The LPH did 
survive the process albeit set alongside the Royal Navy losing all its conventional 
submarines (four Upholder-class boats) and a reduction in escort numbers from 39 
to ‘about 35’.124 
It is within this setting that the development of British maritime doctrine in the 
1990s needs to be considered. This is because, as described above, the strategic 
context of the early 1990s could be interpreted as being unfavourable for arguing 
the ‘maritime case’. However, due to the legacy of the latter part of the Cold War, 
and the need for the Royal Navy to demarcate a role for itself vis-à-vis the 
established roles of the Army and Royal Air Force in NATO planning,125 and the 
publication in 1989 and 1991 respectively of official statements of Army doctrine 
(British Military Doctrine) and the RAF’s AP3000,126 the Royal Navy in the early 
1990s initiated its own efforts to produce a doctrinal statement. A key motivation 
for this was the perceived forthcoming development of joint doctrine and the need 
for the Royal Navy to have a document available when this process began.127 
Thus, a core element underpinning the development of British maritime doctrine 
in the 1990s was the requirement to articulate the utility of maritime power, with a 
particular emphasis on its contribution at the joint level, in order to assure a Royal 
Navy input into the development of joint doctrine. It is in part for this reason that 
BR1806 was promulgated as maritime, rather than naval, doctrine; as The 
Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine states: 
This document is specifically concerned with the application of maritime power, 
as opposed to naval power. The difference is significant. Maritime power is 
inherently joint in nature. It emanates from forces drawn from all three Services, 
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both sea and land based, supported by national and commercial resources, 
exercising influence over sea, land and air environments.128 
This approach to the development of the Royal Navy’s doctrine was successful in 
two respects. Firstly, and noting a drawback of the use of the term ‘maritime’, 
Grove suggests: ‘There are problems in this approach as it sometimes seems to 
make “maritime” a single-service “dark blue” word. But it does have the 
advantage of making the Royal Navy’s doctrine basically joint’.129 Secondly, the 
emphasis on the utility of maritime power at the joint level resulted in providing, 
as stated by Grove, ‘its authors [Professor Eric Grove and Commander Michael 
Codner] and the Navy in general, disproportionate leverage in the production of 
the first 1996 edition of British Defence Doctrine (BDD)’.130 The objective of 
providing a Royal Navy input into the development of joint doctrine was achieved 
and this would hold longer-term significance, in particular with regard to the 
enunciation of an expeditionary approach to British strategy in the 1998 Strategic 
Defence Review that included commitment to the CVF programme. The influence 
of BR1806 on British Defence Doctrine is summarised by Grove (whilst again 
noting that Grove was one of authors of 1806) in the following terms: 
The dynamics of the creation of this document vindicated the architects of 1806. 
Not only were the authors of 1806 fully involved in its drafting (and the naval 
perspectives fully inputted) but Chapter 2 of 1806, ‘General Concepts of Armed 
Conflict’, proved a useful starting point for the authors of the new joint 
document....131 
The emphasis on the role and utility of maritime power at the joint level would 
remain a core tenet of British maritime doctrine. The second edition of BR1806, 
renamed British Maritime Doctrine and published in 1999,132 included a chapter 
entitled ‘Summarising the Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations’, which 
included the statement: 
Maritime force has to be regarded in a joint context in which naval assets 
provided are to a large degree the servants of purposes which will frequently and 
ultimately be executed on shore and by land forces. But maritime manoeuvre, the 
maritime contribution to this venture, offers a sensitive application of force or 
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influence, enabling intervention at a time and place of political choice, and an 
opportunity to exploit the effect of joint assets. 133 
This quotation is important as it illustrates the influence on British maritime 
thinking of a concept originally derived from thinking on land warfare – 
manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare seeks to:  
.... Incapacitate an enemy by disrupting his fighting system (systemic disruption) 
through the concentration of superior force against those elements of his fighting 
system most likely to cause the collapse of his will. Fundamentally the aim is to 
shatter both his moral and physical cohesion.134 
The application of the ‘manoeuvrist approach’ to the maritime environment is 
intended to capitalise on the attributes of the maritime environment and maritime 
forces, namely, the ubiquitous access provided by the sea and the mobility, 
flexibility and leverage of sea-based forces. The reference to manoeuvre warfare 
also highlights a core feature of MCJO; the shift in focus from blue water 
operations to the littoral and the projection of power ashore.135 The littoral is 
defined in BR1806 as encompassing ‘The area from the open ocean which must 
be controlled to support operations ashore, and the area inland from shore that can 
be supported directly from the sea.’136 The concept of ‘Littoral Manoeuvre’ 
subsequently evolved as a component of the Future Navy process alongside 
‘Maritime Strike’ (consisting of Tactical Air Power, Land Attack Missile, Naval 
Fire Support and Air Manoeuvre components137) to form the Maritime Force 
Projection component of the Versatile Maritime Force.138 Littoral Manoeuvre is 
defined as: ‘The use of the littoral as an operational manoeuvre space from which 
a sea-based Joint amphibious force can threaten, or apply and sustain, force 
ashore’.139 It must be highlighted that the definition of the littoral is flexible. For 
example, the opening phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (the US-led 
operation in Afghanistan in October 2001) saw US Navy and Marine Corps 
carrier-borne strike fighters conduct missions at ranges of 600 to 750 nautical 
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miles from their carriers.140 Such missions constituted 72 per cent of all combat 
sorties conducted over Afghanistan between 7 October 2001 and 16 March 2002 
(covering the main combat phase of Operation Enduring Freedom)141 and in 
effect, indicated that for the US Navy, the littoral could be defined as spanning 
600-750 miles inland. 
The utility of the MCJO concept was deemed by the Royal Navy to have been 
proven in operations in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq and was thus formally 
incorporated into the third edition of British Maritime Doctrine (published in 
2004), rather than constituting a stand-alone chapter as in the second edition.142 
The third edition retained the emphasis on the maritime contribution to joint 
operations but also included a significant amount of generic defence, rather than 
specifically maritime, doctrine. This was due to the third edition pre-dating 
contemporary joint doctrine.143 The third edition of BR1806 was the last to be 
produced under the auspices of the Royal Navy’s Maritime Warfare Centre; the 
latest fourth edition was instead developed at the Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre (DCDC) under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence and 
endorsed by all three Services.144 This transition from producing single service 
doctrine within the service responsible, to the development of environmental 
doctrine within the joint DCDC establishment, effectively marks the culmination 
of the process started in the early 1990s, where the Royal Navy sought to gain an 
input into the joint doctrine process alongside the Army and RAF. In essence, 
maritime doctrine (as well as Army and RAF doctrine) has become an output of 
the overarching joint doctrine process.  
The preceding discussion has sought to firstly place the development of British 
maritime doctrine within the context of the evolving strategic environment and 
resultant debate on the roles and utility of the armed forces in the 1990s. From this 
the shift to the development of joint doctrine and for the Royal Navy, the 
emphasis within its own doctrine on MCJO as a means to secure input into joint 
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Manoeuvrist Approach, can be ascertained. This component of the analysis 
essentially considered the role of maritime doctrine as a contribution to higher-
level thinking, that is, British defence doctrine and ultimately policy (this will be 
discussed in detail in chapter six which specifically examines the connection 
between maritime strategy and national policy). The analysis will now shift to 
focus on the core principles contained within the three editions of BR1806 and the 
extant JDP 0-10 (‘Joint Doctrine Publication’ and the number assigned to the 
current version of British Maritime Doctrine) and thus shed light on the evolution 
of British maritime doctrine from 1995 to the present. 
The foundation of British maritime doctrine is provided in three chapters common 
to the three editions of BR1806; the structure of the fourth edition is somewhat 
different, employing an ends, ways, means framework, but the principles are 
nevertheless still present. The fourth edition of British Maritime Doctrine will be 
discussed separately below. In BR1806, the principal maritime doctrinal points are 
covered in ‘The Maritime Environment and the Nature of Maritime Power’, 
‘Concepts Governing the Use of Maritime Power’ (retitled ‘Principles Governing 
the Use of Maritime Power’ in the third edition) and ‘The Application of Maritime 
Power’. ‘The Maritime Environment and the Nature of Maritime Power’ sets out 
in The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine the environmental factors 
affecting the use of the maritime environment, describes the nature of maritime 
power and discusses the attributes of maritime power. In the second edition, the 
chapter, whilst preserving the aforementioned outline, devotes more coverage to 
the environmental aspect, including more detailed discussion of the economic, 
political and legal dimensions. In the third edition, the socio-cultural and 
scientific-technological dimensions of the maritime environment are also added as 
is discussion of ‘Operations in the Littoral’. The chapter on ‘Concepts/Principles 
Governing the Use of Maritime Power’ examines the military applications of 
maritime power at and from the sea, focusing on the key concepts of sea control, 
sea denial, fleet in being, maritime power projection, maritime manoeuvre and 
‘Proactive and Reactive Choices in Strategic Operational Planning’. The latter 
encompassed the debate on the relative merits of the offensive versus the 




‘offensive’; 145 in the second and third editions of BR1806, convoy operations in 
the First and Second World Wars were utilised as a case study of ‘The Balance of 
Offensive and Defensive’. In The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, the 
term ‘Command of the Sea’ is discussed as a stand-alone concept; in the second 
and third editions, it is only briefly discussed in the chapter’s introduction. The US 
Navy derived term ‘Battlespace Dominance’ was also included within the three 
editions of BR1806 but has been removed from current doctrine. Battlespace 
dominance was defined as  
...Control over the environments of the entire battlespace; the surface, subsurface, 
air, land and space environments, and the electromagnetic spectrum...The concept 
of battlespace dominance is useful in joint and littoral operations where there is a 
need to maintain freedom of action ashore.146 
The omission of a section on ‘Cover’ in The Fundamentals of British Maritime 
Doctrine was corrected in the second edition;147 it has remained within the 
subsequent iterations of British Maritime Doctrine. Cover is defined as ‘the 
provision of support if required, to less powerful units or detached elements of the 
force that are engaged in operations of their own, taking advantage of the wider 
sea control that the main force has achieved’.148 This quotation highlights the 
fundamental connection between naval and maritime power. As Till states: ‘navies 
must strive for sea control because that facilitated the achievement of naval 
objectives that would in turn help secure national objectives in a maritime 
campaign or war’.149 The concept of cover will be returned to in a subsequent 
chapter as a component of discussions pertaining to the debate on British maritime 
strategy.  
Within British Maritime Doctrine, the discussion of cover completes the ‘at sea’ 
portion of the chapter on the ‘Concepts/Principles Governing the Use of Maritime 
Power’; the chapter then proceeds to examine the concept of maritime power 
projection. The structure of the discussion of maritime power projection in The 
Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine and its evolution in the subsequent 
iterations of BR1806 warrants brief discussion. The discussion of maritime power 	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projection is divided into sections explaining ‘The Significance of Land Warfare 
Concepts for Maritime Doctrine’, ‘Manoeuvre in Maritime Warfare’, ‘Manoeuvre 
as a Style of Warfare’, ‘Manoeuvre as a Style of Warfare in the Maritime Context’ 
and ‘Manoeuvre from the Sea as a Combat Function’. The sections explain both 
the concept of Manoeuvre Warfare and its relevance to the maritime environment; 
this does result in some of the content being more generic to defence (for example, 
the section on ‘Manoeuvre as a Style of Warfare’)150 rather than specifically 
maritime, but as noted above, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine 
pre-dated the generic, non-environmental British Defence Doctrine. In the 
subsequent editions of BR1806, the discussion of maritime power projection 
focuses on the maritime dimensions of Manoeuvre Warfare, omitting ‘The 
Significance of Land Warfare Concepts for Maritime Doctrine’ and ‘Manoeuvre 
as a Style of Warfare’. In an indication of the increasing importance of the 
maritime contribution at the joint level, a section on ‘Manoeuvre and Joint 
Operations’ is also included in the second and third editions of BR1806.    
The third of the maritime doctrinal chapters, ‘The Application of Maritime 
Power’, addresses the range of tasks that maritime forces can undertake at and 
from the sea. The chapter employs an analytical framework dividing the 
applications of maritime power into three categories. Military or combat-governed 
use: ‘A military use is one in which combat is used or threatened or which 
presupposes a combat capability. All Warfighting tasks require the military use of 
force’. Second, Constabulary use: ‘...forces are employed to enforce law or to 
implement some regime established by international mandate. Violence is only 
employed for self-defence or as a last resort in the execution of the constabulary 
task’. This includes tasks such as embargo enforcement, counter-piracy, and 
maritime counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics operations. Third, Benign use: 
This includes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, search and 
rescue or disposal of ordnance; ‘tasks are benign because violence has no part to 
play in their execution’.151  
This framework was derived from Professor Eric Grove’s previously developed 
‘military/diplomatic/constabulary’ concept articulated in his Future of Sea 	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Power.152 Grove’s ‘The use of the sea’ trinity was evolved from Ken Booth’s 
earlier triangular model of the uses of the sea, articulated in his 1977 book Navies 
and Foreign Policy.153 A major element in Grove’s evolved concept was a clearer 
distinction, influenced by Sir James Cable, between the military and diplomatic 
uses of maritime power.154 In BR1806, the military application of maritime power 
is divided into ‘Maritime Power from the Sea’ and ‘Maritime Power at Sea’; the 
former includes nuclear deterrence and ‘Combat Operations Against the Land’ 
(for example, amphibious operations, land attack missile strikes and carrier-borne 
air operations); the latter is sub-divided into ‘Operations against Enemy Forces’ 
(including interdiction operations, blockade and other methods to attain sea 
control) and ‘Protection of Maritime Trade’ (including convoy, escort operations 
and naval control of shipping)155. In addition, naval diplomacy, and from the 
second edition onward, defence diplomacy, and peace support operations, are 
included as military applications. In the third edition of BR1806, the applications 
of maritime power were placed within the following contexts: ‘The Maritime 
Contribution to Standing Strategic Tasks’, ‘The Maritime Contribution to 
Standing Home Commitments’, ‘The Maritime Contribution to Standing Overseas 
Commitments’ and ‘The Maritime Contribution to Contingent Overseas 
Operations’. 156  It is perhaps the case that this detailed break-down of 
commitments was included in the third edition, as at that time, the UK was 
committed to operations in Iraq (Operation Telic) and Afghanistan, to convey a 
political message regarding the Royal Navy’s spectrum of operational activities 
and thus ensure that the Royal Navy was seen to be ‘relevant’ to policy-makers.  
Across the three editions of BR1806, the context for maritime doctrine within the 
wider strategic and grand strategic setting was established prior to discussing the 
specifically maritime doctrine. In the first edition, due to its pre-dating British 
Defence Doctrine, this resulted in dedicated chapters on ‘Security and Defence 
Policy’ and ‘General Concepts of Armed Conflict’. In the subsequent editions, a 	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single chapter on ‘Maritime Doctrine in Context’ (the first chapter in both 
editions) was used to link maritime doctrine with wider defence policy and British 
Defence Doctrine, for example, by placing the Principles of War in a maritime 
context.157  
The fourth edition of British Maritime Doctrine, published in 2011 as a Joint 
Doctrine Publication by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, follows 
a somewhat different approach to the previous editions. This is principally for two 
reasons. First, as the document has been developed as an output of the wider joint 
doctrinal development process centred at DCDC, there is no longer the 
requirement to include within British Maritime Doctrine a range of content that is 
issued separately; this includes particularly content relating to logistics and 
campaign planning and conduct. Secondly, the new edition of British Maritime 
Doctrine utilises an ends, ways, means framework, thus resulting in the document 
being distilled into three chapters rather than the nine chapters (plus the 
bibliographical essay ‘From Trafalgar to Today: A Bibliographical Essay on 
Doctrine and the Development of British Naval Strategic Thought’)158 of the third 
edition. Chapter one summarises the ends for British maritime power; this is 
placed within the context of UK national interests and the strategic maritime 
environment and follows on from the October 2010 National Security Strategy 
and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).159 Chapter two considers the 
ways in which maritime power functions. This includes an overview of the 
attributes of maritime power and examines the roles of maritime power utilising a 
new framework replacing the military, constabulary and benign roles-based 
construct of BR1806. The three roles defined in the current edition of British 
Maritime Doctrine are: war-fighting; maritime security; and international 
engagement. The former two are essentially consistent with the earlier military 
and constabulary roles; the latter, international engagement is defined as: ‘British 
maritime forces, working with partners, exert power and influence in support of 
national political objectives with the aim to prevent conflict by deterring, 
coercing, stabilising and reassuring others in time of crisis’. 160 International 	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engagement includes such tasks as conflict prevention, nuclear and conventional 
deterrence, reassurance, coercion, containment, providing presence and maritime 
stabilisation operations.161  
The principles governing the use of maritime power at and from the sea are 
included under the heading ‘war-fighting’ and are consistent with BR1806. The 
section on maritime power projection and its contribution to joint operations has 
been tabulated and uses the following headings: ‘Shape’, ‘Reassure’, ‘Deter’, 
‘Coerce’, Disrupt’, ‘Project’, ‘Support’, ‘Limit’ and ‘Recover’.162 Chapter three 
considers the means by which maritime capability is delivered. It is divided into 
three sections covering the conceptual, moral and physical components. 
Previously, these aspects of maritime doctrine were also covered in a dedicated 
chapter entitled ‘Maritime Combat Capabilities’, Maritime Operational 
Capability’ or ‘Maritime Fighting Power and Operational Capability’ in the first, 
second and third editions respectively. This chapter includes under the ‘Force 
Structure’ heading, the force generation requirements established in the SDSR 
replacing the aforementioned maritime contribution to specific tasks outlined in 
the third edition of BR1806. The SDSR force components consist of three major 
elements. First, the Committed Force, comprising ‘those force elements required 
to meet the non-discretionary elements of the National Security Strategy...For the 
Royal Navy this includes submarines, surface ships, aircraft, marines and support 
units and ships that are globally deployed on operations...’ Second, the Responsive 
Force, which comprises ‘those force elements that are required to respond to the 
full range of demands for which the UK should be prepared’. This includes 3 
Commando Brigade Royal Marines. Thirdly, the Adaptive Force, which 
comprises ‘those force elements that routinely, are neither attributed to the 
committed nor responsive force’. This includes those assets ‘recently returned 
from operations, are generating for operations or are in an extended maintenance 
period and are at a lower readiness’.163  
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The ‘Responsive Force’ includes the ‘Responsive Force Task Group’ that the 
Royal Navy is required to provide under the SDSR.164 The Response Force Task 
Group replaces the previously separate Carrier Strike Task Group and 
Amphibious Task Group and is intended to provide a hybrid power projection 
capability (that is, carrier strike and littoral manoeuvre), especially from when the 
Carrier Enabled Power Projection capability is established.165 The Carrier Enabled 
Power Projection concept will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. 
In order to link this chapter with the following chapters examining the CVF 
programme, it is useful to note the doctrinal context within which the development 
of the ships, and the associated joint combat aircraft variant debate (concerning 
the fast jet component of the ship’s planned air group), took place. Having already 
established the shift in focus for British maritime thinking in the 1990s from Cold 
War scenarios to expeditionary operations, in particular in the littoral and the 
incorporation into doctrine of the Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations, 
mention of the Royal Navy’s forward-looking conceptual thinking – The Future 
Navy and Future Navy Operational Concept – is required. The Future Navy 
articulated the Navy Board’s ‘strategic concept for the future naval service’,166 
and this informed the operational-level Future Navy Operational Concept.167 Both 
documents were developed in 2000-01168 and were incorporated into the third 
edition of BR1806. The overarching strategic vision articulated in The Future 
Navy centred on the concept of a Versatile Maritime Force which: 
... is optimised for Joint power projection, assured access to the theatre of 
operations for the Joint force, Joint rapid effect, and information superiority, but 
able to play its part in all types of conflict... has the global reach, sustainability 
and endurance required to operate in the geographic regions identified in UK 
defence policy... can provide suitably configured maritime capabilities able to 
contribute at the different scales of effort required by MoD planning 
assumptions... is fully interoperable with the Future Army, Future Air Force, and 
other national and international military and civil partners likely to be 
encountered in the joint, combined or integrated operations envisaged in UK 
defence policy...169 
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The Future Navy also introduced an ‘enabling concept’ for the VMF: ‘Swing...the 
ability to configure a force, formation or unit to allow it to operate successfully, 
and cost effectively, across a range of mission types and roles’.170 ‘Swing’ would 
be based on a number of components, including adaptability, configurability, 
standardisation, simplicity of operation and information superiority;171 the aircraft 
carrier was cited as a ‘definitive example’ of configurability (‘the ability to 
configure a unit to suit strategic, operational or tactical imperative’).172 The vision 
articulated in The Future Navy provided the basis for the operational-level Future 
Navy Operational Concept, which had the purpose of describing how the Royal 
Navy will fight and the four core maritime capabilities that it would contribute to 
a future joint campaign. 173  Those four capabilities were defined as: power 
projection (including maritime strike and littoral manoeuvre), flexible global 
reach, optimised access (based on sea control in both open waters and the littoral) 
and C4ISR.174 It is in this context provided by The Future Navy, The Future Navy 
Operational Concept and the VMF that Royal Navy thinking on the roles and 
utility of the future aircraft carriers, and wider capability development, needs to be 
considered, especially in light of their importance to the Future Navy,175 and will 
be examined in detail in the following chapters. 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview of the development 
of contemporary British maritime thinking and doctrine and the longer-term 
historical context from which it has emerged. This was in order to highlight the 
enduring themes and ideas within British maritime thinking and to deduce the 
influence of such thinking on contemporary doctrine. From the above analysis, 
both historic and contemporary, the following emerge as enduring tenets of British 
maritime strategic thought. First, an emphasis on the maritime, rather than naval, 	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approach to the military application of seapower and the contribution of maritime 
power to joint operations. That is, the utility of maritime power as a strategic 
instrument of national policy.  Second, a pragmatic and flexible conception of sea 
control which is viewed as a means to an end – the exploitation of maritime 
communications to enable the projection of power ashore. In this regard, a 
member of the team at DCDC that developed the fourth edition of British 
Maritime Doctrine stated that the ‘core imperative [for the Royal Navy]: [is] to 
attain the necessary degree of sea control to enable hard-edged combat operations 
and day-to-day international engagement and influence’. 176  Finally, the 
recognition of the importance of the study of history as the basis for the analysis 
and interpretation of experience and the development of knowledge and 
understanding; both of which are the foundation for the development of effective 
doctrine.177  
The development of the British approach to, and thinking on, maritime strategy 
highlights the connection between national context and conceptions of seapower. 
In summary, due to Britain’s historic position, in particular in the latter half of the 
19th and early 20th centuries, as the preeminent maritime power, British thinkers, 
such as Admiral Colomb and Sir Julian Corbett, could consider how to exploit 
British naval strength, for example, to enable expeditionary operations, following 
the defeat of lesser naval forces. In contrast, those states with relatively weaker 
naval capabilities would develop their thinking regarding the exploitation of 
seapower along different lines. In this regard, the French Jeune Ecole of the 
nineteenth century and German thinkers of the twentieth sought to exploit guerre 
de course – commerce warfare – as a means to offset British maritime 
superiority.178 In addition, the examination of the historical application of British 
maritime power and its relation to national policy, enabled thinkers such as 
Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond to develop the notion of a ‘British 
Way in Warfare’ and to emphasise the utility of maritime forces to British national 
strategy. This has an enduring relevance as indicated by the focus on the maritime 
contribution to joint operations in contemporary British maritime doctrine. 	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This chapter has been concerned with British thinking on the roles and utility of 
maritime power and its translation into doctrine in order to provide that 
‘framework of principles, practices and procedures’ underpinning and guiding the 
development of British maritime capabilities. From 1995 and the publication of 
the first edition of BR1806, the Royal Navy has sought to articulate a coherent 
strategic statement concerning the roles, application and utility of British maritime 
power and its contribution to national policy. It has also sought to outline a 
strategic vision for the future development of Britain’s maritime capabilities and 
how they would contribute to Britain’s future national policy requirements in a 
dynamic strategic environment. At the core of the future maritime force vision are 
the two new aircraft carriers of the Queen Elizabeth-class, the design of which 
was significantly influenced by the developing emphasis on maritime power 
projection, within the context of the MCJO, discussed in this chapter. The 
following three chapters will consider the rationale for their development, 
potential alternatives, and the debate concerning their utility and the implications 








The purpose of this chapter is to examine the rationale for the development and 
acquisition of what became the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. In order to 
do this, the chapter will first briefly examine the Royal Navy and its historical 
engagement with carrier airpower; it then proceeds to consider the strategic 
rationale for carrier airpower, examining its roles, utility and contribution to 
national policy. Proceeding from this, the chapter examines the evolution of 
British thinking on the development of a replacement for the Invincible-class 
aircraft carriers, that is, the evolution of the Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) 
programme. The development of British thinking on a replacement aircraft carrier 
capability, in particular between 1996 and 2002, illustrates effectively the 
changing trajectory of wider British maritime doctrine – as discussed in the 
preceding chapter – from a focus on sea control, in particular anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW), operations in the North Atlantic to expeditionary power 
projection operations, as conceptualised in the Maritime Contribution to Joint 
Operations. 1  Conversely, the direction of policy adopted by the British 
government since 2010, especially toward maritime airpower (and amphibious 
capabilities), reflects an increasing divergence between national policy and 
maritime strategy with significant implications for the capability and credibility of 
British maritime airpower.2   
This chapter is also the first of three chapters that focus on the debate concerning 
the development and acquisition of Britain’s future aircraft carriers. In this regard, 
the purpose of this chapter is to examine both in theoretical terms and with 
reference to historical experience, the strategic roles and utility of aircraft carriers 	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in order to inform the analysis of the rationale underpinning Britain’s decision to 
invest in the Queen Elizabeth-class. Chapter four will examine the design and 
development of the carriers and debate on the variant of fixed-wing aircraft to be 
embarked: whilst chapter five will consider potential alternatives to the aircraft 
carrier and the role of maritime aviation within wider British airpower. 
Central to this chapter and those following, is the question: what is the utility of an 
aircraft carrier? This question is important because in order to determine the 
relevance and whether or not there is a need for an aircraft carrier, its utility must 
be understood. In this light, the state of public debate in the UK concerning its 
maritime capabilities, in particular aircraft carriers, warrants concern. This is 
highlighted by Tim Benbow with regard to the debate ahead of the 2010 Strategic 
Defence and Security Review: 
Even the Prime Minister and some senior military officers publicly professed not to 
know what aircraft carriers were useful for.... The principal gap in knowledge that 
became so painfully evident was the remarkable lack of awareness of the options 
that aircraft carriers and amphibious forces provide to policy-makers. This blind 
spot is disappointing and in stark contrast to the approach of states such as the 
United States, France, Italy and Spain, not to mention India and China.3 
The ‘remarkable lack of awareness’ concerning the utility of aircraft carriers has 
direct strategic implications for the development of British maritime airpower, 
most notably seen in the British government’s decision to reduce the fixed-wing 
component of the planned Queen Elizabeth-class air-group to 12 aircraft (from 36; 
the air-group could, contingent on funding and the availability of trained 
personnel, be expanded in future), to switch from a catapult-assisted take-off but 
arrested recovery (CATOBAR) configuration for the aircraft carriers to a short 
take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) configuration and a commitment at present 
to operating a part-time carrier capability with only one ship being operational. 
The Royal Navy has accumulated substantial, and at times world-leading, 
experience of aviation operations at sea. This provides a valuable source of 
historical knowledge to inform contemporary debates, whilst also highlighting the 
utility of carrier airpower to British national policy. 
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The Royal Navy and Carrier Airpower: A Brief Overview     
The purpose of this section is to highlight key points in the development of 
Britain’s use of carrier-based airpower. It is not intended to provide an account of 
the history of British maritime airpower and is necessarily brief and selective.4 
Rather, the key points to be highlighted, for example, the inter-war period of Dual 
Control and the debate concerning the requirements of British airpower in the 
1960s, are central to understanding the British debate on the roles and utility of 
carrier airpower. Situated alongside the debate on the roles and utility of carrier 
airpower, is the enduring debate on its ownership; that is, whether the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) should be responsible for all British airpower, or whether, due to the 
unique requirements of operating within the maritime environment, the Fleet Air 
Arm constitutes an indivisible component of the Royal Navy. The debate on 
ownership will be discussed in-depth in chapter five; however, aspects of the 
analysis in this chapter touch upon this issue and will be highlighted where 
appropriate.5 
The Royal Navy commenced its first experiments involving aircraft in 1903 with 
tethered man-carrying kites.6 This was followed by an interest in airships, most 
notably marked by the signing of a contract for the Royal Navy’s first airship on 7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The following provide a valuable and diverse account of the development of British maritime 
airpower: Tim Benbow (ed.), British Naval Aviation: The First 100 Years, (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2011); Tim Benbow, ‘The Post-1945 Struggle for Naval Aviation’, Eric Grove, ‘The Naval 
Aviation Controversy 1919-1939’, and Captain Jeremy Stocker, RNR ‘Full Circle: Queen 
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5 For a valuable account of the wider debate concerning the need for an independent air force, 
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May 1909 – the official ‘beginning’ of British naval aviation.7 The Royal Navy 
commissioned its first aircraft (albeit seaplane) carrier, HMS Hermes, on 7 May 
1913; the ship was intended to evaluate whether it was possible for aircraft to 
operate with the fleet under operational conditions.8 This was one aspect of a 
larger, pro-active effort to research and develop the potential of maritime 
aviation,9 the results of which were summarised by Lieutenant Commander Peter 
Kemp, Royal Navy as follows: 
It was naval pilots who practised and evolved a workable method of bombing, who 
experimented with wireless transmitters in aircraft, who first attempted to fit 
machine-guns in aeroplanes. It was their zeal and enthusiasm, backed up by an 
adventurous and far-seeing First Lord, which had produced the finest aerial fighting 
force in the world by the time the war clouds burst over Europe in 1914.10 
The Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS)11 was moreover, as Dr Christina Goulter, 
Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the 
Joint Services Command and Staff College, argues: 
... materially, and perhaps psychologically, better prepared for its particular tasks 
than its military counterpart. Once the war started, the gap widened, and the most 
striking contrast was in the area of solving operational problems, especially those 
related to equipment. While there was little attempt made by RFC [Royal Flying 
Corps] heads to rectify many tactical and technical shortcomings, the RNAS had by 
1918 identified, and made considerable progress towards solving, the chief 
difficulties involved in long-range maritime air operations.12 
It does warrant mention though that, in some respects, the RNAS was becoming a 
nascent air force within the Admiralty, rather than a fleet air arm.13 The Royal 
Navy had established a particularly strong position with respect to the 
development of a nascent aircraft carrier force, operating at the time of the 
Armistice a force of six seaplane or aircraft carriers with two more vessels (Eagle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., p.10. 
8 David Hobbs, A Century of Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of Ships and Shipborne Aircraft 
(Barnsley: Seaforth, 2009), pp.28-29.  
9 See, for example, Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’ and ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured 
Corps? The Royal Naval Air Service at War’ in Benbow (ed.), British Naval Aviation; Kemp, Fleet 
Air Arm; Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914-1945; and Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive  
(especially chapter one, ‘Lessons Learned: The First Maritime Aviation Experience’) for accounts 
of the development of British maritime aviation before and during the First World War.  
10 Kemp, Fleet Air Arm, p.23.  
11 This thesis follows the convention set out by Till in Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914-1945, 
that for clarity, the Royal Navy’s air component is referred to as the Royal Naval Air Service for 
the period up to 1918, or as the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) from 1918 onwards, whilst noting that the 
FAA was officially created in 1924 and technically ended with the post-Inskip return of it to the 
Royal Navy in 1939, before re-emerging in 1953. Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, p.9.   
12 Goulter, p.9. 




and Hermes, the first purpose-built aircraft carrier) expected in service by the end 
of 1919. 14  In addition, discussions were underway regarding the possible 
conversion to aircraft carriers of the cruisers Glorious and Courageous. 15 
Professor Geoffrey Till summarises the Royal Navy’s position in 1918 thus: ‘...At 
a time when no other naval power had a single aircraft or seaplane carrier, the 
Royal Navy was planning the eventual disposition of no less than 10 of these 
revolutionary vessels’.16 However, the creation of the Royal Air Force, via the 
amalgamation of the RNAS and Royal Flying Corps (RFC), in April 1918, would 
have significant implications for the development of British maritime airpower.17 
As Goulter highlights, with reference to the disparity in size between the RNAS 
and RFC: 
With the amalgamation, the Admiralty’s influence on aviation reduced radically, 
and there was nothing to replace the naval tradition of heavy investment in research 
and development. An examination of the extent of the RFC’s advances compared 
with those of the RNAS during the war demonstrates just how serious were the 
consequences of the amalgamation, especially for maritime aviation.18   
Further, as Till suggests, citing Admiral of the Fleet Sir Caspar John, a former 
Fleet Air Arm officer and First Sea Lord (1960-1963): 
“The basic reason for the Admiralty ... failings ... was the emasculation of the Navy 
on April 1, 1918, when the bulk of its air knowledge went to the RAF, and took all 
too long to replace...” Deprived of its leadership at the top, naval aviation for many 
years lacked the bureaucratic muscle needed to push for the kind of progress and 
expansion that would have made the sceptical think again.19 
The placing of Britain’s maritime air assets under the control of the RAF, and in 
the case of naval aviation from 1924 under the ‘Dual Control’ of the Admiralty 
and RAF, served as a fundamental constraint on the development of naval and 
wider maritime aviation.20 The RAF’s core raison d’être was strategic bombing, 
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illustrated by the respective size of the RNAS and RFC at the point of amalgamation; the former 
consisting of some 55,000 officers and men, the latter in excess of 200,000. Goulter, p.22. 
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and to a significant extent, other roles such as the provision of maritime airpower 
were seen as unnecessary diversions.21 Dr Peter Gray, then a Group Captain and 
Director of Defence Studies (RAF), explained the significance of strategic 
bombing thus: 
As post-Great War budgets were slashed, the RAF needed its own, distinct role. If 
air power was primarily in support of land and naval forces, assets could be 
redistributed with an appropriate saving in organisation costs – and then the 
junior service would probably be allowed to wither on the vine. The strategic 
bombing role offered both a lifeline for the RAF and a cudgel with which to beat 
sister services in the scrimmage for funding. As this was a continuing process, the 
concept of strategic bombing became embedded in the RAF psyche, particularly 
under the charismatic leadership of ‘Boom’ Trenchard.22 
The perceived utility of strategic bombing was articulated in the RAF’s principal 
doctrinal publication, AP1300 Royal Air Force Manual – Operations, in the 
following terms: ‘The bombardment of the most vital and vulnerable of these 
centres may be more effective and decisive than the direct attack on naval and 
military forces’.23 Moreover, the RAF, being then (as it is now) a principally land-
based organisation, lacked sufficient familiarity with the requirements of 
operations at and from the sea. Kemp explains the question at the centre of the 
inter-war debate on ownership of naval aviation thus: 
It was the use to which it could be put in the naval field as adjunct of sea power and 
a new element of naval strategy. Sea power, for all its immense and devastating 
strength, is a delicate instrument finely balanced, and in its exercise it calls for an 
expert touch, acquired only after years of training and experience. To try and graft 
a powerful new weapon on to so intricate a growth without expert knowledge and 
guidance was certain to end in confusion or chaos, and it was only the Admiralty 
that could supply that expert knowledge and guidance.24      
The enacting of an agreement in 1924 between the Deputy Chief of the Naval 
Staff, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes and the Chief of the Air Staff, Lord Trenchard – 
the Trenchard-Keyes Agreement – effectively laid the foundations for the Dual 
Control system.25 The purpose of this agreement was to implement the Balfour 	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Report (deriving from the Balfour Subcommittee convened in 1923) which 
established that the Admiralty would pay for the Fleet Air Arm (FAA), that it 
would receive what it required from the Air Ministry and that all observers and 70 
per cent of pilots were to be naval although the latter would be attached to the 
Royal Air Force (but remain in naval uniform).26 Although the Trenchard-Keyes 
Agreement would increase the naval component of the FAA, it would until 1937, 
remain under the authority of the RAF. The return of the FAA to Admiralty 
control, the Inskip Award, was achieved following an inquiry by Sir Thomas 
Inskip, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, the findings of which were 
announced in Parliament on 30 July 1937.27 The transition from Royal Air Force 
to Royal Navy control was completed in 1939.28 
The implications of nearly two decades of RAF/Dual Control for British naval 
aviation are expressed succinctly by Till: 
By 1939 the Royal Navy had yielded the race to develop air power at sea to the US 
and Japanese navies. Where they both deployed over 600 front-line aircraft at sea, 
the British could only manage some 230. Such low numbers encouraged the 
development of relatively inefficient multi-purpose aircraft, weakened the 
performance of the FAA over the whole range of its activities, and made it 
particularly difficult for naval aviation to make that quantum jump from being a 
supportive, ancillary weapon of the Fleet to being a dominant and even decisive 
one.29 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the FAA’s performance in the 
Second World War; however Kemp provides the following summary of key 
lessons emanating from that conflict: 
The first, and overriding, aspect of naval aviation that emerged from the war was 
that it was not a service apart, an air component of the Navy, but an integral part of 
it, extending the range and efficiency of sea power as exercised by the ships of the 
fleet. The two classic examples of this... were the battle of Cape Matapan and the 
hunt of the Bismarck.... Equally important was the provision of close fighter 
support of fleets, squadrons, and convoys at sea. This lesson was most painfully 
and expensively learned off Malaya in the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the 
Repulse.... We learned, too, that carrier-borne aircraft brought with them the ability 
to mount attacks on the enemy in places where he least expected it, and to cover 
assaults designed to further the land operations of the Army.... In these operations it 
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was the presence of the carrier which made possible the assaults from the sea, since 
the chosen theatres of operation were beyond the range of shore-based fighters.30  
The FAA ostensibly entered the post-war period in a strong position, operating on 
paper, a numerically impressive force of wartime aircraft carriers and having 
under construction four Hermes-class light fleet and two Eagle (ex-Audacious) 
class fleet carriers.31 However, the long-term prospects for the FAA were less 
certain. This was principally due to three factors; the parlous economic situation 
confronting Britain in the late 1940s and 1950s; the advent of atomic and nuclear 
weapons and the implications for warfare and strategy; and the development of jet 
aircraft and their impact on carrier design and operations.32 Moreover, in 1950, the 
Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor attempted 
to revisit the debate on ownership of naval aviation, by proposing in a letter to the 
First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser, the merger of RAF Coastal 
Command and the Fleet Air Arm to form a joint Maritime Air Force.33 The 1950s 
would also see a sustained attack on the roles and utility of the FAA under the 
auspices of the Radical Review, held from 1953 to 1955.34 This process would, as 
with debates held before and since, address issues such as the cost effectiveness of 
carrier airpower, whether the Royal Air Force could fulfil maritime air roles 
instead of the Royal Navy and the utility of carriers to British national policy.35           
The 1960s marked both the high and low points of British carrier airpower. The 
former illustrated by the (excluding comparison with the US Navy) formidable 
force of five strike carriers - Ark Royal, Eagle, Victorious, Centaur and Hermes - 
that formed the core of the Royal Navy.36 The latter, the Labour government’s 
decision in 1966 to cancel the planned first of a new class of medium (53,000 
tons) aircraft carriers, CVA-01,37 and withdraw from service the existing ships. 	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The run-down of the existing carrier force occurred rapidly through the late 1960s 
and early 70s; the last carrier to remain, Ark Royal, remained in service until 1978, 
operating an air group of 12 Phantom fighter, 15 Buccaneer strike aircraft, four 
Gannet airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft and seven Sea King anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) helicopters. 38  HMS Hermes was retained in service as a 
commando carrier, that is, only capable of operating rotary wing and short take-
off/vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft (a role fulfilled commendably in the 1982 
Falklands War).  
Concurrent with the development of CVA-01 was work to develop a new escort 
cruiser with a significant embarked helicopter capability (originally intended to be 
nine Wessex ASW).39 This programme survived the cancellation of CVA-01, and 
evolved through the late 1960s into a Through Deck Command Cruiser (TDCC) 
capable of operating helicopters and STOVL aircraft, the latter at that stage, 
envisaged to be Royal Air Force Harriers. The Harrier entered service with the 
Royal Air Force in 1969 and in the same year conducted trials from both the 
cruiser HMS Blake and the carrier HMS Eagle, which led to official approval for 
RAF Harriers to operate at sea.40 These were followed in 1971 by additional trials 
on-board HMS Ark Royal to test the concept of carrier-based Harrier operations.41 
The Royal Navy had also been pursuing work on a ‘maritime support’ version of 
the Harrier and in November 1972, the Harrier manufacturer, Hawker Siddeley, 
received a contract to undertake a study into a ‘Sea Harrier’ for fighter, 
reconnaissance and strike duties with the Fleet Air Arm.42 The contract for the 
first TDCC – Invincible - was placed in April 1973; economic circumstances 
delayed an order for the Sea Harrier, which was finally placed in May 1975.43 
HMS Invincible, the first of three Invincible-class vessels (the other two being 
Illustrious and Ark Royal), was commissioned in 1980 with an air group of nine 
Sea King ASW helicopters and five Sea Harriers. HMS Hermes had also been 
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retained and re-configured as an ASW carrier, with Sea Harrier capability pending 
replacement by Illustrious.44  
In contrast to the current decade-long gap in carrier capability and its concomitant 
impact on the entire system of generating credible naval aviation, the transition at 
the end of the 1970s and early 1980s from conventional carrier operations to 
STOVL operations took place with the benefit of an existing active cadre of Royal 
Navy aircrew and support personnel well-versed and experienced in carrier air 
operations. The Invincible-class provided a very limited fixed-wing capability 
(originally intended mainly to counter shadowing Soviet maritime 
reconnaissance/strike aircraft) especially when compared to the broader capability 
across the whole range of roles of the old Ark Royal. For example, the Sea Harrier 
FRS1, in contrast to the Phantom, lacked a beyond visual range air-to-air missile 
capability (rectified in the 1990s with the FA2 variant), lacked the strike capability 
of the Buccaneer, and as demonstrated in the Falklands War, Invincible (and 
Hermes) then lacked an AEW capability. This was subsequently remedied via the 
development of a specialist Sea King variant. However, the Invincible-class/Sea 
Harrier combination did enable the FAA to maintain a fixed-wing naval aviation 
capability and one that provided a credible, albeit small-scale, capability. This 
issue will be discussed in more detail below with respect to the rationale for 
developing CVF. The Invincible-class remained in service as fixed-wing carriers 
until 2010, when the Coalition government as part of its Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), ordered the immediate withdrawal from service of the 
Harrier and the Ark Royal. Thus, for the first time in nearly a century, Britain lost 
the capability to deploy fixed-wing aircraft at sea, albeit with the commitment that 
at least one of the two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers under construction, would 
enter service sometime in the 2020 timeframe. 
The Strategic Rationale for and Utility of Carrier Airpower45 
The core purpose of carrier airpower is to provide affordable, independent and 
strategically credible deployable airpower.46 The utility of aircraft carriers reflects 	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the broader utility of maritime power. The ability to utilise the sea as a means of 
communication and access, provides maritime forces with the ability to exploit a 
manoeuvre space encompassing 70 per cent of the earth’s surface, free from 
restriction (the high seas are a global commons and warships have the right of 
innocent passage through international straits and archipelagic waters). Moreover, 
80 per cent of the world’s population live within 80 nautical miles of the coast and 
is thus susceptible to influence from the sea.47 The key attributes of access, 
mobility, versatility, sustainability and leverage enable maritime forces to exercise 
influence via a forward presence on a sustained basis.48 The aircraft carrier adds to 
this the ability to provide organic airpower, independent of access, basing and 
over-flight issues, whilst moving up to 500 miles a day, in support of national 
interests. The utility of organic airpower was alluded to in AP3000 British Air and 
Space Power Doctrine as:  
.... Enabling joint ... campaigns to be conducted, particularly by guaranteeing 
freedom of manoeuvre through control of the air ... British air [and space] power 
underpins the United Kingdom’s capability to conduct deep operations, influencing 
events and behaviours anywhere, and at any time.49 
It warrants mention that the above quotation referred to the value of airpower in 
generic, and principally land-based terms. AP3000 was Royal Air Force-led and 
devoted very little attention to sea-based airpower; the extant air doctrine, UK Air 
and Space Doctrine, in contrast, devotes significantly more attention to the utility 
of carrier-based aviation.50 
The utility of and rationale for carrier airpower was recognised in the 1998 
Strategic Defence Review (SDR): 
Our conclusion is that the ability to deploy offensive air power will be central to 
future force projection operations. But we cannot be certain that we will always 
have access to suitable air bases. Even when we do, experience has shown that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Interview with Rear Admiral Tom Cunningham CBE, (then) Rear Admiral Fleet Air Arm, 
Portsmouth, 1 July 2011. 
47 Navy Command Carrier Strike Briefing Presentation, May 2012.  
48 For explanation of the attributes of maritime power, see Ministry of Defence, British Maritime 
Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10, 2011), pp.2-1 to 2-6.  
49 Royal Air Force, AP 3000 British Air and Space Power Doctrine (Fourth Edition) (Ministry of 
Defence: 2009), p.7. AP 3000 constituted the Royal Air Force’s principal doctrinal document. The 
above statement is however applicable to maritime airpower; the concept of ‘control of the air’ for 
example, being a component of the maritime concept of ‘sea control’ (see MoD, British Maritime 
Doctrine, pp.2-10 to 2-11). 
50 MoD/DCDC, UK Air and Space Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30, 2013), see especially 




bases may not always be available in the early stages of a crisis, and that their 
infrastructure is not always able to support the full range of operations required. In 
these and a range of other operational circumstances, aircraft carriers can provide 
valuable flexibility. They can also offer a coercive presence which may forestall the 
need for warfighting...51 
The rationale was reiterated in the 2010 SDSR: 
This capability [Carrier Strike] will give the UK long term political flexibility to act 
without depending, at times of regional tension, on agreement from other countries 
to use of their bases for any mission we want to undertake ... In particular, it 
provides options for a coercive response to crises, as a complement or alternative to 
ground engagements. It contributes to an overall Force Structure geared towards 
helping deter or contain threats from relatively well-equipped regional powers, as 
well as dealing with insurgencies and non-state actors in failing states.52 
Maritime airpower grants flexibility and a sovereign base from which to operate;53 
it is independent of host nation support or caveats and does not impinge on a local 
population. Moreover, a carrier can be redeployed immediately after an operation, 
in contrast to the many months involved in recovering national personnel and 
assets from far-flung land-based corners of the globe. The aircraft carrier also has 
the advantage of being combat-ready at the time of arrival. Although aircraft can 
nominally arrive at a destination faster than a ship, albeit depending on whether 
over-flight permissions, in-flight refuelling support, intermediate and terminal 
basing are available, land-based combat aircraft also require their logistic support 
to deploy in order to undertake operations. The latter point is highlighted with 
reference to the deployment of Typhoon aircraft in support of Operation Ellamy 
(the UK contribution to operations against Libya in 2011), and cited by Peter Luff, 
then Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology: 
The Typhoon Force was warned of a possible deployment on 17 Mar 11; by 1300Z 
on 20 Mar 11, 10 aircraft were in transit to southern Italy ... the rapid provision of 
support infrastructure and turnaround of the deployed aircraft in theatre allowed 
RAF Typhoons to be employed in support of UN resolution 1973 by 1200Z the 
following day, less than 18 hours after their arrival.54 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999 (London: The Stationery Office, 
1998), pp. 143-144. 
52 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), Cm 7948 (London: The Stationery Office, October 2010), p.22. 
53 Interview with US Navy officer, London, 28 September 2011. The officer, interviewed under the 
condition of anonymity, was well placed to offer insight on both British carrier policy and the US 
experience of naval aviation.  
54 ‘Typhoon Force on Operation Ellamy – Narrative’ cited in ‘Letter from Peter Luff MP, Minister 
for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology’ (Ev. 59) in House of Commons Defence 
Committee, Operations in Libya, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Vol. 1, HC 950 (London: The 




The 18-hour lag between the arrival of the Typhoons at their deployed operating 
base and employment is in distinct contrast to the immediate capability offered by 
carrier-based aircraft; such a long gap could have serious consequences in some 
scenarios. The carrier air group deploys with its logistic support and munitions on-
board ship and additional logistics support embarked on accompanying auxiliary 
vessels. This contributes to the carrier’s utility as a means of providing influence; 
the capability to generate combat power at short notice constitutes an overt means 
of conveying intent whether to coerce an adversary or reassure an ally.  
The ability of maritime forces to provide an early intervention capability, thereby 
potentially enabling a crisis or conflict situation to be contained, is of significant 
strategic utility and thus provides policy-makers with choice.55 As a situation 
develops, it may be deemed necessary to make the carrier task group’s presence 
known in the region; alternatively, the force could withdraw without either side 
having to appear to climb down or lose face diplomatically should circumstances 
change; or if necessary, conduct a show of force (as Buccaneers from HMS Ark 
Royal did in 1972 to counter a Guatemalan threat to then British Honduras, now 
Belize).56 That is, the strategic utility of an aircraft carrier is its ability to provide 
choice and a flexible, scalable response to dynamic situations; if combined with a 
forward presence, this may deter conflict from breaking out (the British response 
to an Iraqi threat to Kuwait in 1961 is a valuable example of this in action).57 
An additional strategic and operational benefit provided by aircraft carriers is their 
reduced relative vulnerability to attack, especially compared to land bases. The 
latter’s vulnerability was demonstrated vividly by the Taliban attack on the 
airfield at Camp Bastion on 14 September 2012. This marked the ‘greatest loss of 
US combat aircraft in a single day since the Vietnam War’,58 destroying six AV-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 For further discussion and a historical survey of the utility of aircraft carriers in British service, 
see Benbow, ‘British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships: 1945-2010’. 
56 For an account of this operation, see Rowland White, Phoenix Squadron (London: Corgi Books, 
2010). 
57 See Ian Speller, ‘Limited War and Crisis Management: Naval Aviation in Action from the 
Korean War to the Falklands Conflict’, in Benbow (ed.), British Naval Aviation, pp.151-175; and 
Ian Speller, ‘Kuwait (Op VANTAGE, July 1961)’ in Lt Cdr Tristan Lovering, Royal Navy (ed.), 
Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the Sea (Royal Navy, 2006), pp.413-426.  
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8B Harriers on the ground and significantly damaging two more – approximately 
six per cent of the US Marine Corp’s AV-8B fleet.59 Further, as Benbow states: 
It is often overlooked by the critics of carriers that they are considerably less 
vulnerable to many forms of attack than air bases, the location of which is easily 
available on Google Earth.  It is a matter of fact that no carrier has been hit by an 
enemy, let alone sunk, since the end of the Second World War; nor has any aircraft 
been destroyed by enemy action while onboard a carrier during this period, in 
contrast to the thousands destroyed on bases ashore.60 
Moreover, an aircraft carrier does not operate in isolation; it constitutes one 
component of a task group including escorts, support vessels and submarines. The 
carrier and its air group, combined with the capabilities (in particular, ASW, anti-
surface warfare and anti-air warfare) of the accompanying surface combatants and 
associated submarine(s) form a mutually supporting force projection and 
protection system, which combined with the inherently dynamic and complex 
nature of the maritime environment, significantly complicate an adversary’s 
ability to find, fix and strike the carrier.  
The vulnerability of aircraft carriers and their task groups, especially vis-à-vis 
emergent anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats,61 has to be placed within the 
wider context of an adversary attaining a find, fix and strike capability rather than 
a simplistic analysis based on a perceived vulnerability to a specific ‘carrier 
killer’-type weapon system (for example, the Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic 
missile).62 The Chinese are investing significantly in the development of the 
requisite intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance systems 
to aid in the locating and prosecution of maritime targets;63 such investment would 
be beyond the capabilities of most potential likely adversaries. Further, in the 
event of a major war involving China, fixed infrastructure – especially airbases 
and logistic nodes – would be high-value targets for attack.64 An aircraft carrier 	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60 Tim Benbow and James Bosbotinis, ‘The Interoperability of Future UK Air Power, Afloat and 
Ashore: A Historical Analysis’, Corbett Paper No.13 (The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy 
Studies, January 2014), p.7. 
61 For an overview of the evolving A2/AD threat from a US perspective, see Andrew F. 
Krepinevich, Why AirSea [sic]Battle? (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010).   
62 For analysis of the DF-21 ASBM, see Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, ‘Using the Land 
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College Review, Vol.62, No.4 (Autumn 2009), pp.53-86. 
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has to be located before it can be attacked, and to then deploy ‘sufficient capable 
forces to bear to pose a credible threat is an operation that only a handful of 
nations are capable of achieving’.65    
It would however be wrong to suggest that carriers are not vulnerable to attack. As 
Benbow points out, carriers are potentially vulnerable to certain threats such as 
naval mines or torpedoes that by their nature do not pose a threat to a land base.66 
Further, the shift in emphasis from blue water operations to those in the littoral 
poses certain challenges to carrier operations, namely a reduction in manoeuvre 
space (thus potentially making the find, fix and strike task less difficult) and 
increasing vulnerability to specialist littoral warfare systems, especially advanced 
diesel-electric submarines.67 Conversely, the confines and specific geographical 
characteristics of a littoral environment could be exploited to enhance the 
defensive capabilities of the carrier task group. This was a key aspect of NATO’s 
Forward Maritime Strategy in the 1980s, governing operations in defence of 
Norway and NATO’s northern flank, whereby NATO carrier battle groups would 
utilise the Norwegian fjords as defensive bastions. 68  The use of dispersed 
operations and emission control also further complicate an adversary’s attempts to 
successfully target an aircraft carrier.69 In the medium term, at least for those 
carriers designed for catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) 
operations (that is, those of the US and French navies), the incorporation of 
advanced long-range, persistent unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) such as 
the X-47B70 and unmanned carrier launched airborne surveillance and strike 
system (UCLASS) 71  offer the potential to engage an adversary from 	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68 For analysis of the Forward Maritime Strategy and its testing in Exercise Team Work ’88, see 
Eric Grove, Battle for the Fiørds: NATO’s Forward Maritime Strategy in Action (London: Ian 
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69 For example, see Robert G. Angevine, ‘Hiding In Plain Sight: The US Navy and Dispersed 
Operations under EMCON, 1956-1972’, Naval War College Review, Vol.64, No.2 (Spring 2011), 
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intercontinental stand-off positions, thus considerably easing force protection and 
reducing vulnerability to enemy action.72               
The development of advanced UCAVs may, as alluded to above, enable suitably 
configured aircraft carriers73 to undertake new roles such as the provision of 
strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and or strike 
capabilities. 74  This would further enhance the already significant multi-role 
capabilities that aircraft carriers provide. It is also important to highlight that the 
utility of an aircraft carrier should be defined in broader terms than simply what 
its fast jet component can achieve. The latter do indeed constitute the core element 
of the ship’s weapon system, but the wider utility of the ship, for example, in 
demonstrating presence and providing a flexible and adaptable mobile base, 
should not be overlooked. The view, as expressed by then Commander-in-Chief 
Royal Air Force Strike Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, 
highlights this: ‘...Carrier Air with its ability to poise in a diplomatically neutral or 
even coercive way makes a major contribution...Notice that I talk of carrier air not 
carriers themselves. For it is the aircraft that achieves the effect.’75 This statement 
overlooks the fact that it is the ship that delivers presence (as discussed above on 
pages 107 and 109). Moreover, the embarked aircraft are dependent on the carrier 
for mission support, operational capability (through support functions such as 
mission planning, arming and fuelling and maintenance) and command and 
control. In this context, the combat aircraft are essentially the ‘tip of the spear’. It 
is also critical for the purposes of generating credible and effective carrier 
airpower that the importance of the ship-air interface is recognised and that the 
carrier is not seen as ‘just a deployed operating base’ onto which aircraft can 
stage.  
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The roles an aircraft carrier is capable of undertaking will to a significant extent, 
be dependent on the size and configuration of the carrier itself. A larger vessel 
(one capable of embarking an air group of 40 or more fixed and rotary wing 
aircraft, and typically exceeding 40,000 tons displacement)76 will be capable of 
embarking a larger and potentially more diverse air group,77 achieving a higher 
sortie generation rate,78 have a larger and more flexible hangar deck and a larger 
flight deck, thus enhancing the efficiency of aviation operations.79 A larger flight 
deck, for example, enables a greater number of aircraft to be maintained on deck 
alert, thereby enhancing the sortie generation rate, and may ease mixed fixed and 
rotary-wing operations by enabling separate operating areas on deck.80 Further, a 
larger vessel is more cost-effective due to its higher internal volume, less 
constrained space for fitting out and has greater through-life growth potential.81 
This is not to say that small carriers such as the Invincible-class and the new 
Spanish Juan Carlos-class82 or Italian Cavour-class83 do not provide a valuable 
capability, but rather that larger designs (such as the Queen Elizabeth-class or US 
Nimitz or Gerald R. Ford-class carriers) offer advantages, in particular, as stated 
by then Commander David James, Royal Navy: ‘A criticism of our current and 
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indeed any small carrier is that they carry insufficient aircraft to be militarily 
decisive’.84  
The British government’s 2010 SDSR called into question the utility of a large air 
group by stating with regard to the Queen Elizabeth-class:  
We cannot now foresee circumstances in which the UK would require the scale of 
strike capability previously planned [36 embarked fast jets]. We are unlikely to face 
adversaries in large-scale air combat. We are far more likely to engage in precision 
operations, which may need to overcome sophisticated air defence capabilities. The 
single carrier will therefore routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations 
while retaining the capacity to deploy up to the 36 previously planned...85             
This decision has significant strategic and operational implications. In strategic 
terms, the small size of the intended fast jet component of the air group (and the 
commitment to only operating one ship - the second being kept at extended 
readiness)86 may restrict the deterrent value of Britain’s carrier capability.87 In 
order to be a deterrent, capability must be demonstrated – thus conveying 
credibility, which provides influence.88 In addition, in the context of planning for 
coalition operations, the limited air group may be perceived to constitute tokenism 
especially viewed alongside the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle and its 
air group of up to 40 Rafale, Super Etendard and E-2C Hawkeye and helicopters. 
It warrants mention that the air group embarked for operations against Libya in 
2011 comprised eight Rafale, six Super Etendard, two E-2C Hawkeye and ten 
helicopters (26 aircraft in total).89 The perceived credibility of the Russian Navy’s 
carrier capability is also relevant in this regard. Russia operates one aircraft 
carrier, the 58,600 ton Admiral Kuznetsov, and although designed to embark an air 
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group of up to 36 Sukhoi Su-33 Flankers,90 only deploys (infrequently) with 12 
Flankers embarked;91 the ship does not convey an effective presence.92 
The argument that ‘We cannot now foresee circumstances in which the UK would 
require the scale of strike capability previously planned’ contains three elements 
of risk. Firstly, the scaling down of the air group from 36 to 12 combat aircraft 
(thus deploying fewer combat aircraft than the Invincible-class did at their peak) 
suggests that the UK would not wish to contribute any more than a minimal force 
to an operation.93 In this regard, 32 fast jets are seen as typically required to 
provide indigenous protection for a brigade (the level of effort focused on in the 
SDSR).94 Secondly, it suggests a preference for land-basing of combat airpower 
for expeditionary operations, which may be problematic in terms of political and 
diplomatic constraints, and militarily via potential opposing A2/AD strategies. 
Thirdly, as Christine H. Fox discusses with regard to the value of small aircraft 
carriers,95 in the near future, the expected focus on irregular warfare, the provision 
of support to small ground units and ensuring battlespace dominance against 
asymmetric threats, requires ‘aircraft airborne on-station continuously for 
extended periods of time... [and] requires either high sortie rates or “chain-gang” 
of aircraft for persistence at long ranges...Small carriers lack sufficient numbers 
and types of aircraft to perform these missions...’96 That is, the prospective 
operating environment and experience from recent operations, such as Libya, 
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indicates a continuing requirement for a carrier air group to possess sufficient 
mass to in Commander James’ words, ‘be militarily decisive’.  
The British government’s decision to reduce the size of the planned air group of 
the new carrier(s) is also indicative of the professed lack of knowledge highlighted 
by Benbow (see page 98). The SDSR states that 12 fast jets will be routinely 
embarked on the active carrier but that the capability to deploy up to 36 aircraft 
will be retained. As will be discussed subsequently, the capability to operate from 
an aircraft carrier requires sustained investment in embarked training in order to 
develop and maintain competence in aviation operations at sea. Policy-makers 
could not expect in a crisis to order an extra 24 aircraft out to the carrier and 
assume that those aircraft could be employed effectively in short order unless their 
pilots – and the support personnel on the ship – are well-versed in carrier 
operations and this is only achieved through regular and sustained embarkation.  
The importance of a proficient ship-air interface also underpins a carrier’s 
contribution to coalition operations. Whether operating in a US-led coalition or as 
the lead nation, perhaps alongside France or a major Commonwealth ally such as 
India or Australia,97 a British aircraft carrier, in particular one as capable as the 
Queen Elizabeth-class constitutes a significant contribution. As discussed above, 
carriers can reassure regional allies and partners, and through exercising a forward 
presence, can undertake joint training, thus facilitating familiarity and potentially 
interoperability, thereby laying the foundations for coalition operations. This is 
also relevant to developing enhanced cooperation between established allies; in 
the realm of carrier operations, Britain and the US, for example, have a close 
relationship regarding the development of interoperability between the US Navy 
and Marine Corps and the Royal Navy: this was demonstrated vividly in 2007 in 
the joint exercise Bold Step, which saw 15 US Marine Corps Harriers operate for 
two and a half weeks from HMS Illustrious.98 In addition, few states possess a 
carrier-based airpower capability, and aside from the US, only the UK will 
possess a sea-based fifth generation aircraft; this will provide a highly valuable 	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capability (especially accounting for the ISTAR, command and control and 
electronic attack capabilities of the aircraft99) and niche contribution to most 
potential coalitions.  
The investment required to develop an aircraft carrier capability is significant but 
non-discretionary if the capability is to be effective and credible both for national 
and coalition purposes. Moreover, the ability to utilise a carrier for non-traditional 
roles, for example, as a base for Special Forces 100  or suitable land-based 
aircraft,101 is contingent on the existence of a proficient ship-air interface. This 
was the case in the Falklands War, where RAF Harrier GR3 ground-attack aircraft 
were deployed to the carrier HMS Hermes to augment the ship’s own Sea Harrier 
fighters: 
RAF aircraft flying on to Hermes joined a well-founded airfield that was 
experienced in the safe operation of Harriers in poor weather and with a fully 
worked up Air department optimised for the environment. They were supported 
and trained by the existing carrier system. They also had the benefit of dovetailing 
with the RN’s 800 Sqn, who provided deck briefings and an intensive work-up 
package. Their minds were firmly focussed upon the dangers of operating from a 
ship.102 
The naval interface is required in order to provide ‘the professional and physical 
basis for effective operations in an unfamiliar environment’.103 This is illustrated 
by US Army experience in Operation Uphold Democracy, where the aircraft 
carrier USS Eisenhower was employed as a helicopter carrier: 
Helicopter separation was an important lesson learned from the operation. As 
helicopters leave the flight deck, they lose ground effect. If one helicopter follows 
too closely behind the previous one, it can fly into the downward wash from the 
first helo. Both of these effects can cause altitude loss. Army helicopter pilots, 
accustomed to flying over land, held to tight formations when arriving or departing 	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Special Operations Task Force for the 1994 US intervention in Haiti, Operation Uphold 
Democracy (the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower operated as a helicopter carrier in this operation, 
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the flight deck. Standard safe helicopter separations need to be established, and 
Army units operating from flight decks must train to the standards.104 
This case is particularly relevant to thinking regarding the employment of 
Britain’s forthcoming Queen Elizabeth-class carriers. This is because they are 
intended to provide a ‘Carrier Enabled Power Projection’ (CEPP) capability; a 
hybridised carrier strike and littoral manoeuvre capability.105 This will include 
operating a mixed air group from the operational aircraft carrier including 
concurrently up to 12 Merlin, a small number of Chinook and up to eight Apache 
helicopters alongside 12 F-35s. In this regard, McGrady and Sullivan observed 
that for Operation Uphold Democracy: 
No fixed-wing aircraft were embarked, which allowed the deck to be operated 
completely as a helo deck. Attempting to operate even a few fixed-wing aircraft 
from the CV would have complicated matters immensely because it would have 
been necessary to build deck operations around fixed-wing launch-and-recovery 
operations. Even operating fixed-wing aircraft during periods of no helo operations 
would have been a major problem because a major reorganization of the flight deck 
and hangar decks would have been required to clear the necessary areas.106    
This highlights the point emphasised by Benbow (see page 99) regarding the need 
to have an understanding of what aircraft carriers can do and what options they 
provide policy-makers. As will be discussed below, CEPP is an unprecedented 
approach to carrier operations and ‘no other country uses its carriers in the way 
that the United Kingdom is planning to do’;107 the question thus should be posed – 
does the pursuit of CEPP indicate an insufficient degree of understanding amongst 
policy-makers regarding the utility of aircraft carriers and therefore how they 
should be employed? In order to answer this question, the process that resulted in 
the development of CEPP requires examination – that is, the evolution of British 
thinking concerning a replacement for the Invincible-class aircraft carriers.  
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From CVSG(R) to CVF: the Evolving Rationale for the Queen 
Elizabeth-Class                                                                                            
The purpose of this part of the chapter is to provide an overview of the evolving 
rationale underpinning the British government’s policy toward a replacement 
aircraft carrier capability. Analysis of the specific options that have been 
developed, considered or potential alternative courses of action will be undertaken 
in the following chapter. The following analysis principally covers the period 
from 1998 to the present, that is, from the decision taken in the SDR to ‘buy two 
new larger aircraft carriers to project power more flexibly around the world’.108 It 
is however necessary as a means of establishing context, to firstly provide an 
outline of pre-SDR thinking regarding a replacement aircraft carrier capability; 
this will particularly highlight the influence of the wider shift in British maritime 
thinking in the mid-to-late 1990s.  
The Ministry of Defence commenced conceptual studies into a replacement for the 
Invincible-class in 1994, which was intended to lead to the generation of a Staff 
Target and Ministerial approval for a replacement carrier programme by the end 
of 1997.109 The change of government following the May 1997 General Election 
and subsequent Strategic Defence Review resulted in the Staff Target for The 
Future Aircraft Carrier being delayed until after the SDR was completed in the 
summer of 1998.110 The initial studies underway in the period 1994-96 were under 
the title of CVSG(R), that is, a ‘replacement guided missile-armed anti-submarine 
support aircraft carrier’ – the Invincible-class at this stage had the CVSG 
designation. The CVF programme itself was conceived in 1996.111 
The change in designation from CVSG(R) to CV(F) is indicative of the wider shift 
underway in British maritime thinking in the second half of the 1990s. This is 
because it marks the move away from the late Cold War (particularly 1970s and 
1980s) focus on sea control in the eastern North Atlantic to a broader 
expeditionary perspective. The Invincible-class also reflected this shift. The 
CVSG designation highlighted the hybrid nature of the class in that the ‘G’ aspect 	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of the designation referred to the organic area air defence capability provided by 
the Sea Dart surface-to-air missile system and the cruiser origins of the class. The 
Sea Dart system was removed from the Invincible-class during the 1990s in order 
to enhance the aviation capabilities of the ships (by enabling a flight deck 
extension and allowing the space previously occupied by the Sea Dart magazine to 
be used for aircraft ordnance)112, including facilitating the embarking of RAF 
Harrier GR7s. The latter reflected a change in role for the Invincible-class: 
The Invincible Class carriers were designed for Cold War anti-submarine warfare 
operations with helicopters and a limited air defence capability provided by a small 
number of embarked Sea Harriers. This is no longer the main requirement. The 
emphasis is now on increased offensive air power, and an ability to operate the 
largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles.113 
The removal of the Sea Dart system and change in role from ASW-focused sea 
control to maritime power projection was highlighted by the change in designation 
for the Invincible-class from CVSG to CVS, although the latter designation, under 
the US system on which it is based, would classify the Invincible-class as anti-
submarine support carriers. This would not be the first time there has been a 
confused application of the US designation system. As Grove states with regard to 
the initial designation of the Invincible-class: 
By now the TDCC had acquired a new designation – CAH, or “helicopter carrying 
heavy cruiser” in the American system the MOD(N) now used. Unfortunately, the 
Royal Navy’s grasp of the meanings of these abbreviations has never been entirely 
firm, and soon the accepted meaning seems to have been “cruiser (even sometimes 
“carrier”) assault helicopter,” a strange title as, at this stage, the ship had no assault 
role...114  
The new emphasis on power projection also formed the basis for thinking 
regarding the replacement carrier capability: 
The focus for our maritime forces in the new environment will move towards rapid 
deployment operations...Aircraft carriers will have a wide utility, including for 
deterrence and coercion. Our current INVINCIBLE class carriers will be given a 
wider power projection role by the development of a “Joint Force 2000” combining 
RN and RAF Harrier aircraft. To meet our longer term needs, we plan to replace 
our current carriers from around 2012 by two larger, more versatile, carriers 
capable of carrying a more powerful force, including a future carrier borne aircraft 
to replace the Harrier.115 	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The focus on the maritime power projection role for CVF reflected both the 
evolving maritime doctrinal context and strategic environment of the mid-to-late 
1990s. The former is illustrated by the development of the Maritime Contribution 
to Joint Operations and the manoeuvrist approach;116 the latter by operations in the 
Balkans and vis-à-vis Iraq.117 It is also apparent in the thinking underpinning the 
development of the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA) requirement. The 
FCBA, the planned replacement for the Sea Harrier FA2, was defined in an 
outline requirement endorsed in 1996 as: ‘An all-weather, survivable, multi-role 
fighter with the ability to perform air defence, offensive air support and deep 
interdiction missions over a 500nm radius of action’.118 This is in contrast to the 
Sea Harrier FA2 which was principally intended to serve in the air defence role 
with a secondary anti-ship and reconnaissance capability.119  
Before discussing further the strategic rationale for CVF, it is necessary to set out 
the policy context within which the SDR decision on the carriers was made. As 
mentioned above, initial work on developing a replacement for the Invincible-
class commenced in the mid-1990s, and initial naval thinking on a replacement 
carrier envisaged a STOVL design of similar capability to the Invincible-class 
embarking the relevant variant of the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).120 The UK 
had joined the then Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) programme in 
December 1995; this became the JSF programme in 1996, following a ‘“firming 
up” of operational requirements across the three US armed services’.121 The 
JAST/JSF programme succeeded a number of US and joint US-UK programmes, 
the latter in particular covering advanced STOVL (ASTOVL) projects with the 
US Marines Corps with a view to developing a supersonic STOVL replacement 
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for the Harrier/Sea Harrier, AV-8B and F/A-18.122 The election of the new Labour 
government in 1997 brought with it a new appetite for aircraft carriers, and this, 
along with the overall political-military environment (for example, the 
aforementioned operations in the Balkans and Middle East, and general 
internationalism of the new government) served as a significant driver for the 
carrier decision in the SDR.123 Further, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) equipment 
programme itself served as a second driver for the carrier decision.124 This was 
because, in addition to the carrier replacement, programmes to develop successors 
to the RAF’s Tornado and Harrier aircraft were being developed.125 That is, a 
substantial part of the UK’s airpower requirements for the mid-to-long term were 
simultaneously under consideration and were therefore to a significant extent, 
inter-linked. This was especially the case with regard to the Tornado replacement, 
then referred to as the Future Offensive Aircraft (the project would subsequently 
become the Future Offensive Air System – FOAS). This programme was a key 
element of MoD planning from the mid-1990s until 2005; for example, in 1996, 
the periodical Flight International reported: 
A top-level study is being carried out within the MoD into its future long-range 
offensive capability, with the FOA an “integral part of the equation”. Other 
elements of the yet-to-be-balanced equation include the Royal Navy’s future 
aircraft carrier and conventional cruise-missile-armed submarines.126 
Prior to the SDR, the FCBA was intended to replace the Sea Harrier; for this 
purpose, approximately 60 aircraft were required.127 However, following the 
decision in the SDR to establish a joint Royal Navy-Royal Air Force Harrier 
force, Joint Force 2000, the separate FCBA and Royal Air Force Harrier 
replacement requirements were merged, thus creating a requirement for 120 
aircraft under what would become the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) programme (it 
was initially known as the Future Joint Combat Aircraft).128 A key driver in the 
creation of Joint Force 2000 was the realisation by the RAF that, in order to 	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acquire a fifth generation aircraft, it would have to agree with the Royal Navy on a 
force that could deploy from land and sea.129 This was due to, effectively, the UK 
being capable of only affording one fleet of such aircraft.130 The creation of Joint 
Force 2000, and once operational known as Joint Force Harrier,131 was a key 
element of the nascent wider future carrier effort as outlined in the SDR: 
The operational potential of a joint carrier air wing was graphically shown earlier 
this year in the Gulf, when the deployment of Royal Air Force Harrier GR7s 
alongside the Royal Navy Sea Harriers on HMS INVINCIBLE made an important 
contribution to the multinational force applying pressure on Iraq to comply with 
UN resolutions [Operation Bolton]. Total integration of current Harrier aircraft into 
a single force is impracticable. The two Harrier variants share only around 10% of 
their airframe and avionics, and they have quite different primary operational roles.  
But closer harmonization between the existing Harrier forces could pave the way 
towards a truly joint force for the future. Capitalising on the success of current joint 
Harrier operations, we propose to develop a Joint Force 2000, which could 
eventually involve the replacement of all Harriers with a common aircraft type. 
There are several options for the new aircraft (which would be capable of operating 
from ashore and afloat). For the Joint Force 2000 concept to work successfully, we 
will need a common aircraft, common operating procedures, common maintenance 
practice and a common support organisation. Further study will begin shortly to 
determine the best way to realise the potential which the concept offers to provide a 
flexible and deployable joint force, able to operate either from land bases or aircraft 
carriers.132  
The above quotation highlights another key strand of thought regarding the 
development of CVF – its role as a ‘joint defence asset’. This was described by 
Commander James as meaning: ‘The concept does not rely on a unique set of 
aircraft specifically earmarked for the CVF but rather on the ship’s ability to 
embark an air group tailored to the specific mission’.133 During 1997-98, the 
notion that CVF could be developed as a ‘mobile bird farm’ was generated. This 
concept was meant to convey the idea that CVF would have a broader utility, 
operate the widest range of UK fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and be affordable.134  
However, the concept was flawed as it omitted the mission support requirement, 
that is, pre-working up of the ship and embarked aircraft is still required in order 
to ensure integration with the ship and environment.135 The latter is highlighted by 	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experience from the Falklands War. The detachment of Royal Air Force Harrier 
GR3s deployed to HMS Hermes required some modification to enable operations 
from the carrier and the integration of Fleet Air Arm rocket pods on the aircraft in 
lieu of the RAF’s SNEB pods, which were unsuitable for carrier operations as the 
pods were not insulated against the high electromagnetic forces aboard a ship.136 
The notion of CVF as a joint defence asset was also intended to convince the 
Royal Air Force that it ‘was their carrier as well’,137 and thus ensure at least tacit 
acceptance of the new carrier programme.138  
The SDR explicitly cited the experience of operations in the Persian Gulf, in 
particular Operation Bolton, as demonstrating the rationale for CVF. This received 
further vindication in December 1998 with the Anglo-US Operation Desert Fox, a 
four-day operation against targets in Iraq following non-compliance with UN 
Security Council resolutions pertaining to disarmament. The importance of Desert 
Fox to thinking on carrier airpower was that the first phase of the operation only 
involved sea-based assets (ship and submarine-launched cruise missiles and 
carrier-based aircraft).139 Operations in the Gulf provided a reference with which 
to benchmark the size of air group that CVF would require, and therefore inform 
the size of the carrier itself. In the context of Operation Bolton, then Captain 
James Burnell-Nugent stated: 
There was a day and a night mission every 24 hours, generally with four [Harrier] 
GR7s over Iraq in company with four [Sea Harrier] FA2s providing force 
protection. Although the interim directive from PJHQ [Permanent Joint 
Headquarters] called for such a mission once per day, the desire to maximise UK 
visibility on the ATO [air tasking order], as well as the degree of training and 
integration needed, resulted in double that rate of flying.140   
The implications for CVF were summarised by Rear Admiral Sir Iain Henderson, 
then Flag Officer Maritime Aviation: 
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What one needs to do is to be able to deliver a large package of ordnance ashore, in 
one go, if need be. The basic building block is a four aircraft formation. So I 
believe that something in the order of 40 to 50 aeroplanes would be optimal, 
divided principally between the bomber and fighter role.141 
In doctrinal terms, between 2001 and 2010, the vision for the future carriers 
remained consistent. As discussed in the preceding chapter (see pages 93-94), the 
development of the Future Navy and associated Future Navy Operational Concept 
and Versatile Maritime Force papers in 2000-2001 provided the intellectual 
framework within which the carriers would be developed and their roles and 
utility articulated. The importance of the future carriers to the Future Navy vision 
was articulated in 2004 by the then First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Alan West: 
To meet the future pace of change the conceptual headmark [sic] for this versatile 
maritime force will be agility, both in the delivery of capability and in the way the 
force operates...This is reflected in our future equipment programme, which is 
focused on delivering effect from the sea onto land. This will include a land attack 
capability, supporting forces ashore and securing access to the theatre of 
operations. Central to this is the CVF (Future Aircraft Carrier), which with the joint 
combat aircraft (JCA) and the maritime airborne surveillance capability, will be the 
basis of Britain’s joint force projection...I see CVF and JCA as the Ministry of 
Defence’s most importance procurement project.142    
It is important to note that the principal role of CVF was highlighted as being an 
enabling capability, that is, securing access to the theatre of operations, providing 
support to forces ashore and providing the foundation for wider joint operations – 
thus emphasising the broader utility of the MCJO. The 2007 Future Maritime 
Operational Concept (FMOC - successor to the previous Future Navy 
Operational Concept) outlined further the doctrinal position of the new carriers, 
which had by this stage been placed under the policy umbrella of Carrier Strike.143 
The FMOC comprehensively summarised in broad terms the roles and utility of 
the forthcoming carriers:  
The CS capability will energise and enhance a wide range of tasks, including those 
envisaged within the Future Land Operational Concept (FLOC) and Future Air and 
Space Operational Concept (FA&SOC), and will contribute to operations in most 	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environments, while sustaining flying operations on a continuous basis or as 
dictated by the operational situation. A CS TG [Task Group], with a tailored Air 
Group and supporting MFP [Maritime Force Projection], will enable the delivery of 
flexible, scaleable [sic] expeditionary offensive air power – and other Combat and 
Combat Support activity – under the least favourable Access, Basing and 
Overflight (ABO) conditions from a highly mobile, well-found sovereign operating 
base. In its primary role, this will provide deep strike against Time Sensitive 
Targets (TST) in all environments and the ability to support the Land Component 
in Close Air Support and Air Defence over land and sea. Additionally the CS TG 
will provide an organic air surveillance and airspace coordination capability with 
utility across the full spectrum of Military Tasks, as well as offering a Forward 
Aviation Support (FAS) capacity, a secure operating base for Special Forces (SF) 
and the ability to operate a wide range of attack and support air assets, including 
unmanned vehicles.144   
The FMOC ably articulated the strategic utility of aircraft carriers, yet as Benbow 
highlighted, senior military officers and policy-makers admitted ignorance of the 
utility of carrier airpower during the formulation of the SDSR in 2010. It is 
possible that the professed ignorance of the utility of carrier airpower resulted in 
part from a policy of deliberate obfuscation on the part of some elements (civilian 
and military) in the Ministry of Defence. This is illustrated by the use of 
terminology pertaining to carrier airpower. The term ‘carrier airpower’ has been in 
wide use internationally since before the Second World War, however, only the 
UK has, since 1998, continually sought to redefine the meaning of the term and 
the roles of aircraft carriers.145 This is reflective of enduring tensions within the 
Ministry of Defence (discussed in chapter six) and is highlighted by the shift in 
2010 from the term Carrier Strike to Carrier Enabled Power Projection.146 The 
latter constitutes the current policy baseline governing the development and 
eventual operational employment of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. It 
is also the biggest challenge facing the Royal Navy for the next 20 years.147 CEPP, 
rather than delivering a clearly defined and understood model of carrier airpower 
(for example, as in the US or France or as articulated in the FMOC), seeks to 
deliver a hybrid capability providing elements of Carrier Strike and littoral 
manoeuvre. It appears to constitute a high-risk approach to what is already an 
inherently complex and demanding task – the delivery of airpower at and from the 
sea. CEPP is, as highlighted by the National Audit Office, an unprecedented 
approach to carrier-based airpower; its commitment to concurrent fixed and rotary 	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wing operations adds an additional layer of risk and complexity.148 The latter 
aspect will be discussed more fully in chapter five, but it is important to note that 
such an approach to carrier airpower is unique to the UK.149 The approach defined 
by CEPP is achievable, but will require dedicated assets (fixed and rotary-wing), 
joint service support and full political support and direction with a complete 
awareness of the environmental risks associated with operating from an aircraft 
carrier.150 However, as Rear Admiral Chris Parry has written with regard to the 
future carriers: 
It is important that concepts take into account that these extremely large ships 
have a range of potential uses beyond that of simply being a launch-and-recovery 
platform for fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. It will be essential to maximise the 
flexibility of use of these capital ships and they should be viewed as multi-
purpose and potentially multi-role platforms, capable of conducting a range of 
simultaneous and discrete missions in addition to – and in the absence of – their 
carrier-strike capability…. Right at the heart of the concept should be the 
continuous encouragement of an adaptive capability and modular mentality that 
offer the facility to vary force, task and support packages to reflect the ever-
changing range of effects and activities required, both within the ships themselves 
and across the full range of associated forces.151 
However, ultimately, the extent to which this is forthcoming will be contingent on 
the degree of knowledge and understanding of the strategic utility that carrier 
airpower provides. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the preceding discussion has been threefold. It has sought to 
highlight the enduring role of carrier airpower in British maritime and national 
strategy; to examine in broad terms, the strategic utility of carrier airpower, and 
thus inform the subsequent discussion of the rationale for Britain proceeding with 
a replacement for the Invincible-class. The examination of the rationale for 
acquiring the Queen Elizabeth-class is necessarily in overview form as the 
following two chapters will expand upon the detail of the debates concerning the 
design, development and particular roles of the ships and their contribution to 
wider British strategy. From the preceding analysis, it is discernible that aircraft 	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carriers have been an enduring contributor to British defence and strategic 
objectives for nearly a century. Moreover, in particular with regard to the early 
development of military aviation, the Royal Navy has played a significant role in 
the successful exploitation of the air environment for military purposes. It would 
also be erroneous to argue that the scale reflected in the plans for the Queen 
Elizabeth-class (before 2010) reflect an overinflated ambition on the part of the 
Royal Navy; rather, the rationale for the future carriers reflected long-term trends 
in British and international thinking on the roles and utility of carrier airpower. It 
also reflected the analysis of valuable operational experience gained in the Gulf 
and Balkans during the 1990s. In addition, the nature of the contemporary and 
prospective strategic environment indicate a requirement for larger, rather than 
smaller carriers, which were themselves principally designed for narrowly defined 
contingencies of the Cold War (in particular, in the case of the British Invincible-
class, ASW in the North Atlantic against the Soviet Union). The scale of the 
future carriers was striking due to the reduced size and capability of the 
Invincible-class, which were a compromise solution developed following the 
conclusions of a debate in, and circumstances of, the 1960s.  
As signposted in this chapter and to be discussed further in the following chapters, 
debates over ownership (highlighted by the period of Royal Air Force/Dual 
Control in the inter-war period), carrier versus land-based airpower and the 
general requirement for aircraft carriers, are enduring and either directly or 
indirectly relevant to contemporary thinking concerning British maritime 
airpower. It is also important to note, and this should be evident from the 
preceding analysis, that despite the Royal Navy clearly articulating the utility of 
the future carriers in both the maritime and wider strategic contexts, policy-
makers have not recognised or fully understood the strategic utility of carrier 
airpower. As a consequence, policy since 2010 toward the development of 
Britain’s future carrier airpower has taken on a greater degree of risk and will 
deliver substantially less capability. This is especially the case with regard to the 
variant of JCA to be acquired for the fixed-wing component of the carrier’s air 
group and will be discussed in the next chapter. Having set out in this chapter the 
rationale for developing CVF, the development of the ships and their intended air 




4. The Future Aircraft Carrier Programme: Design, 
Development and Debate 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the design and development of what 
would become the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers under the auspices of the 
Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) programme. In order to do this, the chapter first 
examines the design and development of the ships themselves and particularly 
focuses on the debate over whether to configure the ships for short take-off and 
vertical landing (STOVL), short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR) or 
catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) operations. 
Proceeding from this, the chapter examines the debate concerning the type of 
fixed-wing combat aircraft to be acquired for the new aircraft carriers, including 
the 2002 decision to select a STOVL aircraft and the 2010 change of course to a 
CATOBAR option. The chapter then considers the decision taken in May 2012 to 
again revise the choice of ship configuration (reverting from CATOBAR to 
STOVL) and thus the choice of embarked combat aircraft. The content and 
trajectory of these debates, as will be discussed below, highlight several key 
points, namely, contrasting perspectives on the roles and utility of carrier airpower 
at the Service and inter-Service level;1 the composition of, and direction of 
investment in British airpower; and the contribution of maritime forces to British 
strategy. Moreover, the debates, especially with regard to the variant of Joint 
Combat Aircraft to be acquired, also shed light on the roles and influence of core 
actors (in particular Rolls Royce and BAE Systems) in the defence industrial 
sector on defence procurement, and raise questions pertaining to the efficacy of 
government policy making. The two inter-linked debates, underway since 1998 
and likely to persist into the carriers’ service careers, 2  have significant 	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implications for British carrier-based and wider airpower, maritime and grand 
strategy, and long-term Defence policy.  
The preceding chapter examined the roles and utility of, and rationale for aircraft 
carriers in general strategic terms. This chapter builds upon that analysis and 
considers the development of what would become the Queen Elizabeth-class 
within the context of British strategic and operational requirements. The policy 
benchmarks established in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and the 
2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and National Security Strategy 
(SDSR) provide the overall framework within which British military strategy has 
developed. The SDR defined the UK’s scale of effort in the following terms: 
We cannot predict the crises we will face. Our forces are our insurance against the 
unexpected. We must not skimp on the premium because we will pay a heavy price 
if we get it wrong. At the same time we cannot afford the luxury of having 
additional forces 'just in case'. Our objective is to meet our purely national 
requirements and be able to make a reasonable contribution to multi-national 
operations in support of our foreign and security policy objectives. On this basis, 
we have set some broad benchmarks for the scale of our planning...we should be 
able to: respond to a major international crisis which might require a military effort 
and combat operations of a similar scale and duration to the Gulf War when we 
deployed an armoured division, 26 major warships and over 80 combat aircraft.3  
The SDSR reduced the scale of effort envisaged for Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, 
but preserved the commitment to an expeditionary approach to operations 
(although with a greater focus on small-scale operations). The Defence Planning 
Assumptions promulgated in the SDSR state: 
The new Defence Planning Assumptions envisage that the Armed Forces in the 
future will be sized and shaped to conduct: an enduring stabilisation operation at 
around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with maritime and air support as 
required, while also conducting: one non-enduring complex intervention (up to 
2,000 personnel), and one non-enduring simple intervention (up to 1,000 
personnel); or alternatively: three non-enduring operations if we were not already 
engaged in an enduring operation; or: for a limited time, and with sufficient 
warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, 
with maritime and air support (around 30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to 
Iraq in 2003).4 
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The reduced scale of effort outlined in the SDSR has resulted in the reduction in 
size of the planned air-group for the new aircraft carrier(s)5 and the development 
of the concept of Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP); the latter replacing 
the Royal Navy’s previously separate Carrier Strike and Amphibious Task Groups 
(see chapter two, page 93). The carrier programme however was fortunate to 
avoid cancellation, as at the time of the SDSR it was under intense pressure due to 
a combination of countervailing factors, namely relating to the financial 
environment and the on-going campaign in Afghanistan. This will be discussed at 
length in chapter six. Moreover, in part due to inter-service rivalries but as 
discussed in the preceding chapter, also due to a less than full understanding of the 
roles and utility of aircraft carriers, the rationale for acquiring a Carrier Strike 
capability was questioned. In this light, the chapter seeks to evaluate whether the 
developmental path chosen for the future aircraft carrier programme constituted 
the most effective (in terms of cost and capability) option for Britain; that is, what 
capability would be most suitable both to fulfil UK requirements and also to make 
a ‘reasonable contribution’ to multi-national operations?     
Developing CVF  
The purpose of this first section of the chapter is, as explained above, to examine 
the development of the Future Aircraft Carrier programme, in particular with 
regard to the debate on ship configuration. The 1998 SDR established the context 
guiding the development of the Future Aircraft Carrier programme and set out an 
outline vision for the ships, stating: 
The emphasis is now on increased offensive air power, and an ability to operate the 
largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles. When the 
current carrier force reaches the end of its planned life, we plan to replace it with 
two larger vessels. Work will now begin to refine our requirements but present 
thinking suggests that they might be of the order of 30,000-40,000 tonnes and 
capable of deploying up to 50 aircraft, including helicopters... No decisions have 
been taken on a future carrier-borne aircraft but a version of the Joint Strike Fighter 
currently under development in the United States remains a strong contender.6  
The SDR did not determine whether the ships would be configured for STOVL, 
STOBAR or CATOBAR operations. The vision articulated for the ships in the 	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SDR points toward a decision to pursue, what would be for Britain, a higher level 
of capability. Malcolm Bird, then responsible for developing a carrier line of 
business within BAeSEMA (a former component of what is now BAE Systems), 
stated at a conference in March 1997 on ‘British Naval Aviation in the 21st 
Century’ hosted by the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at 
Lancaster University, that the UK was considering for its CVF programme, 
‘whether the carrier should operate 20, 25, 30 or 40 aircraft...’7 Also considered 
were adopting a converted container ship design or stretching the Invincible-
class.8    
The main purpose of CVF was to provide a medium-scale air capability, with the 
size of the carriers being determined by the required weight of offensive airpower, 
calculated to be 36 fast jets undertaking two sorties per day for five consecutive 
days.9 The medium scale air capability was defined as 36 ‘force elements at 
readiness’ (the planning tool used to determine force readiness).10 Thirty-six 
embarked fast jets would provide nine four-ship groups, with 32 aircraft assigned 
to the offensive strike role and four providing air defence.11 Anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) helicopters would also be embarked. The Queen Elizabeth-class 
are not intended to be ‘traditional aircraft carriers’, rather they are an ‘airfield 
option’ for the deployment of Britain’s expeditionary F-35 force.12 In this respect, 
the ships were not intended to be Fleet carriers or platforms for operating fixed-
wing airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft nor to defend the fleet.13  
By means of comparison, the fourth Ark Royal (Britain’s last conventional aircraft 
carrier, decommissioned in 1978) embarked an air-group consisting of 12 
Phantom FG1s, 15 Buccaneer S2s, seven Sea King HAS1 ASW helicopters and 
four Gannet AEW aircraft, that is, 38 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.14  Ark Royal 
displaced 43,000 tons (light) and in excess of 50,000 tons when fully fuelled, 	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stored and with the air-group embarked.15 The cancelled CVA-01, in contrast, 
would have displaced 54,500 tons (fully loaded) and embarked an air-group of 47, 
comprising 36 Phantoms and Buccaneers, four AEW aircraft and seven 
helicopters.16 The process of making the CVF design adaptable (see below) added 
significant weight to the ships; there were also moves from some quarters to 
increase the size of the ships in order to gain a fixed wing AEW and air-to-air-
refuelling capability thereby moving CVF into a different league of carrier.17 
Aside from determining the size and displacement of CVF and the strength of its 
projected air-group, the nature of the propulsion system to be used in the new 
carriers also required consideration. The option of developing CVF as a nuclear-
powered vessel was examined in the very early stages of the programme.18 
Nuclear propulsion offers significant through life cost advantages, including 
reduced fuel costs, increased aviation fuel capacity and a reduced requirement for 
replenishment at sea. 19  However, equipping CVF with a nuclear propulsion 
system would have required either the development of a bespoke reactor for the 
two aircraft carriers at significant cost, or the use of reactors based on those fitted 
in the Vanguard-class Trident-armed submarines.20 The latter option would have 
necessitated the use of three reactors per ship in order to generate sufficient 
power;21 in contrast, the US Nimitz-class CVNs are powered by two reactors.22 
Captain D. J. I. Garstin, Royal Navy, writing in The Naval Review, asks the 
question of whether it would have been feasible to import US-designed reactors 
for use in CVF;23 this option, to be feasible, would likely require the compatibility 
of a US reactor with existing British infrastructure, which is geared toward 
supporting submarine propulsion systems. The development of the necessary 
shore infrastructure to build and support a CVNF was estimated to be equivalent 	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17 Interview with retired senior Royal Air Force officer. 
18 Interview with Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh, Fareham, 29 May 2014. 
19 Interview with Rear Admiral Tom Cunningham CBE, (then) Rear Admiral Fleet Air Arm, 
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to the cost of at least one conventional carrier, which at the time of the studies into 
nuclear propulsion (1998), was projected to be in the region of £1.4 billion.24 It 
was therefore decided to proceed with the development of CVF as a 
conventionally powered aircraft carrier utilising the innovative integrated full 
electric propulsion system. All options were considered in the course of 
developing the carrier programme,25 including potential cooperation with France. 
This was with respect to French interest in building a third CVF, configured for 
CATOBAR operations, in order to provide the French Navy with a second aircraft 
carrier, complementing the nuclear-powered Charles De Gaulle. The option of 
constructing carrier modules in France was considered, as was assembly at the 
DCNS (France’s leading naval defence company) Saint-Nazaire shipyard.26    
As stated in the preceding chapter, the core purpose of carrier airpower is to 
provide affordable, independent and strategically credible deployable airpower.27 
On this basis, determining the nature and scale of embarked aviation capabilities is 
of central importance in the development of an aircraft carrier. In the context of 
CVF, this aspect, in particular the nature of embarked operations, that is, STOVL, 
STOBAR or CATOBAR, formed a critical area of debate. This debate, to a 
significant extent, went beyond determining the type of aircraft carrier and 
embarked aircraft that would fulfil the CVF requirement, having implications for 
the balance and development of wider British airpower. This was especially so 
with regard to the implications of selecting the CATOBAR option for CVF.28 In 
the context of discussing the potential future utility of Joint Force 2000, Wing 
Commander Neil Meadows, RAF, described the CATOBAR option for CVF in 
the following terms: 
...The procurement of a CTOL [conventional take-off and landing,] FAC [Future 
Aircraft Carrier]/FCBA [Future Carrier Borne Aircraft] combination would allow 
the aircraft carrier to mount all but the most intensive of air combat operations and 
would thus radically alter JF 2000’s deployment considerations in favour of sea-	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borne operations. Only in its prospective CTOL form, therefore, would JF 2000 
become the ‘deployable and effective offensive air capability’ which the SDR 
envisaged, fully able to fulfil the expeditionary roles of the post-Cold War era as a 
true instrument of political choice, and able to operate equally effectively from 
aircraft carriers and land bases in all but the most intense of conflicts.29 
That is, the development of CVF as a CATOBAR-equipped carrier and thus the 
acquisition of conventional naval aircraft, rather than STOVL aircraft (which as 
will be discussed below, are significantly less capable), would enable the Royal 
Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF) to acquire a common aircraft equally capable of 
operations from aircraft carriers or land bases. This would allow the then current 
policy assumption of UK future airpower being provided by three programmes, 
Typhoon, the Joint Combat Aircraft and FOAS (Future Offensive Air System),30 
to be rationalised into two programmes: Typhoon and a common aircraft for the 
JCA and FOAS requirements. Moreover, following the merging of the Future 
Carrier Borne Aircraft (the original FCBA requirement was for 60 aircraft to 
replace the Sea Harrier31) and RAF Harrier replacement programmes to form the 
JCA programme and with it the requirement for approximately 150 JCA (of which 
half would be Royal Navy-owned32), the quantitative and particularly qualitative 
contribution of the Fleet Air Arm to British airpower would increase substantially. 
This is particularly highlighted if it is considered that a CVF air-group was 
originally intended to include 36 fixed-wing combat aircraft; such an air-group 
would constitute a significant contribution to a major UK expeditionary operation, 
for example, for Operation Telic (the 2003 invasion of Iraq), the UK deployed a 
total of 62 combat aircraft (Harrier GR7, Tornado GR4 and F3), all of which were 
land-based and operated by the RAF.33  
The debate on land versus sea-based airpower will be discussed in greater detail 
below, however it is important to highlight at this stage, the wider policy context 
for, and implications of, the debate on which aircraft carrier configuration to 
proceed with. In general terms, the debates on carrier configuration and deriving 
from that, which variant of the Joint Combat Aircraft to acquire, were focused on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Wing Commander Neil Meadows RAF, ‘To Sea or Not To Sea: That is the Question’, Air Power 
Review, Vol. 3, No.1 (Spring 2000), pp.82-106. Emphasis added. 
30 Interview with Rear Admiral Cunningham, 1 July 2011.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Interview with Captain Jock Alexander OBE Royal Navy, (then) Naval Staff – Assistant Head 
Carrier Strike and Aviation, London, 3 May 2012.  




the respective merits (military, political, economic and industrial) of STOVL vis-
à-vis CATOBAR. There were a number of lobbies involved in this debate: a 
strong naval, principally Fleet Air Arm (FAA), lobby advocating the acquisition 
of the US F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet (requiring CATOBAR); two lobbies 
within BAE Systems, one advocating a navalised Typhoon (requiring STOBAR), 
the other advocating the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF, either STOVL or 
CATOBAR);34 and the Royal Air Force advocating STOVL JSF.35  
The STOBAR option, as will be discussed below, was considered both in the 
formative stage of the CVF programme and again, as a potential alternative to the 
US-led F-35 programme in the mid-2000s.36 Although not occupying as central a 
position in the carrier debate as STOVL versus CATOBAR, the STOBAR option 
is significant not least for its implications for understanding the technical 
requirements for carrier-borne aircraft and its relevance to international carrier 
programmes (Russia, China and India all operate or are awaiting delivery of 
Soviet-built STOBAR aircraft carriers). 
The STOBAR Option 
An aircraft carrier built to a STOBAR configuration incorporates a forward ski-
jump to assist the short take-off of a fixed-wing aircraft (instead of utilising a 
catapult-launching system), and an angled flight deck with arrestor wires (as per a 
conventional CATOBAR carrier) to enable the arrested recovery of fixed-wing 
aircraft. At present, the only STOBAR aircraft carrier in operational service is the 
Russian Navy’s Admiral Kuznetsov (defined in Russian terminology as a heavy 
aircraft-carrying cruiser), which operates naval derivatives of the Sukhoi 27 
Flanker and Sukhoi 25 Frogfoot (the Su-33 and Su-25UTG respectively) 
alongside embarked helicopters.37 Although a STOBAR carrier is, due to the 
absence of a catapult-launching system, of simpler design than a CATOBAR ship, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Interview with Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh. 
35 Interview with retired senior Royal Air Force officer. 
36 House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC), Future Carrier and Joint Combat Aircraft 
Programmes, Second Report of Session 2005-06, HC 554 (London: The Stationery Office, 2005), 
p.31.  
37 Russia’s Naval Ships, Armament and Equipment (Moscow: Military Parade, 2009), pp.32-33; 
and Yefim Gordon, Russian Air Power: Current Organisation and Aircraft of all Russian Air 
Forces (Hinckley: Midland Publishing, 2009), pp.206-207. For an overview of the development of 




the need for a fixed-wing aircraft to launch from the carrier under its own 
propulsion results in reduced performance, in particular with regard to range and 
payload (as with STOVL aircraft).38 STOBAR operations require more deck space 
than CATOBAR to enable the short take-off run and require an arrested recovery; 
in addition, STOBAR operations are also more susceptible to wind, tide, rolling 
and pitching.39 In operational terms, due to the constraints imposed on aircraft by 
the need to perform a short take-off, a STOBAR carrier is more suited to 
providing a sea control capability (with its embarked fixed-wing aircraft providing 
air defence and to an extent anti-shipping capabilities and helicopters providing 
ASW), rather than a power projection capability. This is highlighted by Russian 
experience and China’s initial efforts to develop a nascent aircraft carrier 
capability.40 
In the British context, the STOBAR option for CVF is associated with the 
viability of a naval variant of the Eurofighter Typhoon, which was considered as 
part of the Joint Combat Aircraft programme.41 At first glance, a naval variant of 
the Typhoon, a core element of the RAF’s long-term force structure, would have 
appeared to be a leading contender for the FCBA/JCA requirement on the basis of 
maximising the return on a substantial investment42 and ensuring commonality 
with the RAF. Traditionally, naval aircraft have required significant airframe 
strengthening to endure the rigours of launching from and recovering aboard 
aircraft carriers. Efforts to adapt land-based designs for ship-borne operations 
have tended either to fail (for example, the US F-111B) or require such extensive 
modification as to constitute essentially new aircraft.43 A navalised Typhoon 
would have required a redesigned thicker wing to lower its stalling speed 
(necessary for recovering aboard a carrier); a significantly altered undercarriage 
(to cope with the rigours of carrier launch and recovery); and an improved land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Nan Li and Christopher Weuve, ‘China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update’, Naval War 
College Review, Vol.63, No.1 (Winter 2010), pp.13-32. 
39 Ibid., p.24. 
40 Ibid. 
41 HCDC, Future Carrier and Joint Combat Aircraft Programmes, p.25; and Richard Scott, 
‘Future Carrier-Borne Aircraft’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol.38, No.10 (9 September 1998), 
pp.64-68.   
42 The total cost of the Typhoon programme is estimated to be £20.2 billion. National Audit Office, 
Management of the Typhoon Project, HC 755, Session 2010-2011 (London: The Stationery Office, 
March 2011), p.23, para 2.2. 




attack capability (at this stage, the aircraft was principally configured for the air-
to-air mission).44 The development of a navalised Typhoon would thus have 
entailed significant cost and not provided a level of capability equivalent to that of 
the F/A-18 (purpose-built for carrier operations) or JSF, which in addition to being 
designed for sea-based operations, was also a fifth generation aircraft, a key point 
which will be discussed further below.      
Comparing STOVL and CATOBAR 
The debate on whether to pursue the STOVL or CATOBAR option for the future 
aircraft carriers and their air groups is no mere technical detail but is of central 
importance to understanding the development of the carrier programme in its 
broadest context. This includes the associated Joint Combat Aircraft and Future 
Organic AEW/Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) programmes, 
the role of carrier airpower in British strategy and the long-term trajectory and 
balance of British airpower. The outcome of the debate would determine the 
design of the ships to be built; the type and capability of the aircraft to be 
embarked; the roles the ships would be capable of undertaking and thus their 
utility to British strategy; and the balance of British fixed-wing combat air 
capability to be provided by sea and land-based aircraft respectively. Prior to 
examining the debate, a brief summary, in generic terms, of STOVL and 
CATOBAR ship configurations and the respective associated aircraft types are 
provided. 
An aircraft carrier designed for STOVL operations will typically be of simpler 
design, due to the absence of catapults and arresting gear, than a CATOBAR 
carrier. It may also incorporate a ski-jump (as, for example, in the British 
Invincible-class or Spanish Principe de Asturias) to improve short take-off 
performance; 45  although not required, an angled flight deck may also be 
incorporated in order to enable rolling vertical landings (as opposed to a vertical 
landing), thereby improving vertical landing bring-back performance (the weight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Interview with Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh. 
45 For discussion of the development of the ski-jump and the benefits it confers on STOVL 
operations, see David Hobbs, A Century of Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of Ships and 
Shipborne Aircraft (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2009), pp.261-264 and p.272 for the compatibility of 




of payload permitted for a vertical recovery).46 Rear Admiral Richard Philips, then 
Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operational Requirements (Sea)), described at 
the aforementioned ‘British Naval Aviation in the 21st Century’ conference, the 
advantages of STOVL as: ‘STOVL operations use less space on the flight deck, 
enabling use of smaller hulls which are less weather dependent – since, when the 
weather deteriorates, the aircraft’s recovery position can be moved to the midship 
[sic] area where deck movement is minimised’.47 Further, as Commander David 
James, Royal Navy, stated with regard to STOVL: ‘Flight operations are less 
affected by sea state than in a CTOL or STOBAR ship. This is because the 
STOVL aircraft establishes a hover alongside the ship and can choose the deck 
area with least motion and await a quiescent period before committing to the final 
landing’.48 Moreover, because the recovery boarding rate for STOVL operations is 
expected to be more assured than for arrested recoveries, an organic air-to-air 
refuelling capability has not traditionally been required – although would prove 
useful to de-risk recoveries of large formations of STOVL aircraft.49 A STOVL 
deck is also more versatile and offers greater tactical flexibility, in particular as it 
is not bound by the launch and recovery cycle associated with a CATOBAR 
deck.50  
David Jordan has cited an additional potential benefit of naval STOVL aircraft: 
A 1992 report by the Center for Naval Analyses suggested that naval STOVL 
aircraft could undertake 25 percent [sic] more sorties than a conventional-takeoff 
[sic]-and-landing type over a five-hundred-nautical-mile radius in a twelve-hour 
period; if the radius of action were reduced to 250 nautical miles, the STOVL type 
could generate 40 percent [sic] more.51  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Commander D. R. James, Royal Navy, ‘Carrier 2000: A Consideration of Naval Aviation in the 
Millennium – II’, The Naval Review, Vol.87, No.2, (April 2009), pp.105-113. For background 
information on ship-borne rolling vertical landing (SRVL), see Richard Scott, ‘Seeking the Third 
Way: UK Considers Rolling Vertical Landing for its F-35Bs’, Jane’s Navy International, Vol.113, 
No.3 (April 2008), pp.14-15. At present, no STOVL carrier in service features an angled flight 
deck.  
47 Rear Admiral R. T. R. Philips, ‘Naval Aviation in a Changed Strategic Environment’, in 
Professor Martin Edmonds (ed.), ‘British Naval Aviation the 21st Century’, Bailrigg Memorandum 
(CDISS, 1997), pp.13-23, quotation, pp.18-19   
48 James, ‘Carrier 2000 – II’, pp.108-109.  
49 I am grateful to Commander Henry Mitchell, Royal Navy, for this insight.  
50 Interview with retired senior MoD official. 
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However, as Major John Jordan, United States Marines Corps, highlights, citing 
US Navy and Marines Corps experience concerning aircraft availability and 
maintainability:  
CVTOL [carrier take-off and landing] aircraft availability is historically 80 percent 
[sic], while STOVL availability is only 63 percent [sic]. “Thus one might build a 
case that fewer sorties may be generated using STOVL aircraft rather than CVTOL. 
This is a far cry from the 23% STOVL advantage claimed by [the Center for Naval 
Analyses].”52   
It is suggested that the reduced availability of STOVL aircraft is due to their 
added complexity (associated with making an aircraft capable of STOVL 
operations) thus increasing the incidence of technical failure.53 However, a source 
with extensive operational experience on both conventional land-based and 
STOVL aircraft has stated that, in his experience, service availability for STOVL 
aircraft is comparable to that of conventional aircraft, and where there have been 
issues with availability, it is due to factors not related to the STOVL system.54     
The F-35 programme, although still in testing, offers the following valuable 
insight with regard to the potential difference in reliability between a STOVL and 
conventional aircraft: ‘[the] Demonstrated Mean Flight Hours Between Critical 
Failure for the F-35A [conventional take-off and landing] was 5.95 hours, for the 
F-35B [STOVL] was 4.16 hours, and for the F-35C [carrier variant] was 6.71 
hours...’55 It must be noted that these figures are derived from testing and do not 
represent expected operational performance, but most significantly, the F-35B is 
expected to have a shorter time between critical failure compared to that for the F-
35C with a concomitant effect on aircraft availability. In the same light, repair 
times for the STOVL aircraft are longer than those of the carrier variant, at 5.3 
hours and 4.0 hours respectively.56 Thus, although more STOVL aircraft can be 
launched and recovered within a given period than for CATOBAR, historic (and 
likely future) availability will result in, for the same number of aircraft, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Major John O. Jordan, USMC, Marine TacAir and the STOVL Penalty: Myth or Menace? 
Student Research Paper, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College (April 2001), 
p.35. Retrieved via http://www.dtic.mil.    
53 See Ibid for discussion of this subject, in particular pages 31-36. 
54 Interview with retired senior Royal Air Force officer. 
55 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (US Department of Defense), ‘F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF)’ in FY 2012 Annual Report (The Office of the Director, Operational Test and 
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CATOBAR operations being sustained for longer and with less logistic drag 
whereas STOVL aircraft will experience technical failure more readily and or 
require greater effort to sustain operations – in addition to inherent performance 
differences.57 
As will be discussed below with specific reference to the F-35, STOVL aircraft 
have reduced performance, in particular with regard to range, payload, combat 
persistence and target coverage, compared to conventional aircraft. Further, the 
choice of a STOVL configuration for an aircraft carrier currently limits the choice 
of organic enabling assets, especially AEW/ISTAR,58 to a rotary-wing system. 
Tilt-rotor aircraft such as the V-22 (see below) and hybrid air vehicles may, with 
sufficient investment, address this limitation.59 The implications of a helicopter-
based MASC solution are identified by Lieutenant Commander David South, 
Royal Navy:  
The helicopter’s performance will be significantly reduced in comparison [to the 
land-based E-3 or carrier-based E-2] due to limited endurance, a lack of access to a 
comprehensive Multi-tactical Data Links (MTDL) suite, constraints on crew size 
and thus the number of aircraft which can be controlled, and insufficient radio 
communications to allow multi-tasking with maritime, air and ground forces... CVF 
launched strike packages will depend on the services of E3 or other navies’ E2C 
aircraft to provide a suitable level of control and direction in a busy and complex 
operational environment, whilst the MASC will be reduced to a single role platform 
only capable of limited control in relatively benign airspace.60 
The development of a V-22 Osprey-based MASC system would significantly 
contribute to mitigating the above deficiencies, whilst being STOVL capable (the 
V-22 is a tilt-rotor design which allows it to perform V/STOL operations61) but 
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Bosbotinis, ‘The Strategic Utility of the Queen Elizabeth-class Aircraft Carriers’, Defence IQ, 1 
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would require major British investment.62 The provision of an organic ISTAR 
capability highlights the central weakness of a STOVL carrier, that is, its limited 
airpower capability. This is not to say that a STOVL aircraft carrier cannot 
provide a most useful capability – HMS Hermes and Invincible were, for example, 
mission critical assets in the Falklands War – but that the capability it can provide 
will be limited.63 In this regard, a STOVL carrier constitutes a cost effective 
option should the capability being sought be of a limited nature, but as will now 
be discussed, in the context of seeking to acquire a medium aircraft carrier with a 
significant level of capability, a CATOBAR carrier may be more cost effective 
and better suited to the vision articulated in the SDR, and reiterated in the SDSR. 
In the context of developing CVF, ‘Noah’s News’ writing in The Naval Review, 
effectively summarises the essence of the STOVL-CATOBAR choice: 
In making a choice of variant for FCBA, the UK’s force projection aspirations must 
be clearly articulated and understood: is it power projection of maritime offensive 
air as conducted by USN or French carriers, or expeditionary maritime offensive air 
operations as advocated by the US Marine Corps? The latter would envisage using 
aircraft primarily to provide fire support to marine ground forces ashore (Close Air 
Support) rather than an ability to conduct the full spectrum of offensive air 
operations.64 
It also warrants highlighting that in the case of the US Marine Corps, it has been 
able to develop the niche specialisation of expeditionary maritime offensive air 
operations because the US Navy and Air Force provide the wider offensive air and 
general airpower functions that US policy requires. Thus, for the UK, the pursuit 
of the US Marine Corps-type approach would either require additional capabilities 
to be provided (at extra cost) by, for example, the RAF, or a reliance on allies for 
those capabilities. 
In contrast to a STOVL aircraft carrier, a ship designed for CATOBAR operations 
has a catapult-launching system (typically steam-powered but electromagnetic 
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20 June 2007, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-navy-seeks-demonstration-of-toss-
radar-on-v-22-osprey-215013/. Accessed 8 September 2013.   
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see Meadows, ‘To Sea or Not to Sea’. 
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systems are increasingly being used)65 for fixed-wing aircraft and an angled flight 
deck with arrestor wires to recover those aircraft. Due to the requirements of 
catapult-assisted launches and arrested recoveries, a CATOBAR-configured ship 
will be, to an extent, larger than a STOVL design, a CATOBAR configuration 
being viable only for ships exceeding 40,000 tons. For a CATOBAR ship, the 
main design drivers are the catapult-launch system and flight deck arrangements 
(for launching and recovering aircraft), whilst a STOVL design is driven by the 
deck length required for the short take-off.66 Although it is the case that STOVL 
carriers can be smaller, albeit embarking small air groups, for medium and large 
carrier designs, the requirements of aviation operations for a given number of 
aircraft, whether of STOVL or CATOBAR design, result in both STOVL and 
CATOBAR vessels tending toward similar overall dimensions.67 Despite the 
added complexity of the catapult-launching system and arresting gear, the cost 
difference between a STOVL and CATOBAR carrier is approximately six per 
cent in both initial construction and life cycle costs.68 Wing Commander Meadows 
describes the advantages of a CATOBAR aircraft carrier thus: 
Whilst a CTOL FAC/FCBA combination would be larger… it would, however, 
offer considerably more in terms of air power projection capability than its STOVL 
equivalent. An electromagnetic catapult could launch aircraft of all-up weights in 
excess of 70,000 lbs. It would also enable the use of more capable, fixed-wing 
AEW aircraft (such as the E-2 Hawkeye) and small AAR [air-to-air refuelling] 
tankers. The CTOL carrier’s arrestor capability would also permit the recovery of 
its aircraft in most configurations and with significant battle damage.69   
By using the vision outlined for CVF in the SDR, that is, an aircraft carrier that 
can provide ‘increased offensive air power, and an ability to operate the largest 
possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles’, the advantage of a 
CATOBAR configuration can be illustrated. With regard to ‘increased offensive 	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air power’, a conventional naval aircraft can carry a greater payload over larger 
distances, and or spend more time on-station than a STOVL aircraft. Moreover, a 
CATOBAR carrier can embark specialist force enablers and multipliers such as 
electronic warfare/defence suppression aircraft (for example, the EA-18G 
Growler70) and as previously noted, more capable ISTAR aircraft (such as the E-
2D Hawkeye71), thereby enhancing the ability of the carrier’s strike fighters to 
prosecute targets in heavily-defended airspace and those targets which are time-
sensitive and or mobile. An ISTAR asset such as the E-2 can also significantly 
improve situational awareness and understanding of the operating area or 
battlespace (depending on whether the carrier is undertaking a forward presence or 
combat tasking) thus aiding wider national or coalition activities. The carrier’s 
organic air-to-air refuelling (AAR) aircraft, in addition to providing the necessary 
support for arrested recoveries,72 can also be utilised to extend the reach of the 
embarked strike fighters. France made use of this tactic to extend the reach of its 
Super Etendard aircraft flying off the Charles de Gaulle for operations over 
Afghanistan (over 700 miles from the carrier’s operating area).73 The unrefuelled 
range of the Super Etendard is approximately 750 nautical miles.74 Furthermore, a 
CATOBAR carrier can operate the same V/STOL fixed and rotary-wing aircraft 
that a STOVL carrier can operate (the converse does not apply) and, in the British 
case, would confer the additional benefit of interoperability with the US and 
French navies.75  
The use of a CATOBAR approach, however, incurs some penalties. The naval, 
predominantly FAA, lobby that advocated a CATOBAR configuration for CVF 
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discounted a lot of arguments pointing to the difficulties of such an approach.76 It 
is argued that the launch and recovery cycle associated with CATOBAR 
operations is a significant constraint, in particular with regard to providing 
responsive tactical airpower, whilst simultaneous launch and recovery operations 
are inefficient.77 In addition, the requirement to maintain a fuel reserve for 
recovering aboard the carrier, a process supported by organic tanking (see 
footnote 72), may reduce the time over target for a CATOBAR aircraft; the more 
assured recovery rate for STOVL highlights the greater flexibility of a STOVL 
deck.78 Moreover, CATOBAR deck operations are more labour intensive and 
complex in comparison to a STOVL deck and more costly.79 
The Royal Navy’s initial thinking on CVF was for a STOVL vessel; however, as 
the required sortie generation rate was increased and the ship’s size grew beyond 
40,000 tons, a CATOBAR configuration became viable.80 Dr Lee Willett, former 
Head of the Maritime Studies Programme at the Royal United Services Institute 
for Defence and Security Studies, has noted with regard to the RAF’s attitude 
toward the CVF programme that: 
CVA01 was torpedoed not only by budgetary issues, but also by inter-service 
rivalry. In recent years, tensions existed between the Royal Navy and RAF over 
who would ‘own’ JSF: in other words, is it a carrier-based aircraft that can operate 
from land, or vice-versa? There were also some very difficult times privately 
between senior elements of the two services and within the Harrier community over 
the carrier programme. As the programme developed, however, the RAF did not 
publicly oppose it, although its support may have been somewhat qualified.81 
This quotation highlights three issues central to an analysis of the debate 
concerning British maritime airpower; ownership, sea-basing versus land-basing, 
and the RAF attitude toward maritime airpower. The issue of ownership will be 
discussed in chapter five; the issues of sea versus land-basing and the Royal Air 
Force’s perspective toward the carrier programme, although to be discussed in 
further detail both later in this chapter and in chapter five, are relevant to the 
discussion to which the chapter now turns, that of the debate concerning which 	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variant of F-35 to acquire to meet the JCA requirement and thus determine 
whether CVF would be equipped for STOVL or CATOBAR operations. 
The Joint Combat Aircraft Variant Debate 
The Lockheed Martin F-35 was selected to meet the JCA requirement in January 
2001;82 the particular variant would be determined subsequently. The F-35 is an 
advanced fifth generation aircraft, developed to fulfil the requirement of providing 
the US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps and international partners with a Joint 
Strike Fighter; this has resulted in the development of three variants – the F-35A 
(conventional take-off and landing, land-based), F-35B (STOVL) and F-35C 
(CATOBAR).83 The UK is the only ‘Level 1’ partner in the US-led programme. 
This is based on a $2 billion investment in the System Development and 
Demonstration Phase that provides Britain with the right to ‘bid for work on a best 
value basis, and participate in the aircraft’s development’.84 BAE Systems is a 
principal sub-contractor (alongside the US company Northrop Grumman) to 
Lockheed Martin for F-35 production. It is responsible for the design and 
production of the aft section of all three variants of the aircraft in addition to other 
aspects of the F-35’s on-board systems,85 whilst Rolls Royce is responsible for 
developing the lift system enabling the F-35B’s STOVL capability. 86  The 
significance of the F-35 programme to BAE Systems and Rolls Royce is 
highlighted by considering that, at the time of writing, in excess of 2,500 F-35s are 
to be acquired for the US and international customers.87 
The JCA variant debate was ‘heated’, in part due to internal competition within 
the Ministry of Defence between the carrier variant of the F-35 and the RAF’s 
FOAS programme.88 FOAS was intended to replace the Tornado GR4 in the 	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second decade of the 21st century, having a projected in-service date of 2015-18, 
and was to be a system of attack platforms both manned and remotely-piloted.89 
Air Commodore (now Air Marshal Sir) Tim Anderson described FOAS as ‘our 
prudent investment in the future that will continue to ensure a sharp tip to the 
spear as JCA reaches middle age and beyond’;90 this suggests that FOAS was 
intended to constitute the high-end of future British airpower, providing a level of 
capability a step-up from that provided by the JCA. The RAF advocated acquiring 
the F-35B, citing its flexibility and capability; operational analysis following the 
SDR indicated that the F-35B could reach 70 per cent of all targets that the UK 
would wish to hold at risk, the remaining 30 per cent could either be reached using 
Tomahawk or air-launched cruise missiles (such as Storm Shadow) or by the 
US.91 It also highlighted continuity with the STOVL Harrier and STOVL as an 
important niche capability.92 Further, the RAF was looking at acquiring some 
land-based F-35As within the 150 F-35s the UK intended to acquire.93 Although 
there would be some increased operational costs associated with operating a 
mixed fleet (the projected through life costs of operating a mixed F-35 fleet were 
estimated in 2012 to exceed that of a single F-35C fleet by £2 billion94), those 
costs would be balanced by the lower acquisition cost of the F-35A (the F-35A is 
the least-expensive of the three variants).95  
It has been suggested that the RAF advocated acquiring the F-35B in order to 
minimise the strike capability of CVF, thus undermining the case for the carriers, 
and to create a capability gap that necessitated investment in FOAS.96 The F-35C, 
capable of fulfilling both the JCA and FOAS roles, was seen as an ‘existential 
threat’ to the RAF as the strike role was central to the RAF ethos;97 conversely, it 
warrants mention that there was some support within the RAF for acquiring the F-
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35C.98 A key aspect of the variant debate was the case put forward by the RAF 
regarding the importance of being at the heart of the Combined Air Operations 
Centre for coalition air operational planning, and the imperative of having a ‘day 
one’99 capability in order to be relevant to the US, thereby gaining campaign 
influence and boosting the UK position vis-à-vis Washington.100 This would 
require a high-end strike system (for example, FOAS) and could only be delivered 
by the RAF.101 Air Commodore Anderson highlighted the importance of this latter 
capability in the context of FOAS:  
Long-range offensive air power will be an essential element of any integrated 
campaign in anti-access environments...This important element of what can be 
described as a ‘Day One’ capability must address the application of effect against 
the most demanding of targets, probably at extended range from the UK, Sovereign 
or allies’ territories, and in the highest of threat environments...we will clearly wish 
to watch closely evolving US concepts for timely effect at range to enable, where 
possible, the UK to meet its desired level and extent of commitment to coalition 
operations.102   
This illustrates the point raised by ‘Noah’s News’, and quoted above, regarding 
the implications of the JCA variant decision. The difference in capability between 
the F-35B and F-35C is significant. In 2001/02, the F-35B was projected to have a 
combat radius of 496 nautical miles with an internal payload consisting of two 
AIM-120 advanced medium range air-to-air missiles and two 1,000 lbs precision-
guided munitions.103 In contrast, the F-35C had a projected combat radius of 799 
nautical miles with an internal payload of two AIM-120s and two 2,000 lbs 
precision-guided munitions.104 The difference in range and internal payload is due 
to the space taken by the shaft-driven lift fan integrated with the engine in the F-
35B; this reduces the aircraft’s internal fuel load to 13,400 lbs compared to 19,145 
lbs in the F-35C, and restricts the size of the internal weapons bays on the F-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Interview with retired senior Royal Air Force officer. The option of acquiring a mixed F-35 fleet 
was also considered as part of the 2012 variant decision. Interview with Captain Alexander.  
99 That is, operations at the start of a conflict, against an adversary’s strategic targets defended by a 
still-intact integrated air defence system. 
100 Interview with former senior MoD civil servant. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Anderson, ‘UK Long Range Offensive Air Power for 2020 and Beyond’, pp.46-47. 
103 Eric S. Ryberg [then head of the JSF Basing and Ship Suitability Integrated Project Team], ‘The 
Influence of Ship Configuration on the Design of the Joint Strike Fighter’, Paper prepared for the 
‘Engineering the Total Ship’ Symposium, US National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2002. Retrieved via http://www.dtic.mil.  




35B.105 The difference in range would also impact on the respective variant’s 
combat persistence (that is, time over target or on-station); data from 2012 suggest 
that the F-35B has a time over target of 15 minutes compared to 36 minutes for 
the F-35C.106 The F-35B would also be more dependent on land-based air-to-air 
refuelling assets.  
The value of the longer range of the F-35C should have been particularly apparent 
due to then recent operational experience, namely, the first phase of air operations 
over Afghanistan in autumn 2001 and Operation Allied Force over Yugoslavia in 
1999. The former involved carrier-launched air operations over ranges of 650 to 
750 nautical miles to target:107 the latter 3,500 nautical mile round-trip sorties by 
Tornados from Germany.108 The difference in internal payload between the two 
variants is especially significant, in particular due to the F-35B’s inability to carry 
2,000 lbs penetrating munitions. It is argued that this means the F-35B cannot 
prosecute hardened, strategic targets (for example, command bunkers, bridges and 
aircraft bunkers) 109  without recourse to carrying external ordnance and 
compromising the aircraft’s low observability. Conversely, it is suggested that the 
lack of a 2,000 lbs munitions capability has been exaggerated.110 For example, the 
UK has a lead in the development of intelligent warheads, which can be used to 
prosecute hardened targets rather than relying on heavier-weight ordnance:111 the 
BROACH warhead fitted to the Storm Shadow cruise missile being a notable 
example.112     
However, the unrefuelled reach of the F-35B, even if armed with the Storm 
Shadow cruise missile (with a range of up to 250 nautical miles113), thus 
compromising the aircraft’s low observability, would only extend to a total of 744 	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nautical miles; less than the F-35C armed with internal ordnance and therefore 
capable of operating within an adversary’s airspace on ‘day one’ operations.  
Further, as Robert Hewson, then editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, wrote in 
2004:  
It is uncertain just how many of the UK’s desired weapons options will now fit in 
the redesigned aircraft [the F-35B had to be redesigned in order to reduce its weight 
and thus preserve its STOVL capability], but there are clearly some serious 
implications. This comes at a time when UK industry (led by MBDA Missile 
Systems) already faces an uphill struggle in convincing the US to integrate non-US 
systems in the first place.114 
This highlights another aspect of the variant debate: that of industrial interest. 
Richard Scott, naval editor for Jane’s Defence Weekly, has described the original 
2002 variant decision in favour of the F-35B,115 as ‘very finely balanced’ and in 
part influenced by ‘the industrial interests of Rolls-Royce and BAE Systems’.116 
As previously noted, Rolls-Royce is responsible for the development and 
manufacture of the STOVL lift system in the F-35B. In 2002, Rolls-Royce was 
‘not in great shape’;117 the Rolls-Royce developed ‘LiftSystem’ was seen as 
providing an opportunity to ensure UK involvement in the STOVL variant and 
make the UK indispensable to the programme.118 Moreover, it would highlight to 
the US that the UK was a credible partner: there was a distinct lure associated with 
gaining ‘Level 1’ partner status in the JSF programme, a political appeal deriving 
from the potential industrial benefits and the national prestige of being linked with 
the US in such a high-profile programme.119 In the case of BAE Systems, it is 
suggested that RAF lobbying was a key driver, focusing on the capability gap that 
would exist with the procurement of the F-35B, thus leaving space for investment 
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in FOAS (which was as important to the RAF as it was to BAE Systems) and 
novel technologies.120  
At the political level, factors influencing the decision to select the F-35B included 
a projected earlier in-service date (2012, at that time, also the projected in-service 
date for the first-of-class of CVF), increased operational flexibility and what were 
expected to be greater benefits for British companies.121 In addition, the head of 
the JSF programme office in the United States in 2001 was a US Marine Corps 
general – Major General Michael Hough; the US Marine Corps (USMC) is the 
principal customer for the F-35B, and a desire to gain influence in the programme 
office contributed to Britain’s decision to opt for the STOVL variant.122 The 
selection of the F-35B would create a symbiotic link with the USMC in defending 
the continued development of the STOVL variant.123 Further, the USMC was 
lobbying ‘very hard’ in the UK in favour of the F-35B.124 As has been discussed 
above, the ‘greater benefits for British companies’ is debateable (especially with 
regard to MBDA) and in many respects, the F-35B offers less operational 
capability than the F-35C. The earlier projected in-service date, although 
nominally an advantage, does not consider the element of technical risk in the 
STOVL programme, which was of sufficient concern to warrant the development 
of CVF as an adaptable carrier, that is, initially configured for STOVL but 
designed to be refitted for CATOBAR operations.125 In the event of significant 
delay or failure of the STOVL variant, the only STOVL fall-back option would be 
continued use of the Harrier; in the event of a delay or failure of the F-35C, fall-
back options would potentially include the lease/acquisition of the F/A-18E/F or 
the French Rafale-M.  
The decision to develop CVF as an adaptable design also meant that a key 
advantage of opting for a STOVL ship-air system – a smaller, less expensive ship 
– was not available. Furthermore, the through-life costs of the F-35C were 
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forecast to be much lower than those of the F-35B,126 whilst the unit costs were in 
2001/02, predicted to be $45.8 million for the F-35B and $47.8 million for the F-
35C.127 The difference in unit cost, spread over a projected 150 aircraft JCA fleet, 
would amount to the F-35C option costing $300 million more than the F-35B. 
However, the F-35C could also provide the manned component of FOAS, 
therefore allowing the RAF to streamline its future force structure to two principal 
fast jet types (thus enabling efficiency savings); the Typhoon and F-35C, rather 
than the planned three fast jet force, that is, Typhoon, F-35B JCA and FOAS. The 
ability of the F-35C to fulfil the FOAS role is alluded to by the National Audit 
Office in its 2011 report on Carrier Strike, where it states that the F-35B could not 
fulfil the deep and persistent operational capability (DPOC) requirement 
(successor to the FOAS programme), whereas the F-35C could.128 
The selection of the F-35B and decision to configure CVF for STOVL operations, 
albeit with a view to the potential refit of CATOBAR equipment at some point in 
the future, would, although offering a substantial increase in capability over that 
provided by the Sea Harrier/Harrier combination, ‘perpetuate the inherent air 
power limitations...which would continue to restrict ship-borne air operations to a 
far smaller scale than would be possible from a land base’.129 It would also limit 
the MASC programme to a rotary wing solution (unless a tilt rotor option was 
developed). 130  The MASC requirement did not have a significant role in 
determining whether to develop CVF as a STOVL or CATOBAR carrier and the 
reason for this sheds light on the perceived role of the carriers. That is, the focus 
for the ships would be the delivery of offensive air power against the land – the 
AEW requirement was seen as less relevant as the ships would be operating within 
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range of land-based assets (this also reflected the RAF perspective concerning the 
employment of the aircraft carriers).131  
Lieutenant M. S. Russell, Royal Navy, writing in The Naval Review, argues with 
regard to the latter point that: ‘Operational analysis shows that existing UK theatre 
strategic and UK/coalition maritime air surveillance assets would not be able to 
provide coverage for the UK Carrier Task Group...’132 Further, since 1945, 
experience has indicated that airbases have not been as widely, immediately and 
freely available as advocates of land-based airpower have argued, 133  thus 
emphasising the need for a sufficient organic MASC capability. This can arguably 
be fulfilled by a rotary wing solution; the Sea King Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance 
and Control System was deemed ‘good enough’ and maritime AEW is tactically 
focused in contrast to the strategic capability provide by the land-based E-3 
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System).134 Moreover, a distributed 
approach to battlespace surveillance and early warning could be adopted utilising 
the F-35 alongside a heli-borne AEW system and the Type 45 Daring-class anti-
air warfare destroyers (this approach would benefit from the adoption of 
Cooperative Engagement Capability).135 
The decision to pursue the STOVL solution for CVF limits the extent to which 
Britain can develop interoperability with the US and French navies,136 as well as 
development of a single cross-domain capable unmanned air system (UAS) and/or 
unmanned combat air system (UCAS) capability contributing to the manned / 
unmanned mix of future combat air capabilities.137 It also prevented Britain from 
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exploiting a comparative advantage it possessed in the development of 
electromagnetic catapult technology. Britain was a major supplier of linear 
induction motor technology (the technology underpinning the electromagnetic 
aircraft launch system) and possessed the lead in developing electromagnetic 
catapults.138 The company, Force Engineering Ltd, had developed advanced linear 
induction motors, which it provided for the EMCAT (Electro-Magnetic 
CATapult) programme; an MoD effort in partnership with Converteam Ltd,139 to 
develop an electromagnetic catapult system for CVF prior to the selection of the 
STOVL variant of the F-35.140 The EMCAT system would arguably constitute a 
technically better system than the electromagnetic aircraft launch system and be 
more affordable.141 Lieutenant Commander Loring, Royal Navy, citing figures 
supplied by Converteam, suggests a full-size EMCAT shore test facility would 
cost approximately £30 million; the cost of installing the system on CVF is not 
provided although whole life costs for both CVF vessels equipped with EMCAT 
are given as £284 million (over a 30 year ship life);142 Lieutenant Commander 
Jeremy Tyler, Royal Navy, writing in the Naval Review suggests that the cost of 
fitting a catapult system to both carriers would have been approximately £150 
million.143 CVF designs incorporating two or three catapults (either steam or 
electromagnetic) were developed; however, the winning CVF design (‘Alpha’) 
from which the adaptable ‘Delta’ configuration was developed, would in a 
CATOBAR configuration, be equipped with two catapults.144 This points to a 
requirement for four catapults in total, and based on the projected cost of an 
EMCAT shore facility costing £30 million, the figure of £150 million for four 
catapults (£37.5 million per catapult; an increase in 25 per cent over the shore-
based system) would appear plausible. If taken together with the above-noted cost 
difference between the F-35 variants ($300 million more for the carrier version), 
the additional cost of developing CVF as CATOBAR-equipped carriers would 
likely have been in the region of £350 million. It warrants highlighting that the 	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above costs are based on the premise of the ships being built to a CATOBAR 
configuration and not the retrofitting of a catapult system.  
The decision to opt for the STOVL variant of the F-35 and configure CVF for 
STOVL operations can perhaps be summarised as an example of ‘the deflection of 
strategy by politics’. In this regard, the National Audit Office (NAO) states: 
In 2002, the Department [MoD] selected the STOVL variant of the Joint Strike 
Fighter... as its preferred aircraft...The Department’s quantitative analysis 
consistently showed that the carrier variant...was more capable and cheaper to 
support throughout its operational life. The decision to select STOVL took into 
account a number of wider political, military and industrial factors.145 
This quotation prompts the question: why, if the carrier variant of the F-35 was 
assessed to be clearly the better option both in terms of military utility and cost, 
was the STOVL variant selected instead? The variant decision was informed by 
the need to protect Rolls-Royce and the lobbying of the RAF,146 with the Navy 
Board advising on ship issues, and the RAF providing aviation advice.147 There 
was also, arguably, a cultural approach to the variant debate, that is, a significant 
proportion of the Harrier community were predisposed toward the STOVL variant 
whereas those from the Tornado community looked to the conventional F-35A or 
C.148 Further, the RAF were qualitatively better-placed in the debate, being much 
better connected industrially and in Parliament and more adept at marshalling 
stakeholders for lobbying.149 However, as highlighted by the NAO, all studies 
undertaken by the MoD showed the F-35C to be the better option and accepting 
the F-35B meant a restriction in capability.150 Most significantly, the decision to 
acquire the F-35B was not the recommended military option: the variant decision 
was a political one and not military.151    
The implication for the carrier programme was that the ships would be designed in 
order ‘to be easily reconfigured for CV operations later in the ship’s life’;152 in 
practice, this resulted in, by 2006/07 (that is, the advanced stage of ship design), 	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CVF effectively having a CATOBAR deck but with a ski jump for STOVL 
operations.153    
The 2010 SDSR Variant Decision 
The wider political-military debate concerning the carrier programme in the SDSR 
will be discussed in detail in chapter six; the purpose of this section is to consider 
narrowly the decision to switch from a STOVL to CATOBAR configuration for 
the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and JCA. Between the original 2002 
STOVL variant selection and 2008, the MoD on three occasions revisited its 
decision, in particular due to concerns over the F-35B’s weight, propulsion system 
and bring-back performance, albeit deciding on each occasion to proceed with the 
STOVL option.154 However, the 2010 SDSR did announce the change from a 
STOVL to CATOBAR configuration for Britain’s future Carrier Strike capability. 
The government explained the rationale for this decision, taken two-thirds of the 
way through the SDSR process,155 in the following terms: 
As currently designed, the Queen Elizabeth will not be fully interoperable with key 
allies, since their naval jets could not land on it. Pursuit of closer partnership is a 
core strategic principle for the Strategic Defence and Security Review because it is 
clear that the UK will in most circumstances act militarily as part of a wider 
coalition. We will therefore install catapult and arrestor gear. This will delay the in-
service date of the new carrier from 2016 to around 2020. But it will allow greater 
interoperability with US and French carriers and naval jets.... Installing the catapult 
and arrestor will allow the UK to acquire the carrier-variant of Joint Strike Fighter 
ready to deploy on the converted carrier instead of the short take-off and vertical 
landing (STOVL) variant. This version of the jet has a longer range and greater 
payload: this, not large numbers of aircraft, is the critical requirement for precision 
strike operations in the future. The UK plans to operate a single model of JSF, 
instead of different land and naval variants. Overall, the carrier-variant of the JSF 
will be cheaper, reducing through-life costs by around 25%.156  
It warrants mention that the RAF was also reportedly advocating the switch from 
the F-35B to the F-35C. Tim Ripley, writing in Jane’s Defence Weekly, suggested 
ahead of the publication of the SDSR that: 
It appears that the RAF is now backing moves to purchase the F-35C variant, which 
is optimised for conventional ‘catapult and trap’ carrier operation, unlike the short 
take-off and vertical-landing (STOVL) F-35B variant. “The F-35C has more 	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capability, range and payload than the ‘B’,” said a senior RAF planner. “We 
envisage the vast majority of JSF missions operating from land most of the time. 
Only if we go floating on a carrier do you need to go STOVL. You pay a price for 
that, so by going ‘C’ you can carry more weapons and fuel.”157 
The comments attributed to the ‘senior RAF planner’ in the above quotation are 
also noteworthy in highlighting the RAF’s perspective on the utility of carrier-
based aviation; this will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
The shift to a CATOBAR configuration for the Queen Elizabeth-class – as CVF 
had been named – would require the fitting of steam catapults or an 
electromagnetic catapult system – the latter either the EMCAT system or the US 
General Atomics’ electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS). In order to 
promote interoperability with the US Navy, 158  the UK was pursuing the 
integration of EMALS (and the associated advanced arresting gear) with the 
Queen Elizabeth-class; a potential foreign military sales contract (worth an 
estimated $200 million) was disclosed in November 2011.159 The estimated 
aggregated procurement cost of the CATOBAR equipment per ship was £12 
million per year through life whilst annual running costs were projected to be £34 
million.160 Moreover, by this time – 2011/12 – the F-35 programme had evolved 
in such a manner that the F-35C carrier variant, in addition to having lower 
through-life costs, had a lower unit cost than the F-35B. As of 2014, the F-35 
variants are estimated to cost (based on the Low-Rate Initial Production – LRIP - 
lot 7 production run) A, $112 million, B, $139 million and C, $130 million 
respectively.161The F-35B engine alone is projected to cost $26.2 million dollars 
compared to $10.8 million for that of the F-35C.162  
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The implications for the carrier programme of the SDSR decision to switch to a 
CATOBAR configuration were principally that the first-of-class Queen Elizabeth 
would be completed without the CATOBAR equipment installed and used for sea 
trials, after which the ship would be placed in extended readiness whilst the 
second-of-class, Prince of Wales would be built to a CATOBAR configuration 
and enter service in 2020.163 This was thus the position the carrier programme had 
reached 11 months after the SDSR; the next projected milestone was the 
completion of an 18-month Conversion Development Phase in December 2012.164 
However, in May 2012, the government again changed course with regard to the 
configuration of the Queen Elizabeth-class.  
The May 2012 Variant Decision 
In May 2012, the government announced its decision to revert to a STOVL 
configuration for the Queen Elizabeth-class and acquire the F-35B. 165  This 
decision was justified on the basis of a significant increase in the cost of the 
CATOBAR conversion - stated to be in the region of £2 billion for HMS Prince of 
Wales and substantially more for HMS Queen Elizabeth (whilst noting that each 
ship is projected to cost approximately £2.5 billion166) and an earlier in-service 
date for the F-35B.167 It was also argued that the variant switch constituted a more 
affordable approach to Carrier Strike, notwithstanding the lower payload, range, 
persistence and greater technical risk of the F-35B, and may enable both ships to 
become operational.168 This was in contrast to the SDSR statement that one carrier 	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would be kept operational whilst the other ship was maintained at extended 
readiness. 
Although space was provided for in the hull of the Queen Elizabeth-class for the 
installation of steam catapults or EMALS, funding for work on maintaining the 
adaptability of the CVF design stopped.169 This meant that the cost of the redesign 
work following the SDSR decision was quite considerable and the scale of effort 
required to fit CATOBAR equipment much greater than anticipated. 170  In 
particular, it was found that the installation of catapults would be more invasive in 
the hull than previously thought; interestingly, the installation of arrestor gear 
would be considerably less invasive and complex than that required for 
catapults.171 This means that, in the long run, it may be easier to convert the 
carriers to a STOBAR rather than CATOBAR configuration, if a STOVL 
successor to the F-35B is not available.172 The FAA lobbied heavily to keep the 
CATOBAR approach, however the priority for the Royal Navy was to maintain 
the capability to deliver fixed-wing aviation from the sea.173 Significantly, the 
reversion decision took political heat out of the carrier programme.174 As will be 
discussed in chapter six, the programme was subject to intense debate in the 
SDSR and narrowly avoided cancellation; in this respect, the reversion decision 
may have eased tensions around the carriers. 
The UK at the time of writing has a requirement for 48 F-35Bs to fulfil the Carrier 
Strike role.175 At an approximate unit cost of $139 million, those aircraft will cost 
approximately $6.672 billion (£3.936 billion); in contrast, the same number of F-
35Cs (costing $130 million) would cost $6.240 billion (£3.68 billion).176 The RAF 
is considering the potential acquisition of the F-35A to replace in the long term, 	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the Typhoon (the RAF intends to operate a force of 107 Typhoons until the 
2030s177).178 The DPOC requirement has also been deferred until the Typhoon is 
replaced in the 2030s.179 This will constitute a significant capability gap and could 
be interpreted as a defeat for the RAF in light of the efforts it expended to protect 
the FOAS programme. Conversely, it may be the case that the DPOC requirement 
has been folded in to the UK’s nascent Future Combat Air System programme, 
which is intended to: 
inform the forthcoming SDSR on the most appropriate force mix of platforms and 
systems in order to meet the future combat air requirement from 2030. A UCAV 
along the lines of Taranis is one potential element of this force mix, along with an 
additional buy of Lightning II, a Typhoon life extension or an alternative new-build 
manned aircraft.180 
The course of the DPOC requirement also highlights, as will be discussed in 
chapter six, the problem of short-termism and the lack of ‘joined-up’ thinking in 
British defence policy, as the National Audit Office summarise: ‘Having changed 
its position on DPOC three times in two years, the Department must now 
introduce a degree of consistency in its decision-making not previously apparent 
in the programme….’181    
The decision to pursue the F-35B may also mean the UK is foreclosing potential 
future opportunities for cooperation (military and industrial) with the US in 
programmes that are currently being formulated, most notably the F/A-XX,182 
unmanned air systems such as the X-47B and unmanned carrier launched airborne 
surveillance and strike system183 and follow-on sixth generation systems.184 In this 	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respect, it may result in the ships still needing to be fitted with CATOBAR 
equipment at some time during their service lives. Conversely, by opting for a 
STOVL approach to maritime aviation, Britain could perhaps, as it did in the 
1980s and 1990s, work with the US Marine Corps to develop a follow-on STOVL 
air system due to their common interest in this area.185 
The active lobbying of the USMC in support of the UK opting for the F-35B has 
been discussed in this chapter. It warrants adding that the 2010 SDSR variant 
decision caused much consternation on the part of the USMC, in part due to the 
potential jeopardy the British policy switch created for the STOVL programme: 
the USMC is dependent on STOVL for its organic sea-based fixed-wing aviation 
capability. The USMC thus welcomed the subsequent 2012 variant reversal 
decision and has provided significant assistance to the UK, namely with regard to 
ensuring that Royal Navy and RAF aviators continue to fly the Harrier thereby 
gaining sea-based STOVL experience. The Deputy Commandant for Marine 
Corps Aviation, Lieutenant General Jon Davis, who served a three-year tour with 
No. 3 Squadron RAF flying the Harrier GR5/7 from 1988 to 1991,186 has been 
instrumental in this process as was the former Commandant of the USMC, 
General James Amos and the Assistant Commandant, General John Paxton.187      
Conclusion 
The purpose of the preceding analysis has been to shed light on the design and 
development of, and associated debates concerning, the CVF programme. The 
analysis has identified the respective costs and benefits of both a STOVL and 
CATOBAR configuration for an aircraft carrier, and would suggest that with 
respect to the CVF programme, a CATOBAR configuration best fitted the stated 
requirements both for the delivery of carrier-based aviation and in the context of 
wider British airpower. In strategic and operational terms, the selection of a 	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CATOBAR configuration for CVF would have provided Britain with the 
capability envisioned in the SDR, whilst yielding a range of benefits, including 
economic (for example, pertaining to the exploitation of Britain’s lead in 
electromagnetic rail technology), political (a greater sovereign power projection 
capability and interoperability with the US and French navies) and military (in 
particular relating to the broader sea-based capability conferred by CATOBAR 
and the opportunity to equip land and sea-based squadrons with a common aircraft 
– also providing further economic advantages). Moreover, the development of 
CVF as a CATOBAR-equipped carrier would ‘future-proof’ the ships, ensure the 
long-term viability of British carrier airpower and enable the UK, if it desired, to 
participate in US naval aviation programmes beyond the Joint Strike Fighter (such 
as advanced unmanned air systems).   
The selection of the F-35B and with it, a STOVL configuration for the Queen 
Elizabeth-class, guided by the concept of CEPP, will provide the UK with a 
valuable maritime aviation capability (particularly suited to smaller-scale 
contingencies) and a significant increase in capability above that formerly 
provided by the Sea Harrier F/A2 and Harrier GR7/9.188 With the benefit of 
hindsight, it could perhaps be argued that the UK should have sought to acquire an 
LHD-type vessel rather than aircraft carriers. As will be discussed in chapter five, 
the acquisition of an LHD to replace both the Royal Navy’s Invincible-class 
aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships (the Fearless-class landing platform 
docks and the helicopter carrier, HMS Ocean) could have constituted a potential 
alternative to the CVF programme. Most importantly, the UK will be acquiring in 
the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, highly flexible and versatile platforms 
for projecting and protecting British interests and influence globally whilst 
remaining affordable. This is highlighted by the fact that the flight deck area of the 
Queen Elizabeth-class is 87 per cent that of a US Nimitz-class,189 whilst costing 
approximately £3 billion per ship. In contrast, the USS Ronald Reagan, a Nimitz-
class carrier, cost in total $17 billion (approximately £10 billion).190   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Rear Admiral Chris Parry, former Director General, Development, Concepts and Doctrine in 
the MoD, provides a valuable review of the utility of the future carriers in ‘The United Kingdom’s 
Future Aircraft Carriers: What Are They Good For?’ 
189 Interview with Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh. 




As discussed above, the RAF, although publicly not opposed to the carrier 
programme (as it was in the 1960s with regard to CVA-01), has perhaps sought to 
restrict the level of airpower capability that Britain could generate from the sea, in 
order to protect its single-Service interest (most notably FOAS). This highlights a 
key issue discussed in chapter three, that of an underdeveloped awareness of the 
utility of carrier airpower at the political level. In this regard, if the utility of 
carrier airpower is not sufficiently understood, it will be much more difficult to 
discern the requirements for aggregate British airpower and thus the appropriate 
balance to be achieved between land and sea-based air forces. Similarly, with 
regard to naval forces, if the utility of carrier airpower is not sufficiently 
understood, the opportunity cost of developing a carrier capability may be 
perceived to be unjustifiably high with respect to the investment that otherwise 
could have been made in surface combatants, submarines or amphibious assets. In 
order to shed further light on the utility of carrier airpower, the alternatives require 
examination; in this case, the capabilities provided by a naval force structure that 
does not include a traditional aircraft carrier, and land-based airpower. This, along 
with an examination of the debate concerning the balance and requirements of 




5. The Future Aircraft Carrier Programme and British 
Strategy: An Examination of Potential Alternatives  
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether the opportunity cost of 
investing in the Future Aircraft Carrier programme is justified by the capabilities 
that will be provided by the Queen Elizabeth-class, or whether potential 
alternative systems or approaches could equally or more effectively provide the 
capability required by British defence policy. In order to do this, the chapter first 
considers alternative naval systems and force structures, in particular, missile-
armed surface combatant and submarine-based force structures and aviation-
capable, multi-role amphibious assault vessels (providing the combined littoral 
manoeuvre and fast jet capability akin to that envisioned by the Carrier Enabled 
Power Projection – CEPP – approach – see chapter three, pages 126-127). The 
potential role of submarines and surface combatants operating as the core of a 
network-enabled, distributed fleet (as opposed to the current fleet architecture 
centred on aircraft carrier strike groups) forms an area of much contemporary 
debate, especially in the United States where, in certain quarters, questions are 
being asked with regard to the survivability, utility and cost-effectiveness of large-
decked aircraft carriers, especially in the face of emerging high-end anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) threats.1 The evaluation of potential naval alternatives 
to the aircraft carrier utilises as the benchmark for analysis, the capabilities 
required for the sea control and power projection missions and wider requirements 
of maritime strategy.2  
Proceeding from this, the chapter examines maritime aviation within the wider 
context of British airpower. It examines the role and utility of land-based airpower 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See especially Captain Henry J. Hendrix, US Navy, ‘At What Cost a Carrier?’ Disruptive 
Defense Papers (Center for a New American Security, March 2013); and Robert C. Rubel, ‘The 
Future of Aircraft Carriers’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Autumn 2011), pp.13-28 
and ‘The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm’, Naval War College, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 
pp.12-24.  
2 See chapter two, pages 88-92, for detailed discussion of British thinking on sea control and 




and critically assesses the respective contributions of sea and land-based aviation 
to British strategy and explores whether land-based aviation renders carrier-based 
airpower superfluous. The Joint Force approach that Britain has pursued since the 
late 1990s is also considered, both in conceptual terms and with regard to the 
actual experience of Joint Force Harrier; its implications for the development of 
maritime and wider airpower are evaluated. Finally, in order to inform a potential 
model for future British airpower, the balance of sea- and land-based aviation in 
relation to wider British strategic requirements is considered.  
This chapter builds upon the analysis within the preceding two chapters that 
examined the rationale for, and the design, development and debate concerning 
the procurement of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. This chapter, 
through a comparative analysis of potential alternatives, seeks to shed further light 
on the utility of aircraft carriers relative to the other options and assess their value 
to British maritime and grand strategy, and to consider whether such platforms are 
a vital capability for Britain. It is also intended that the discussion within this 
chapter of the requirements of maritime strategy and British airpower will assess 
the wider role and utility of maritime forces to British strategy. This will form the 
basis for the analysis in the following chapter of the connection between maritime 
strategy and national policy. It warrants mention that for the purposes of the 
analysis in this chapter, it is assumed, as a baseline, that British national policy 
will remain predicated on possessing the means to project power and influence 
globally, albeit on a limited scale.3 
Alternative Naval Force Structure Options 
The purpose of this section is to examine potential naval alternatives to the 
traditionally conceived fixed-wing aircraft carrier. Can for example, missile-
armed surface combatants and or submarines operating in conjunction with other 
naval and service (Army or Air Force) assets fulfil the same mission requirements 
as aircraft carriers? In short, does the aircraft carrier constitute an essential 
mission system for the Royal Navy to achieve the objectives set by national 
policy? In order to address this question, it is appropriate to briefly define the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National 




principal tasks of a navy. In this regard, Sir Julian Corbett defined the ‘functions 
of a fleet’ in the following terms: ‘The function of the fleet, the object for which it 
was always employed, has been three-fold: firstly, to support or obstruct 
diplomatic effort; secondly, to protect or destroy commerce; and thirdly, to further 
or hinder military operations ashore.’4 Underpinning those three tasks is the 
requirement to gain command of the sea, defined by Corbett as ‘the control of 
maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes’.5 As 
discussed in chapter two, the concept of sea control has superseded that of 
command of the sea; the functions of the fleet, to use contemporary terminology 
would thus be defined as international engagement (function one),6 sea control 
(function two) and power projection (function three).7  
The inherent multi-role capability of an aircraft carrier, enabled by its embarked 
fixed and rotary wing assets, allows the carrier to make a significant contribution 
to all three aforementioned naval functions. The British Invincible-class anti-
submarine aircraft carriers, although designed principally for rotary-wing anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) operations, were capable of conducting, with their 
embarked Sea Harrier fast jets and or Sea King helicopters, the following major 
tasks: anti-air warfare (AAW); anti-surface warfare (ASuW – i.e. anti-shipping 
operations); air-to-ground operations (land attack); littoral manoeuvre (i.e. 
amphibious operations); ASW; and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition 
and reconnaissance (ISTAR). This is in addition to the non-combat roles an 
aircraft carrier can fulfil, in particular providing forward presence, deterrence and 
reassurance in support of wider state policy. However, a suitably configured 
multi-mission surface combatant, such as the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer, can also conduct AAW (and ballistic missile defence – BMD)8, ASW 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Julian Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War: A Study in Combined Strategy, Volume 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [reprint of the original Longmans, Green, and Co. 
1907 edition], p.6.  
5 Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (reprinted with ‘Introduction’ by Eric 
Grove (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988)), p.94. 
6 For an overview of the tasks encompassed under the heading, ‘international engagement’, see 
MoD/DCDC, British Maritime Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10, August 2011), pp.2-21 
to 2-28. 
7 For an overview of current British doctrine regarding the roles governing the employment of 
maritime power, see Ibid, pp.2-7 to 2-28. 
8 An aircraft carrier cannot, at present, directly contribute to this role; its embarked fixed wing 
aircraft can however conduct operations against an adversary’s ballistic missile forces and support 




(via ship-launched missiles and two embarked helicopters), ASuW and land 
attack, utilising mission-appropriate missile systems (such as Standard Missile 2 
and 3 surface-to-air missiles, the Harpoon anti-ship missile and Tomahawk land-
attack cruise missile)9 and the ship’s main gun.10 A surface combatant can also 
undertake the wider strategic roles of providing forward presence, conducting port 
visits and contribute to the maintaining of good order at sea/maritime security, for 
example, by participating in counter-piracy or counter-narcotics operations.11 
Moreover, due to the proliferation of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, in 
particular, the Russian ‘Club-M/K’12 and ‘Yakhont’ systems,13 and Chinese-made 
systems such as the C-700 and C-800 series,14 the ability of large warships, 
including aircraft carriers to operate effectively, has been questioned. Professor 
Robert Rubel, Dean of Warfare Studies at the US Naval War College, has stated 
in this regard: 
The increasing effectiveness of antiship [sic] missiles, along with the increasing 
lethality of antiaircraft defenses [sic], is about to make necessary a shift from a 
force centred on “big deck” aviation platforms to one that is more distributed and 
oriented around missile-firing platforms – most prominently, submarines and 
surface combatants.15       
Rubel has further highlighted the threat posed by the development by China of the 
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, and the development and deployment by 
Russia and China of advanced integrated air defence systems and fighter aircraft 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
may be able to intercept ballistic missiles utilising direct-energy weapons or advanced missile 
systems such as the network centric airborne defense element (NCADE). For an overview of the 
NCADE system, see Raytheon, ‘NCADE’, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/ncade/. 
Accessed 8 September 2013. 
9 For an overview of the Tomahawk, see ‘Tomahawk Cruise Missile’ United States Navy Fact File, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1300&ct=2. Accessed 8 September 
2013. 
10 ‘Destroyers – DDG’, United States Navy Fact File, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=900&ct=4. Accessed 8 September 
2013.   
11 For an overview of the requirements of maintaining good order at sea, see Geoffrey Till, 
Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Second Edition (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 
pp. 286-321.  
12 Concern Morinformsystem-Agat [sic], ‘Club-M Coastal Missile System’, http://www.concern-
agat.com/products/defense-products/81-concern-agat/76-club-m and ‘Club-K Container Missile 
System’, http://www.concern-agat.com/products/defense-products/81-concern-agat/189-club-k. 
Accessed 8 September 2013.  
13 NPO Mashinostroyenia, ‘Missile Complexes with Yakhont ASM’, 
http://www.npomash.ru/activities/en/yakhont.htm. Accessed 8 September 2013.  
14 For an overview of Chinese domestic and international anti-ship missile programmes, see Robert 
Hewson, ‘Dragon’s Teeth – Chinese Missiles Raise Their Game’, Jane’s Navy International, Vol. 
112, No.1 (January/February 2007), pp.19-23.  
15 Robert C. Rubel, ‘The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm’, Naval War College, Vol.62, No.2 




(most notably, derivatives of the Sukhoi Su-27 ‘Flanker’) that together, pose a 
significant threat both to the carrier itself and the survivability and mission 
effectiveness of the embarked air-group.16 This reflects a wider argument that 
aircraft carriers should, in the face of high-end A2/AD threats, be reserved for 
non-high intensity warfare and that major war-fighting should be undertaken by 
dispersed, small stealthy combatants. 17  Such a force would be designed 
particularly to counter access denial threats and operate persistently within the 
littoral, whilst also being more resilient to attrition.18 The US Navy’s Chief of 
Naval Operation’s Strategic Studies Group, based at the US Naval War College, 
examined the requirements of operating in the littoral in the late 1990s, and as 
described by Long and Johnson: ‘argued for two attributes for the future fleet and 
its platforms that became central to the small ship debate: distributed combat 
power, to include a greater number of networked combat ships, the use of 
unmanned vehicles (UVs) and offboard [sic] sensors, and modularity to provide 
mission flexibility’.19 The Strategic Studies Group, although examining future 
fleet requirements for the US Navy, identified an issue that is also of critical 
contemporary importance to the Royal Navy:  
Combat power in the current Navy was tied to particular hulls. The battle force 
ships were capable of carrying out a variety of missions. For example, the Navy’s 
main destroyer type, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class had the capacity to conduct 
ASW, fleet air defense, land attack, mine warfare (MIW), and other missions. All 
this combat power would be lost if the fleet lost that one ship.20 
In the case of the Royal Navy, the loss of one Type 45 Daring-class destroyer21 
would be even more significant; such a loss out of a force of only six Daring-class 
ships would represent 16.6 per cent of Britain’s total destroyer strength and 
principal naval AAW asset (the Daring-class are optimised for the AAW role and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Robert C. Rubel, ‘The Future of Aircraft Carriers’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 
(Autumn 2011), pp.13-28.  
17 This is an alternate school of thought to the Air Sea Battle concept, which also seeks to meet the 
challenge posed by high-end A2/AD threats but retains the aircraft carrier as a core asset of a 
mixed, balanced force. Interview with Professor Geoffrey Till, Shrivenham, 9 June 2011.   
18 Duncan Long and Stuart Johnson, ‘The Littoral Combat Ship: From Concept to Program’, Case 
Studies in Defense Transformation Number 7 (Center for Technology and National Security 
Policy, National Defense University, 2007), p.4. For a British perspective, see MoD/DCDC, 
‘Future “Black Swan” Class Sloop-of-War: A Group System’ (Joint Concept Note 1/12, May 
2012). 
19 Ibid., pp.2-3.  
20 Ibid., p.3.  
21 ‘Type 45 Daring Class Destroyer, United Kingdom’, http://www.naval-




do not have the same level of multi-role capability of the Arleigh Burke-class)22. 
The response advocated by the Strategic Studies Group is summarised by Long 
and Johnson: 
The SSG argued that distributing this combat power on UVs, such as unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) to deliver strikes ashore and unmanned undersea vehicles 
(UUVs) to hunt for mines and submarines, would make the fleet’s combat power 
more survivable…Further, distributed, unmanned sensors would allow the fleet to 
develop more robust battlespace knowledge than would sensors limited to the area 
around a single hull.23  
However, the approach advocated by the Strategic Studies Group did not seek to 
replace the aircraft carrier and other large warships; rather, the force based on 
distributed, networked assets would: ‘counter access denial threats in the littorals. 
Distributing combat power among more platforms would make the fleet more 
tactically stable and lessen the need to expose… [aircraft carriers and other major 
surface combatants]… and the large amount of combat power they contain to 
littoral dangers’.24  
Rubel and Captain Henry Hendrix, US Navy, also emphasise the increasing 
importance of unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) and suggest a shift in 
focus for naval aviation toward UCAVs and other unmanned air systems.25 
Moreover, Hendrix has advocated the development of UCAVs that would be 
capable of operating from the US Navy’s amphibious assault carriers, in particular 
the new America-class.26 This would require the UCAV to be designed for short 
take-off and vertical landing operations and a shift in employment of the 
amphibious assault vessels from one focused on littoral manoeuvre to one akin to 
the CEPP approach under development for the forthcoming British Queen 
Elizabeth-class. This will be discussed in greater detail below. The approach to 
maritime operations suggested by Rubel and Hendrix calls for a shift away from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The US Arleigh Burke-class AEGIS destroyer was considered as an option for the Type 45, 
following Britain’s withdrawal from the pan-European Horizon programme, but discarded on cost 
grounds. House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC), Major Procurement Projects Survey: 
The Common New Generation Frigate Programme, Eighth Report of Session 1998-99, HC 544 
(London: The Stationery Office, 1999), para 28.     
23 Long and Johnson, p.3.  
24 Ibid., p.4.  
25 Captain Henry J. Hendrix, US Navy, ‘At What Cost a Carrier?’ Disruptive Defense Papers 
(Center for a New American Security, March 2013),  pp. 9-10 and Rubel, “The Future of Aircraft 
Carriers’, p.21, 22 and 24. 
26 Hendrix, ‘Twilight of the $UPERflous [sic] Carrier’, Proceedings, Vol. 137/5/1, 299 (May 
2011). For an overview of the America-class, see ‘America Class Amphibious Assault Ship, 




the large deck aircraft carrier as the ‘supreme arbiter of naval power and the 
determinant of fleet architecture’.27 Such an approach would find support in some 
quarters in Britain, where doubts have been raised as to the wisdom of having 
invested in the future aircraft carrier programme whilst seeing the number of 
surface combatants in Royal Navy service decline markedly.28 In this regard, the 
1998 Strategic Defence Review established a total force of 32 destroyers and 
frigates – down from 35;29 the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review 
reduced the size of the destroyer and frigate force from 23 to 19 ships.30 Thus, 
between 1998 and 2010/11, the Royal Navy’s force of surface combatants was 
effectively halved, in major part to fund operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
without increasing the defence budget. 
In order to examine whether Britain should, as an alternative to the Queen 
Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, have sought instead to develop a fleet centred on 
missile-armed surface combatants and submarines, a brief discussion of the 
principal generic platform and weapon system options of potential utility to such 
an approach is required. Subsequent to this, the utility of a missile-centric force 
will be evaluated.   
Major Surface Combatants 
The development of multi-role surface combatants equipped with advanced radar 
systems such as the US-developed AEGIS and vertical launch systems (VLS) 
enabling a significant increase in the missile armament of a warship for a given 
displacement, has prompted discussion as to whether such ships could undertake 
the roles currently performed by aircraft carriers and their embarked air-groups.31 
Robert Work of the US Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments illustrates 
the expansion in offensive capability conferred by the shift to a VLS 
configuration, with reference to the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class cruisers:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Rubel, ‘The Future of Aircraft Carriers’, p.26.  
28 Interview with Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham, London, 13 February 2012. 
29 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999 (London: The Stationery Office, 
1998), p.40. 
30 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), Cm 7948 (London: The Stationery Office, October 2010), p.22.  
31 For example, see Commander Phillip E. Pournelle, US Navy, ‘Rise of the Missile Carriers’, 




The first five Ticonderoga-class cruisers were armed with a Mk-26 twin-rail 
missile launching system both fore and aft, each located over a rotary magazine 
with a capacity of 44 missiles. The next 22 VLS-equipped Ticonderogas carried 64 
missile cells forward and 64 missile cells aft (although six cells were used for 
missile storage). Switching to the VLS system thus allowed the newer cruisers – 
with hulls identical to those of the earlier ships – to increase their total magazine 
capacity from 88 to 122 missiles. In other words, VLS allowed for a 38 percent 
[sic] increase in comparable ship magazine loads.32  
Moreover, the installation of a VLS allows a more flexible approach to a ship’s 
armament, thus enhancing multi-role capability, as highlighted by Work:  
A single VLS cell is a rectangular box with an opening on one end measuring 
25x25 inches. These cells come in three different lengths, and they can be 
configured to carry either four short-range self-defense [sic] missiles in a special 
“quad pack” arrangement; one surface-to-air (SAM) missile; one anti-submarine 
rocket (ASROC) or a single Tomahawk land attack cruise missile.33   
A further benefit of a VLS is its modularity. The Lockheed Martin Mk 41 VLS, 
the system employed by the US Navy, is built upon a basic eight-cell module and 
thus can be scaled to provide a level of capability appropriate to the host ship. For 
example, it could range from an eight-cell module on an offshore patrol vessel to 
provide a self-defence capability, through to a 122-cell fit on a cruiser (such as the 
Ticonderoga-class) providing the full spectrum of AAW, BMD, ASW, ASuW and 
land attack capabilities.34 The use of a VLS also enhances the long-term growth 
potential of a ship. The British Type 45 Daring-class are currently fitted with a 
48-cell VLS equipped with the Sea Viper air defence system; space has been 
reserved within the hull to enable the later installation of ‘strike-length’ VLS cells 
(in order to enable the ship to be armed with the Tomahawk, or similar,35 land 
attack cruise missile).36  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Robert O. Work, ‘Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship’ (Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, February 2004), p.16 
33 Ibid., pp.16-17.  
34 Lockheed Martin, ‘MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS)’, 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/ms2/documents/launchers/MK41_VL
S_factsheet.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2013.   
35 The MBDA Missile de Croisière Naval (MdCN, Naval Cruise Missile), a naval derivative of the 
Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missile, developed for the French Navy, would also be a 
potential candidate for a surface-launched cruise missile for the Daring-class. For an overview of 
the MdCN, see http://www.mbda-systems.com/mediagallery/files/mdcn_background-
1367919511.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2013.  





The contemporary British submarine force (excluding the four Vanguard-class 
Trident nuclear missile-armed boats), comprising six Tomahawk cruise missile-
armed SSNs (five Trafalgar-class and one Astute-class),37 can undertake to a 
significant extent the roles envisaged by commentators such as Rubel and 
Hendrix. However, in evaluating alternatives to acquiring the Queen Elizabeth-
class, the potential utility of a guided missile-armed nuclear submarine – an SSGN 
– warrants consideration. An SSGN in this context is taken to be a nuclear-
powered submarine configured principally for the launching of conventionally 
armed missiles. The US Navy’s four converted Ohio-class submarines are the 
leading example of such a platform.38 The submarines, previously armed with 24 
Trident nuclear submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles were, in the 
early 2000s, re-equipped for the conventional strike mission. This entailed the 
conversion of 22 of the Trident launch tubes to each fire seven Tomahawk cruise 
missiles (for a total of 154 Tomahawks) and the use of the forward two Trident 
tubes for Special Forces support purposes.39 The large capacity of the former 
SSBN provides a significant conventional strike capability – equivalent to the 
Tomahawk load-out of an entire US carrier group.40 The USS Florida, one of the 
four Ohio-class SSGNs, undertook the first combat operations by the type during 
Operation Odyssey Dawn against Libya in 2011.41 The US did not contribute a 
carrier strike group to Operation Odyssey Dawn, but instead utilised long-range 
strike assets (submarine and ship-launched cruise missiles and manned bombers), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 IISS, The Military Balance 2013, p.188.  
38 The Russian (and previously, Soviet) Navy also operate SSGNs, most notably the Oscar-II 
(Project 949A) class boats, armed with 24 SS-N-19 Shipwreck anti-ship missiles. The Russian 
Navy will also be commissioning from 2013 onward, the Graney-class SSGN, which will be 
armed with a variety of missile systems, including the 5,500 kilometre-range Kh-101 conventional 
land-attack cruise missile. For an overview of the Russian submarine force, see James Bosbotinis, 
‘The Russian Federation Navy: An Assessment of its Strategic Setting, Doctrine and Prospects’, 
Special Series (Research and Assessment Branch: The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom), 
10/10, September 2010, pp.19-20 and 24-26.   
39 Lee Willett, ‘Astute, Trident and SSGN: Land Attack for the Royal Navy Submarine Service’, 
RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp.103-107. 
40 Ibid., p.106.  
41 Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class (SW) James Kimber (Naval Submarine Base Kings 
Bay Public Affairs), ‘Florida Returns from Historic Submarine Deployment’, 29 April 2011, 




embarked AV-8B Harriers from an amphibious assault ship and land-based 
tactical aircraft as its principal combat assets.42  
Evaluating the Missile-Centric Force 
It is argued by some analysts that a missile-centric force constitutes a more 
effective (in combat and cost terms) capability than a carrier group. Pournelle 
states in this regard: 
Missile carriers are far more combat-effective and survivable than aircraft carriers 
because of the rapid volume of fire they can deliver, the distribution in several 
shooters, and the low signature relative to an aircraft carrier. The rapid pulse of 
power was the raison d’être for the carrier’s rise in World War II, but we have 
reached the logical maximum of this capacity in the new Gerald R. Ford class, 
and it does not reach that of the vertical-launch system… The ability to deliver a 
massive strike rapidly means the launching platform can rush in, execute the 
mission, and withdraw. The carrier, on the other hand, must remain vulnerable to 
attack while the air wing is launched and recovered through multiple cycles.43 
This quotation contains three points relevant to the analysis of the missile-armed 
submarine/surface combatant-based force structure; namely, volume of fire, 
combat effectiveness and survivability. The volume of offensive fire available to a 
surface action group consisting of perhaps six destroyers, each armed with 
potentially 48 cruise missiles,44 giving a total of 288 cruise missiles, would not 
offer a significant increase over the strike capability of a carrier air group. The 
combat persistence of an aircraft carrier, is in fact, significantly greater, as 
highlighted by Benjamin Lambeth of the US-based RAND Corporation, in his 
observation (albeit with regard to large US Nimitz-class carriers) that ‘A single 
carrier air wing now offers the target-coverage equivalent of 4,000–5,000 TLAMs 
[Tomahawk Land Attack Missile] over the course of a 30-day operation’.45 
Further, an aircraft carrier’s magazines can be replenished in the course of combat 
operations via replenishment-at-sea, whereas as Jan Van Tol points out with 
regard to VLS-equipped vessels: ‘Ships exhausting their magazines would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For an overview of the US contribution to initial operations over Libya, see Jeremiah Gertler, 
‘Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for 
Congress, R41725, 28 March 2011.   
43 Pournelle, ‘Rise of the Missile Carriers’. The assumption that missile carriers have a lower 
signature than an aircraft carrier may be true in the context of individual ships, but arguably would 
not be the case regarding an entire surface action group launching a large salvo of missiles.  
44 Pournelle suggests 50 per cent of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer’s VLS armament consists of 
cruise missiles, that is, 48 missiles. Pournelle, ‘Rise of the Missile Carriers’.  
45 Benjamin S. Lambeth, American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century (RAND 




compelled to leave the theater [sic] to rearm since VLS tubes cannot currently be 
rearmed at sea. These ships would be out of action for weeks given the need to 
transit to and from rear areas, further disadvantaging the defense [sic]’.46  
In the British context, the originally-intended 36-strong Queen Elizabeth-class air-
group would be capable of delivering 72 1,000 lb. weapons if only utilising 
internal carriage; with external ordnance added – an F-35 has four external hard-
points (this would be dependent on the threat environment) – a total of 216 strike 
munitions could be delivered in addition to 72 air-to-air missiles, and this effort 
could be delivered potentially twice a day for five consecutive days (see chapter 
four, page 132). This is a simplified comparison and does not take into account the 
most important difference between the volume of firepower available to a surface 
combatant force or a carrier; the aforementioned combat persistence of the carrier. 
Moreover, an F-35B can carry a range of internal and external ordnance, 
including, for example, eight 285 lb. small diameter bombs (internally), the Storm 
Shadow cruise missile externally (offering a counter-hardened target capability), 
air-to-air weapons and anti-radar missiles.  
In short, a carrier is capable, via its air-group, of delivering on a sustained basis, a 
greater volume of more diverse firepower than a surface combatant force. In 
addition, the carrier-based aircraft are, whilst undertaking a strike sortie, also 
contributing to the establishment of air superiority at ranges beyond that of the 
engagement range of the surface-to-air missiles of a surface combatant,47 and most 
significantly, capable of engaging the launch platforms of advanced air-launched 
anti-ship weapons before missile release (and undertaking counter-force 
operations against surface and ground-launched systems). Thus, in terms of 
combat effectiveness and survivability, the carrier group, effectively combining 
the benefits of a surface action group with the firepower and flexibility of a 
carrier, offers a more capable package than a surface action group. It does warrant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Jan Van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A 
Point of Departure Operational Concept (CSBA, 2010), p.40. 
47 The range of the Sea Viper missile system – the air defence system installed on the Type 45 
Daring-class – is approximately 70 miles, ‘Sea Viper’, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-
Fleet/Ships/Weapons-Systems/Sea-Viper (accessed 8 September 2013). In contrast, an F-35B 
(radius of 463 nautical miles) can engage with the AIM-120, air targets at a range of approximately 
20-30 miles. ‘AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), United States 
of America’, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/aim-120-advanced-medium-range-air-




mention that, at present, the strike range of a Tomahawk cruise missile exceeds 
that of carrier-based aircraft (although air-to-air refuelling can be used to extend 
the range of aircraft), however, future carrier-based unmanned air systems are 
likely to have ranges exceeding significantly that of cruise missiles: the X-47B 
demonstrator, for example, has a range of 2,100 nautical miles.48 A further 
advantage of carrier-based airpower with respect to land attack missiles is the 
former’s demonstrative, non-kinetic capability; an aircraft can be used to convey 
intent without a weapons release. In contrast, a missile can only be used 
offensively. This may not be an issue in high-intensity operations but for lower 
intensity scenarios, such as peacekeeping, crisis response or counter-insurgency 
operations may be a significant constraint. An example in this regard is the use of 
British carrier-based aircraft over Sierra Leone, where Royal Navy Sea Harrier 
F/A2s and Royal Air Force (RAF) Harrier GR7s flew	  ‘together in an extremely 
successful operation where the desired effect was produced by noise and the mere 
“presence” of air power’.49  
The contribution of carrier-based aircraft to developing battle-space awareness 
cannot be overlooked, in particular as next-generation air systems, most notably 
the F-35 and unmanned aircraft,50 are intended to provide advanced ISTAR 
capabilities whilst operating within otherwise denied airspace. In addition, if 
deployed on a forward presence mission, the carrier’s embarked aircraft can, 
whilst undertaking ‘routine’ training flights, also be undertaking ISTAR tasks. 
Moreover, carrier-based fixed wing aircraft can operate at longer ranges, higher 
altitudes – including over the horizon – and carry a more diverse sensor package 
than the organic rotary wing assets of surface combatants. Certain aircraft, in 
particular the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye,51 offer advanced battle management, 
command and control and situational awareness capabilities that would be key to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Northrop Grumman, ‘Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D)’, 
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/X47BUCAS/Documents/X-
47B_Navy_UCAS_FactSheet.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2013. 
49 Commodore Bill Covington, Royal Navy, ‘The Joint Force Harrier Concept’, RAF Historical 
Society Journal (No.35A, ‘The Harrier Story’, 2006), p.100-106, quotation p.102. Cdre Covington 
held a number of positions, including commanding officer of 801 Naval Air Squadron, 
Commander (Air) on HMS Illustrious, Commodore Joint Force 2000 and Senior Naval Officer at 
HQ Strike Command.  
50 Such as the US unmanned carrier launched airborne surveillance and strike system.  
51 Northrop Grumman, ‘E-2D Advanced Hawkeye’, 
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/E2DAdvancedHawkeye/Documents/pageDocume




the network-centric operations envisaged by, for example, Rubel, Hendrix and 
Pournelle and could not be provided by an SSGN or a surface combatant-based 
force structure without recourse to land-based assets. 
The above has focused principally on the power projection role, but it must be 
highlighted that the aircraft carrier has a great degree of flexibility across roles. 
This applies to an extent to surface combatants, and in particular niches, 
submarines. However, the aircraft carrier, by virtue of its ability to enable 
operations across environmental domains (that is, the maritime and air 
environments) at a larger scale than other platforms,52 with the inherently multi-
role capabilities of its embarked fixed and rotary wing aircraft can undertake roles 
in support of all the principal fleet functions. Moreover, the investment in 
alternate capabilities, such as multi-role destroyers or SSGNs, and the necessary 
supporting systems, especially ISTAR assets, would not yield sufficient savings to 
justify the loss of capability compared to that provided by a carrier.  Such assets 
are by no means a cheap alternative. 
The LHD Option 
The alternative naval force structure advocated by Rubel, Hendrix and Pournelle 
does not dismiss the role of naval aviation, but rather suggests that instead of 
acquiring large-deck conventional aircraft carriers, investment should be directed 
toward multi-role amphibious assault carriers which provide both littoral 
manoeuvre and tactical fixed wing aviation capabilities (somewhat akin to the 
CEPP approach envisaged for the Queen Elizabeth-class). Hendrix, for example, 
suggests that rather than continue with acquiring the large Gerald R. Ford-class 
aircraft carriers, the US Navy should instead focus on the America-class 
amphibious assault ships, due to their lower cost and greater utility.53 In addition, 
Hendrix argues that ‘Amphibious ships are the prototypes for future surface 
combatants. Their design essentials make them perfect carriers of unmanned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 For example, a destroyer may embark perhaps two helicopters; a small helicopter carrier such as 
the Japanese Hyuga-class, in contrast, carries 11. For an overview of the Hyuga-class, see ‘JMSDF 
Hyuga Class Destroyer, Japan’, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/hyuga-class/. Accessed 
8 September 2013. 




systems. Amphibious ships by design provide strong interfaces to the air, surface, 
and subsurface domains’.54   
Would such a vessel constitute a viable alternative to the Queen Elizabeth-class? 
The America-class (45,000 ton) are an example of a large ‘landing ship assault’ 
(LHA) and are designed to operate vertical/short take-off and landing (V/STOL) 
fixed-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft and deploy, via air lift, a marine assault force in 
excess of 1,800 troops. 55  There are also the similarly configured ‘landing 
helicopter docks’ (LHD), which feature a floodable docking well to enable 
landing craft and hovercraft (‘landing craft air cushioned’) to mount amphibious 
assault operations. Examples of LHDs include the large US Wasp-class (40,000 
ton), smaller French Mistral-class (21,000 ton) and Spanish Juan Carlos-class 
(27,000 tons). The principal difference in capability between a 20-30,000 ton and 
40,000 ton vessel is the extent of aviation capabilities and troop lift capacity; the 
Juan Carlos-class, for example, can embark up to 24 fixed and rotary wing 
aircraft and 883 troops.56 In contrast, the Wasp-class can transport a marine force 
of up to 1871 troops and embark typically 23 helicopters (and increasingly the tilt-
rotor MV-22 Osprey) and six to eight STOVL Harriers (to be replaced by the F-
35B).57  
In the British case, the acquisition of a large LHD, comparable to the Wasp or 
America-classes and in line with initial thinking on the projected size of CVF 
(30,000-40,000 tons) would have been feasible. In cost terms, such a vessel would 
have been comparable to the planned unit cost of CVF, circa £1.5 billion (the first-
of-class USS America cost $2.4 billion - £1.6 billion)58. An LHD would employ a 
STOVL configuration and thus would bring with it the limitations of STOVL 
aircraft discussed in chapter four (see pages 138-142). Conversely, the pursuit of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid. 
55 For an overview of the America-class, see Grace Jean, ‘Lighting Off: The America-Class 
Amphibious Assault Ships Take Shape’, Jane’s Navy International, Vol.118, No.6 (July/August 
2013), pp.14-18. 
56 Navantia, ‘Strategic Projection Ship, LHD “Juan Carlos I”, 
http://www.navantia.es/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sala_pr/folleto%20LHD_marzo_para%20navantia_i
ngles.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2013.  
57 The typical air-group of a Wasp-class LHD consists of 12 CH-46 Sea Knight, four CH-53E Sea 
Stallion, four AH-1W Super Cobra and three UH-1N Huey helicopters plus six AV-8B Harriers. 
‘AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS - LHA/LHD/LHA(R)’, US Navy Fact File, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=400&ct=4. Accessed 8 September 
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an LHD would have offered the opportunity to focus on the development of a 
more integrated littoral manoeuvre capability akin to the Marine Air Ground Task 
Force concept employed by the United States Marine Corps (USMC).59 Such an 
approach would have been in keeping with thinking in some quarters toward the 
future carrier programme that envisioned the ships as ‘mobile bird farms’ (see 
chapter three, pages 123-124) and would, in retrospect, have been a more suitable 
avenue within which to develop the CEPP approach. In addition, the acquisition of 
an LHD would not have precluded the development of a limited sea-based strike 
capability, utilising the LHD as a fixed wing aircraft carrier: USMC experience is 
useful in this regard. 
The USMC has employed its LHDs as dedicated fixed wing aircraft carriers; the 
USS Bonhomme-Richard and Bataan operated in this capacity in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003 with air-groups consisting of 24 AV-8B Harriers.60 The USMC 
is also developing concepts for employing the F-35B in a similar manner, with 
one option involving the deployment of 16 F-35Bs with six air-to-air refuelling 
configured MV-22 Osprey aircraft on an LHD, and a second option involving the 
deployment of 20 F-35Bs on an LHD in order to generate the maximum number 
of sorties.61 A particular advantage of operating an LHD in this manner is that it 
removes the limitations imposed by operating a ‘mixed deck’, as Major Whalen, 
USMC, explains (and relevant to the approach envisaged under CEPP): ‘The term 
“mixed deck” refers to the combination of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft that 
a Marine composite squadron will embark aboard an LHA or LHD. Under this 
condition, operational and safety limitations lead to inefficiencies that are not seen 
on a deck solely dedicated to fixed-wing operations’.62  
Had the UK sought to procure LHDs rather than CVF, the option of combining the 
carrier replacement programme with longer-term amphibious force structuring 
would become available. That is, the intended number of ships to be acquired 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For an overview of the US Marines’ approach to aviation operations, see US Marine Corps, 
Aviation Operations (MCWP 3-2, 2000), p.1-1.  
60 Major J. Scott Whalen, USMC, ‘V/STOL in the United States Marine Corps: The Past, Present, 
and Future- Why We Need the STOVL Joint Strike Fighter’ (Marine Corps War College, 2005), 
p.10.  
61 Dave Majumdar, ‘PARIS: USMC explores F-35B operating concepts’, Flight Global, 19 June 
2013, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/paris-usmc-explores-f-35b-operating-concepts-
387420/. Accessed 8 September 2013.  




could have been increased in order to provide a replacement for the helicopter 
carrier HMS Ocean.63 A three-strong class of LHDs would enable two to be kept 
operational (as was the case with the Invincible-class) at any one time and would 
allow potentially, for a medium-scale operation, one ship to be deployed as a fixed 
wing carrier with the other in the littoral manoeuvre (dedicated rotary wing) 
capacity and thus maximise the operational effectiveness of both ships. This 
approach would however be vulnerable to budget cuts removing the third ship, 
and thus undermining the concept. The acquisition of an LHD-based maritime 
aviation capability would have meant that the UK was following the second of 
two options, as explained by ‘Noah’s News’ (see chapter four, page 142), that is, 
tactically focused, expeditionary maritime offensive air operations. 
In this respect, the sea-based fixed wing aviation capability available to the UK 
would be less than that originally envisaged for CVF (although comparable to that 
which will be provided under post-SDSR planning); the LHD route would have 
provided the UK with an enhanced littoral manoeuvre capability. In strategic 
terms, the reduced fixed wing capability provided by an LHD would, for medium 
and large-scale operations, result in the UK either needing also to deploy land-
based air assets to provide the full spectrum of air capabilities or draw upon US 
(or French) carrier airpower. At the political level, the pursuit of an LHD may 
have been less contentious than the development of CVF, in particular as an LHD 
would necessarily have meant the Royal Navy only being interested in V/STOL 
operations and therefore not posing a ‘threat’ to the RAF, especially with regard to 
its deep strike role. This is in distinct contrast to the potential contribution to 
aggregate British airpower that a CATOBAR-configured Queen Elizabeth-class 
aircraft carrier with 36 embarked F-35Cs would have made.  
The LHD option was not considered for two principal reasons. First, the 
government sought to acquire a strike carrier capability and not an amphibious 
vessel: the LHD did not provide a relevant answer to the capability question being 
asked by policy. 64  In this regard, the Royal Navy was in the process of 
recapitalising its amphibious capability, receiving the helicopter carrier HMS 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 HMS Ocean was commissioned in 1998; initial thinking toward a replacement envisaged such a 
vessel entering service around 2018. Richard Beedall, ‘Landing Platform Helicopter 
(Replacement) – LPH(R)’, http://navy-matters.beedall.com/lphr.htm. Accessed 8 September 2013.  




Ocean in 1998 and had on order two replacement landing platform docks, Albion 
and Bulwark (commissioned in 2003 and 2004 respectively).65 Second, and noted 
in the preceding point, was that the requirement for CVF defined in the SDR 
called for an aircraft carrier which, as discussed in chapter four (see page 132), 
was intended to provide the necessary weight of offensive airpower for a medium 
scale operation. An LHD would not have met this requirement. However, as will 
be discussed in the following chapter, within the context of the revised carrier 
policy established in the SDSR, the capabilities offered by an LHD would be more 
relevant.    
The contribution of maritime airpower, and particularly its sea-based component, 
to British strategy has been an area of much debate, and since the formation of the 
RAF in 1918, an enduring source of tension between that service and the Royal 
Navy. On occasion, especially during the debate concerning whether to procure 
CVA-01 in the mid-1960s, the RAF argued that land-based airpower rendered 
carrier-based aviation unnecessary;66 this chapter now turns to consider the merits 
of land-based versus sea-based airpower and their respective contribution to 
Britain’s aggregate airpower needs. 
Maritime Aviation and British Airpower 
The utility of maritime aviation to wider British airpower has been questioned on 
a number of occasions since the amalgamation of the Royal Flying Corps and 
Royal Naval Air Service in 1918. Most notably, carrier aviation’s development 
effectively stagnated in the inter-war period due in part to the impact of Royal Air 
Force ownership of naval aviation;67 naval aviation was again subject to intense, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Richard Beedall, ‘Albion Class’, http://navy-matters.beedall.com/albion.htm. Accessed 18 July 
2014. 
66 For a detailed overview of this debate, see Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval 
Policy Since World War II (London: Bodley Head, 1987), pp. 269-277; Edward Hampshire, ‘The 
Battle for CVA01’, in Tim Benbow (ed.), British Naval Aviation: The First 100 Years (Farnham: 
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perhaps over-zealous, scrutiny during the Radical Review of the 1950s68 and as 
previously mentioned, in the 1960s with regard to CVA-01. Most recently, the 
2010 SDSR resulted in the loss (albeit temporary) of a sea-based fixed wing 
capability and significant reduction in the fixed wing component of the future 
Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier(s). Moreover, the statement in the SDSR 
that ‘In the short term, there are few circumstances we can envisage where the 
ability to deploy airpower from the sea will be essential’,69 points to a lack of 
understanding of the utility of sea-based aviation and the influence of particular 
interests within the decision-making process.70 In addition, the May 2012 decision 
to switch to the F-35B and with it, a STOVL configuration for the Queen 
Elizabeth-class, combined with a continuing RAF interest in the land-based F-35A 
(which does not have the same performance/capability limitations as the STOVL 
variant),71 and advocacy of an approach to sea-based operations that emphasises 
minimising embarked periods,72 suggests the debate concerning the appropriate 
balance between land and sea-based fixed wing aviation for the UK will endure.   
In order to inform discussion of what would constitute an appropriate balance of 
land and sea-based aviation for the UK, it is necessary to examine the advantages 
and disadvantages of land basing. A well-founded, main operating base can host a 
larger number of aircraft and generate more sorties than a carrier, including larger 
types such as intra and inter-theatre lift aircraft (for example, the C-130, A-400M 
and C-17). An example in this regard was the scale of effort sustained by 90 US 
Marine Corps aircraft deployed to Ahmed Al Jaber Airbase in Kuwait for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, which significantly exceeded what could be generated 
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“Radical Review”, 1953-55’, in Benbow (ed.), British Naval Aviation.   
69 HM Government, SDSR, p.5. 
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from a sea base.73 Further, a static air base is easier to operate from than an 
aircraft carrier (a runway is not subject to pitch or roll) and importantly, is not 
physically constrained in the same manner as a carrier; that is, an airbase allows 
the separation of runways, taxiways, arming and fuelling areas and permits aircraft 
dispersal, thus reducing vulnerability to attack. In contrast, aviation operations on 
a carrier have to be accommodated within the confines of the ship. However, as 
Wing Commander Neil Meadows, RAF, explains: 
To enable an airfield to ‘generate and recover air power missions’, a considerable 
number of functions are required. These comprise operations support (including Air 
Traffic Control, command and control, intelligence exploitation facilities, 
firefighting [sic] and rescue services), logistics (including flight line, air 
movements, fuel, storage and motor transport facilities) and administration 
(including personnel, resource and financial management, medical infrastructure, 
accommodation, catering and training facilities)… Therefore, land-based 
operations (even from a well-found operating base) are likely to involve the 
deployment of several hundreds of people (in addition to the aircrew and 
engineers…) at considerable economic, human and political expense. Conversely, 
an aircraft carrier’s crew complement are trained to provide all of these support 
functions within the ship’s operational role at no additional cost per deployment.74  
An air base also presents force protection challenges distinct to those encountered 
by an aircraft carrier, namely due to the static nature of the base itself. An air base 
presents a fixed area target that is vulnerable to air and missile attack,75 mortar fire 
and artillery. Carriers are also vulnerable to air and missile attack but have to be 
located first whilst an attacking missile requires a sufficient degree of 
sophistication for tracking and targeting a moving target. Air bases are also 
vulnerable to ground attack: either by conventional forces, by Special Forces or 
terrorist/irregular forces.  Christopher J. Bowie illustrates this with regard to 
Special Forces, stating that ‘Since 1942, special forces worldwide have conducted 
645 separate attacks on airfields to destroy over 2,000 aircraft on the ground’.76 
Moreover, Special Forces have never destroyed a single aircraft on-board an 
aircraft carrier, nor have land forces ever overrun a carrier, in contrast to the many 
air bases ashore which have fallen. The September 2012 Taliban attack on the 	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airfield at Camp Bastion provides a notable example of the threat to airfields; in 
that attack, the Taliban successfully destroyed six per cent of the entire USMC 
Harrier fleet.77 Meadows summarises the force protection challenge thus: 
Static airfields are vulnerable to enemy attack and, although it seems highly 
unlikely that a single (conventional) weapon could close an airfield for a protracted 
period, there remains a significant threat to deployed forces, particularly from 
‘asymmetric’ attack. The threat could be passive in the form of covert observation 
and reporting, or it could be active in the form of air, ground, information or 
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) attack. There is a fundamental 
requirement, therefore, to provide physical protection at deployed operating bases 
for aircraft, airfield surfaces, people, equipment and information. Protection 
measures would include Ground-Based Air Defences, Battle Damage Repair teams 
and the use of organic ground combat units to provide enhanced perimeter 
security.78   
Squadron Leader Dave Watkins, RAF, illustrates the challenge of providing 
enhanced perimeter security, especially to counter indirect fire, with reference to 
US experience in the Vietnam War: 
The US forces in Vietnam discovered the benefits of creating defended zones 
around their airfields that were usually situated close to built-up areas. In order to 
avoid rocket or mortar attacks these zones could be as large as 10 km from the 
airfield perimeter, with the most vulnerable area being that zone between 5,000m 
[sic] and 10,000 m. Within these huge areas, key terrain must be identified and 
most likely weapon launch sites dominated by either view or patrolling in order to 
make the defender’s task manageable.79 
The threat to airbases, particularly in the face of high-end A2/AD threats 
(represented at the top end by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army)80, has 
prompted much debate, especially within the US, on both passive (including 
dispersed operations and hardening airbase facilities) and active (including 
measures to enhance counter-ballistic and cruise missile capabilities) means of 
defence.81 One aspect of the debate concerning the threat to airbases is that of 
whether an adversary could coerce the host nation into withdrawing basing rights. 
In this regard, Jan Van Tol cites Chinese military literature suggesting an 	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objective for Chinese air and missile forces in the event of conflict would be to: 
‘Threaten all US operating bases in the Western Pacific, including those in Japan, 
with persistent ballistic and cruise missile attacks — the concomitant ability to 
strike allies and partners has implications for their willingness to support US 
basing access…’82  
The issue of securing access, basing and overflight (ABO) rights constitutes a 
particularly problematic area for land-based airpower. This applies in particular to 
combat aircraft: securing ABO for support assets, such as transport, air-to-air 
refuelling and surveillance aircraft is much easier.83 The denial or limitation of 
ABO can have major operational implications, including potentially resulting in 
the abandonment or substantial re-shaping of an operation.84 As Tim Benbow 
explains:  
Since 1945 British defence policy has repeatedly been attracted to the siren calls of 
those urging the adoption of the suspiciously convenient assumption that air bases 
and overflight rights will always be available where and when needed.  Yet 
repeatedly even close allies have proved unwilling (or, perhaps for domestic or 
regional political reasons, unable) to allow the use of their facilities or skies.85   
In contrast, in AP 3000 British Air and Space Power Doctrine (although 
ostensibly joint, AP 3000 was produced under the auspices of the RAF), it was 
argued: 
All forms of military power depend on basing and support, and aircraft are no 
exception. Air power’s requirements for access, basing and over-flight rights are 
often cited as a weakness, but in reality, the employment of British air power in the 
post-Cold War era has invariably been consistent with legal and moral justifications 
understood by the states neighbouring the zone of crisis, and gaining host nation 
support has rarely proved to be a significant problem.86  
However, experience in both the 1990s and the last decade would suggest that the 
argument in AP 3000 is quite inaccurate. For example, attempts to secure basing 
rights in Italy for operations over Bosnia in the early 1990s were problematic (a 	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planned US deployment of F-117 strike aircraft was refused); 87  and the 
deployment of HMS Invincible for Operation Bolton in the Persian Gulf in 
November 1997 was the result of a failure to secure overflight rights in the Middle 
East which prevented RAF Tornados from deploying to the region.88 Initial 
operations over Afghanistan in 2001 had to be conducted from aircraft carriers 
and by long-range bombers due to an absence of regional basing for tactical 
aircraft;89 securing ABO for Operation Telic, as previously noted with regard to 
Turkey, was difficult;90 and despite being a close ally, Oman has not permitted 
combat aircraft to be based on its territory for operations over Afghanistan.91 In 
2011, friction between the British and Italian authorities nearly resulted in the 
withdrawal of basing rights at Gioia del Colle - the main base for RAF Typhoon 
and Tornado operations over Libya.92 This indicates both the flawed nature of the 
argument in AP 3000 and the SDSR’s assumption, summarised by Tim Benbow 
that ‘Britain will for the next ten years (although not thereafter) always enjoy 
unfettered access to ample, high quality, secure bases and to overflight, free of 
political constraint, available exactly where and precisely when it is needed’.93 
This is, as Benbow adds: 
Unambiguously contradicted by recent history; the burden of proof must lie on 
those who assert such a huge change in international politics, yet this bold prophesy 
was presented without evidence or argument – the lack of which creates the strong 
suspicion that the true driver of the decision-making was less a careful 
consideration of strategy and requirements than short-term book balancing that 
targeted capabilities out of favour with the then senior military leadership.94 
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Aside from the military implications of being unable to secure sufficient or 
satisfactory ABO, the political consequences of a failure to gain ABO, in the 
absence of alternatives (such as an aircraft carrier) and with it an inability to 
respond to a threat to a national interest, would be significant. In this regard, one 
could reflect on the consequences for British international credibility had Britain 
not possessed aircraft carriers in 1982 and been forced to accept Argentina’s 
seizure of the Falkland Islands.  
In light of the risk associated with being dependent on ABO, and thus only land-
based aviation, the requirement for credible maritime airpower is highlighted; this 
was stated in the SDSR, albeit whilst suggesting it did not apply for the next 
decade. The 2010 National Security Strategy, A Strong Britain In an Age of 
Uncertainty, defines Britain’s role in the world in the following terms: 
In order to protect our interests at home, we must project our influence abroad. As 
the global balance of power shifts, it will become harder for us to do so. But we 
should be under no illusion that our national interest requires our continued full and 
active engagement in world affairs… To do so requires us to project power and to 
use our unique network of alliances and relationships – principally with the United 
States of America, but also as a member of the European Union and NATO, and a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council. We must also maintain the 
capability to act well beyond our shores and work with our allies to have a strategic 
presence wherever we need it.95 
The concluding statement in the above quotation declaring Britain must ‘have a 
strategic presence wherever we need it’ can only be fulfilled with certainty by the 
possession of credible carrier airpower. There are two facets to the development of 
a credible maritime air capability; firstly, the provision of suitably-configured 
ships and air-groups,96 and secondly, a force generation process guided by a full 
awareness of the requirements of aviation operations at sea. The latter necessarily 
raises the contentious question of ownership. The RAF has, since its inception, 
consistently argued for the ‘indivisibility of airpower’, a principle Professor 
Geoffrey Till explains thus:  
The air was the air wherever it was and took on no special quality when it was over 
the sea. The essential thing was to provide a force that was well equipped and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
defence chief’, BBC News, 19 March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21843660. Accessed 
13 September 2013. 
95 HM Government, The National Security Strategy, p.4. 
96 The specific utility of an aircraft carrier is dependent on the capability it delivers, reflected in the 




manned by those experienced in the science of air warfare. Naval flying held no 
special mysteries and its particular requirements could be learned by trained airmen 
without undue difficulty.97   
The RAF perspective toward naval aviation is based on three central pillars: 
efficiency, capability, and ownership.98 Sea-based aviation is perceived to be less 
efficient than land-basing, in particular due to the overhead costs associated with 
an aircraft carrier force and in terms of the number of aircraft that can be 
embarked on a carrier. Moreover, sea-basing is perceived to result in a sacrificing 
of capability; that is, carrier airpower is argued to be of a qualitatively lower 
standard than land-based aviation. Arguments concerning efficiency and 
capability also feed into the view that naval aviation should not be under separate 
ownership. In this respect, a separate Fleet Air Arm plus its associated training 
stream holds no economies of scale. A separate naval air arm also raises issues in 
terms of command and control, in particular with respect to running contrary to 
the RAF’s philosophy of centralised command, decentralised execution. This 
approach is explained in JDP 0-30 Air and Space Power Doctrine: 
Centralised control is essential to unity of command. It means we can allocate and 
apportion inevitably scarce resources to meet commanders’ intent in line with the 
priorities they set. Centralised control embodies the principle of strategy-to-task, 
ensuring that we use air assets as efficiently as possible to achieve the military 
strategic objectives set by higher authority. However, while centralised control 
remains at the heart of air command and control, developing technology and the 
ubiquity of networked communications mean we can often choose to either 
centralise or decentralise execution authority, depending on the specific 
circumstances of the campaign.99    
Further, it is argued that there are problems associated with reconciling different 
service control, and their respective cultures, over airpower components, leading 
to a reduction in operational effectiveness and command and control issues.100   
As recently as 2008/2009, the RAF argued for a rationalisation of British 
airpower, including complete ownership of all fixed-wing aircraft; the then Chief 
of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy asserted that ‘We have got to 
kill some scared [sic] cows to make ourselves efficient. The general public 	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demand and deserve value for money and if that means we have to rationalise, that 
is what we have got to do’.101 This public statement occurred within the context of 
a major inter-service dispute revolving around an RAF attempt to scrap Joint 
Force Harrier;102 the RAF had been working since 2006 to remove the Harrier 
from service.103 In response, Major General (now Lieutenant General Sir) Paul 
Newton, then head of the MoD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 
was tasked to investigate the matter and produce a report examining the size of the 
force, its ethos and manning.104 The RAF contended that no Royal Navy input was 
necessary; the Royal Navy disagreed on two points: first, that there was no 
precedent anywhere for naval air operations that were not supervised by those 
with deep maritime knowledge; and second, that the RAF have consistently shown 
a determination to avoid going to sea.105 The Newton Report reemphasised the 
need for a sizeable portion of Joint Force Harrier to be naval,106 identified nearly 
200 posts on the in-service Invincible-class that required naval experience and 
concluded that only the Royal Navy could produce the manpower to operate the 
Queen Elizabeth-class.107 Newton also recommended that, in order to generate 36 
F-35 force elements at readiness, a minimum of 25 per cent, subsequently 
increased to 33 per cent of the then planned 138-strong F-35 force should be 
Royal Navy-owned.108  
Following on from the Newton Report, a study in 2012 under Edward Ferguson 
within the Ministry of Defence has also found that the F-35B must be operated ‘in 
sufficient numbers to provide a viable power-projection capability, thereby 
maximising the return on investment, and must also be operated by members of 
the Royal Navy’.109 This study was commissioned to resolve a post-SDSR debate 
concerning the size and duration of JCA embarkations on the Queen Elizabeth-
class; the RAF were advocating deployments of small numbers of aircraft, perhaps 	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four to six, for short durations, whilst, in contrast the Royal Navy were arguing for 
routine squadron-strength deployments for extended periods.110   
The Experience of Joint Force Harrier111 
As previously discussed in chapter three (see page 123), in order to secure at least 
grudging acceptance of a continued carrier-based fixed-wing capability, the Royal 
Navy sought to promote the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers as ‘joint 
defence assets’ and share the provision of the fast jet element of British sea-based 
airpower with the RAF via the creation of Joint Force Harrier. The force was 
intended to be two-thirds RAF and one-third Royal Navy; in practice, the RAF 
share was higher, in part due to the Royal Navy finding it difficult to recruit 
enough pilots.112 In terms of force readiness, out of three squadrons, one was 
intended to be at high-readiness and principally carrier-based; the second would 
be embarked half the time; and the third squadron was to be mainly shore-
based.113 Although the notion of a joint force may be attractive, in practice, the 
experience of JFH was less than satisfactory, mainly due to problems in 
integrating Royal Navy and RAF personnel on-board carriers,114 reluctance on the 
part of the RAF toward embarked operations and the focus on land-based 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
Although JFH was intended to be a joint force and to produce interoperable land 
and sea-based squadrons, embarked RAF activity was infrequent and small-scale; 
the most notable joint deployment being the 2005 Marstrike 05 exercise which 
saw the deployment of eight RAF Harrier GR7s from IV Squadron deploy aboard 
HMS Invincible, alongside seven Sea Harrier FA2s of 801 Naval Air Squadron.115 
Following the retirement in 2006 of the Royal Navy’s Sea Harrier FA2, embarked 
activity dropped significantly, impacting the training and number of night-
qualified pilots as well as flight deck safety, efficiency and the carriers’ war-	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fighting potential.116 Moreover, between 2003 and 2007, the FAA lost influence 
within JFH.117 At the time of the Sea Harrier retirement, 50 per cent of pilots were 
night capable: at the time of the withdrawal of the Harrier GR9, only four to five 
per cent of pilots were night-capable and they were mostly former Sea Harrier 
pilots.118 This reduction in capability can be attributed to the decline in embarked 
activity, as illustrated by Exercise Hajjar Osprey (March/April 2008), where only 
four Harriers were embarked on Illustrious for a period of approximately three 
weeks.119 Attaining full day and night deck qualification would typically require at 
least 18 months front line service.120 Moreover, a lack of embarked activity would 
have a detrimental effect not only on the operational capability of the pilots but 
also on the wider ship-air interface. 
The irregular frequency and brief periods spent embarked at sea by RAF Harriers 
indicated that the level of capability that could be provided in the maritime 
environment by the RAF JFH squadrons would be limited. This is not unexpected 
as the RAF considered the Harrier force to be primarily a land-based capability.  
The demands of operations in Iraq and especially Afghanistan further reduced the 
time that RAF Harrier units – and after the withdrawal of the Sea Harrier, all 
Harrier units – spent embarked at sea.  The figure from 2005 onwards of six 
weeks per year embarked121 indicates a most basic daytime capability, with 
serious limits to its military credibility and hence political utility.122 The decline in 
the number of pilots night-qualified for embarked flying, the lack of embarked 
experience and the focus on operations in Afghanistan turned JFH in its latter 
stages into a predominantly land-based force, despite the original intention of a 
more versatile, interoperable capability.  
It is intended that the F-35B will be operated as a joint force and provide an 
interoperable land and sea-based capability as was envisaged for JFH. The stated 
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requirement is currently for 48 F-35Bs,123 sufficient to equip four squadrons, 
which will enable, as explained by Commodore Bill Covington, Royal Navy, with 
regard to JFH: 
The need for four squadrons is based on deployability. [Post-Sea Harrier, the GR9] 
will have to sustain sea-based training and detachments in addition to land-based 
activities… It is believed that four deployable units will provide the best baseline 
structure… and this format and its adaptability in terms of scaling detachment sizes 
and shapes for operations will be tested before JFH makes way for JCA.124    
The experience of JFH may prompt concern that Joint Force Lightning (the name 
given to the F-35) will be similarly constrained. As noted on pages 189-190, the 
Royal Navy and RAF have different perspectives on how carrier-based airpower 
should be utilised. The former advocated a concept-of-operations where the ship 
sails with its air-group embarked (the traditional approach to carrier operations): 
whereas the latter advocated an approach where the ship will sail with just its 
helicopters and only embark its fast jets subsequently and for limited periods.125 
Attaining the necessary level of credibility to coerce or reassure will require a 
substantial investment both financial and temporal in embarked training at sea to 
ensure that both aircrew and support personnel are proficient in operating on-
board and from the carrier.  
It is argued that this requires the air-group to be regularly embarked for sustained 
periods in order to attain a high level of basic day and night proficiency in carrier 
operations; the occasional detachment to the ship of some aircraft, in isolation 
from other aircraft types, will neither constitute a credible capability nor develop 
cohesive operational performance.126 In contrast, it is also argued that the evolving 
technological context, for example, the impact of simulation, changes the 
requirement for working-up at sea, and that the most challenging aspect of air 
operations is in-the-air integration; that is, operating the aircraft proficiently and 
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within a complex battlespace.127 The main area for focus, rather than being the 
aircrew, should be the on-deck maintainers and command and control.128   
How the Queen Elizabeth-class will be used will be the next area of debate,129 and 
the above difference in operational approach forms a facet of this. The prospects 
for Joint Force Lightning are positive; the RAF has accepted split ownership of 
the F-35 force (the RAF needs Royal Navy involvement to justify a fifth 
generation force)130 and the creation of an expeditionary training unit at RAF 
Leeming (a recommendation emanating from experience in Operation Ellamy) has 
resulted in the RAF and Royal Navy (along with the Army) working together in a 
genuine tri-service context.131 Moreover, in contrast to the JFH period, where the 
Harrier was one of three fast jets in British service alongside the Tornado and 
Typhoon, and a target of rationalisation initiatives, the F-35 will be the ‘flagship’ 
fast jet in service and thus a core asset for both the Royal Navy and RAF. This 
should perhaps ensure that Joint Force Lightning is seen to succeed.  
The USMC approach to developing an expeditionary airpower capability may be a 
valuable example for the UK. The USMC seeks to deploy interoperable land and 
sea-based squadrons, but in order to achieve this capability, squadrons preparing 
for sea-based deployments require a ‘complex and intense training period prior to 
deployment.’ 132  This can involve a ‘minimum of 3 months prior to the 
ship’s/CVW’s refresher training (RefTra) or 3 months prior to initial embarkation 
aboard ship for type training’.133 US Marine Corps experience points to the 
requirement for dedicated assets in order to develop a credible maritime aviation 
capability (it also highlights the limited capability JFH would have delivered with 
only six weeks embarked time per year). Moreover, to fully exploit such a 
capability, which in addition to providing a sea-based force also inherently 
provides a force capable of operating from land, would ideally require a full 
awareness of the strategic utility of maritime forces and their wider role in, and 	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contribution to national defence policy: this will be examined in depth in the 
following chapter.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the capabilities, costs and 
benefits of potential alternatives to the traditionally conceived aircraft carrier. It 
has done so within the framework of Britain seeking direct alternatives to a 
carrier-based capability, at similar cost and to maintain, consistent with declared 
policy, a capability to project power globally. In this regard, options requiring 
radical change in overall defence and foreign policy, such as abandoning 
wholesale a power projection capability, have not been considered yet it is only a 
change in defence posture of this scale that could justify a move away from 
carriers. The preceding analysis has shown that although ostensibly viable 
alternatives to the carrier exist – for example, missile-armed submarines and 
surface combatants and land-based aviation – they do not provide, in the case of 
the former, the same degree of flexibility across roles as a carrier, or in the case of 
the latter are dependent on securing ABO. Nor do they offer significant cost 
savings when compared to the cost of acquiring a carrier. The multi-role 
amphibious assault ship, or LHD, could provide a viable alternative to a small or 
mid-sized carrier, albeit accepting a restricted fixed wing strike capability but 
providing an enhanced means of supporting amphibious and helicopter operations. 
(This will be returned to in the following chapter.)  Yet it did not meet the stated 
requirement of policy when the government decided to build CVF.    
It would be wrong to view the aircraft carrier as a panacea, as Benbow states: 
‘Carriers … have limitations in their ability to dominate ground and in the scale of 
effort that they can take on without the backing of land-based forces. 
Nevertheless, they offer unique advantages and are essential for a viable British 
strategy’.134  The utility of aircraft carriers is based on their combining the 
attributes of maritime forces, especially the key attributes of access, mobility, 
versatility, sustainability and leverage, with the attributes of airpower (namely, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




speed, reach, height, ubiquity, agility and concentration)135. That is, maritime 
airpower constitutes a leading example of cross-domain synergy.136 This sets apart 
the aircraft carrier from other naval forces; a carrier task group operates within the 
naval environment and can project, on a sustained basis, power into the air and 
land domains; other naval force structures, such as the distributed missile-armed 
force advocated by, for example, Rubel, Hendrix and Pournelle, cannot operate 
across domains to anywhere near the same extent as a carrier group. Land-based 
airpower, although capable of projecting power on a sustained basis into the 
maritime and land environments, does not have the mobility (and therefore 
strategic, operational or tactical flexibility) or access of sea-based airpower. 
Further, it cannot undertake certain naval roles, and is constrained by the 
requirements of ABO and the various support functions (logistics, force 
protection, etc.) needed to generate airpower whereas sea-based aviation is self-
contained within the carrier.  
At its most fundamental level, the British debate on the design, development and 
acquisition of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers is a debate on the role 
and utility of maritime forces, and even more broadly, that of a maritime strategic 
perspective vis-à-vis a continentalist approach to fulfilling Britain’s military and 
grand strategic requirements. The following chapter will examine the roles and 
utility of a maritime strategy to Britain and consider the implications of such a 
strategy for maritime and wider force development; in this regard, the 
development of the future aircraft carrier programme holds lessons for the future 
development of British defence policy.      
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6. The Future Aircraft Carrier Programme and British 
Maritime Strategy  
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the utility of a potential maritime 
strategy to British national policy. That is, what value do armed forces operating 
at or from the sea have in terms of contributing toward the attainment of national 
political objectives? The chapter builds upon the analysis in chapters one and two, 
which considered the definition and British interpretation of maritime strategy, 
and the analysis in the following chapters of the debates concerning the rationale 
for and design and development of the Future Aircraft Carriers, in particular with 
regard to the wider role and contribution of the carriers to British defence and 
national policy, and asks ‘why a maritime strategy?’ A maritime strategy is 
defined, as stated by Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton (see page 78), and proceeding 
from the earlier work of Sir Julian Corbett, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and 
Captain Stephen Roskill, as being an inherently joint endeavour; and building 
upon the inter-dependence of the three armed services, it should seek to integrate 
the efforts of the three services in pursuit of success.   
In order to do this, the chapter examines the debate concerning the procurement of 
the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers within the context of wider British 
defence policy.  It does so with particular regard to the impact on the programme 
of growing external pressures, namely, those relating to the implications of the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the politico-economic context for the 2010 
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Within this context, the chapter 
also considers the perception of the strategic utility of maritime power within the 
defence and national security policy-making establishment and the extent to which 
defence and national policy are based on a long-term strategic perspective. 
Proceeding from this, the chapter examines the rationale for, and utility of a 
potential maritime strategy for Britain. It does this by first considering Britain’s 
strategic context (for example, its position as an insular, maritime trading nation) 
and the evolving strategic environment (including such factors as the shifting 




constraints). This provides the context for considering the military utility of a 
maritime strategy, its implications for maritime and wider force development and 
British national policy, and the potential circumstances under which such a 
strategy would be adopted.   
At the core of this chapter is the question: why a maritime strategy? This question 
is especially significant, as Sir Julian Corbett explained: 
We are accustomed … to speak of naval strategy and military strategy as though 
they were distinct branches of knowledge which had no common ground. It is the 
theory of war which brings out their intimate relation. It reveals that embracing 
them both is a larger strategy which regards the fleet and army as one weapon, 
which co-ordinates their action, and indicates the lines on which each must move 
to realise the full power of both. It will direct us to assign to each its proper 
function … it will enable each service to realise the better the limitations and the 
possibilities of the function with which it is charged, and how and when its own 
necessities must give way to a higher or more pressing need of the other. It 
discloses, in short, that naval strategy is not a thing by itself, that its problems can 
seldom or never be solved on naval considerations alone, but that it is only a part 
of maritime strategy – the higher learning which teaches us that for a maritime 
State to make successful war and to realise her special strength, army and navy 
must be used and thought of as instruments no less intimately connected [than are 
the three arms ashore].1 
It is in this context that the CVF programme is particularly valuable as a case 
study. The debates surrounding the design and development of the Queen 
Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers have extended beyond a consideration of naval 
factors and considered wider military and grand strategic factors, especially those 
pertaining to air strategy and the maritime industrial base. It is for this reason that 
the carrier debate is of such significance to the broader question of whether Britain 
requires a maritime strategy.  
As with the preceding chapter, for the purposes of the analysis in this chapter, it is 
assumed, as a baseline, that British national policy will remain predicated on 
possessing the means to project power and influence, albeit on a limited scale, 
globally.2 The SDSR described Britain’s national policy aims thus: 
The National Security Strategy sets out two clear objectives: (i) to ensure a secure 
and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and 	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ways of life from all major risks that can affect us directly; and (ii) to shape a 
stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or our 
interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power and influence to shape 
the global environment and tackle potential risks at source.3 
National policy provides the basis from which strategy is developed and the 
objectives toward which armed force will be applied, or as eloquently expressed 
by Carl von Clausewitz, ‘at the highest level the art of war turns into policy – but 
a policy conducted by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes’.4 In 
this light, the importance of determining the strategic utility of maritime power – 
of which the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers will be a major component – 
is highlighted: for policy to make effective use of its armed instrument, the utility 
of that instrument must be known in order for it to be used appropriately. 
The Aircraft Carrier Debate, Maritime Strategy and British Defence 
Policy 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to consider the debate concerning the 
development and procurement of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers within 
the context of wider British defence policy and its implications for the perception 
of the broader utility of maritime power. It particularly takes account of the 
influence of countervailing factors on the debate surrounding the carrier 
programme, which by the time of the SDSR in 2010, enjoyed little support in the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) outside the Royal Navy and was under intense 
pressure financially.5 Moreover, there was a widespread senior military opinion 
that the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers should have been scrapped,6 a view 
reportedly held by the Defence Strategy Group,7 albeit contingent on the extent of 	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Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff, and includes as members, the Vice Chief of the 
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the financial constraints to be imposed on the defence budget during the SDSR 
process.8 
The pressures on the carrier programme were, to a significant extent, also 
symptomatic of wider tensions in British defence policy, deriving particularly 
from a combination of the impact of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, an 
Army-led debate over the evolving character of conflict and thus Britain’s military 
requirements,9 and the post-2008 economic downturn exacerbating an already-
increasingly constrained defence resource base. The consequence of these tensions 
was, as Professors Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, both noted strategic 
commentators, explained: ‘…Policy and strategy are now being defined in the 
short term, rather than with much sense of what might lie beyond the immediate 
horizon. This tendency has been exacerbated by the fiscal pressures … which have 
heightened interservice [sic] rivalry to an extent not seen for many years’.10 In this 
environment, the case for the aircraft carriers particularly, and maritime forces 
more generally, was disadvantaged, especially vis-à-vis those forces (for example, 
protected infantry) seen as more relevant to the immediate requirements of 
operations in Afghanistan. This is in marked contrast to the SDR where the case 
for the then future carrier programme was central to the wider expeditionary 
approach articulated. 
The Shifting Defence Policy Context 
Although the SDR was perceived as a major success both in terms of process and 
‘for bringing foreign and defence policy together in a clear, coherent and 
affordable fashion’ 11  the equipment programme set out in the review was 
inherently unstable.12 This was due to an initial £2 billion funding shortfall based 
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9 For an overview of this debate, see Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, ‘Blair’s War and Brown’s 
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on unrealised assumptions relating to potential efficiency savings.13 The funding 
deficit in the equipment programme became an enduring problem, and alongside 
the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, was a significant constraint on 
MoD resources; the scale of this constraint is indicated in the SDSR: ‘The legacy 
of over-commitment in the Defence programme amounted to around £38 billion. 
Some £20 billion of this is related to unaffordable plans for new equipment and 
support’.14 In this context, the carrier programme, constituting a whole package of 
capability at significant cost, was viewed in some quarters as providing an 
opportunity, through cancellation, to aid in rebalancing the budget.15 Cornish and 
Dorman cited the carrier programme, alongside the Astute-class submarine, Type 
45 destroyer, A-400M transport aircraft, Future Lynx helicopter and the Army’s 
Future Rapid Effect System as major equipment projects listed by the then 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the MoD and the Chief of the Defence Staff (then 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock, now Lord, Stirrup) as options for cancellation 
presented to the prime minister in 2008.16  
Notably, four of the six aforementioned projects were either naval or, in the case 
of the Future Lynx, a joint project with significant naval interest.17 In part, this 
reflects the capital intensive nature of navies; warships and submarines constitute 
significant investments. Moreover, it also illustrates the particular circumstances 
of the first decade-plus of the 21st century as a period in which a number of major 
naval procurement programmes were underway simultaneously, that is, namely 
the Astute-class nuclear-powered submarines, the Type 45 Daring-class destroyers 
and CVF in addition to a number of auxiliary vessels.18 This ‘bow wave’ of naval 
construction was in part due to the then government choosing to delay several 
programmes in order to help fund operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At this 
point, it warrants highlighting that the CVF programme was, and remains central 
to the British military maritime industrial base, not least because the carrier 	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17 The Future Lynx, now known as Wildcat, is the replacement for the Royal Navy’s and Army’s 
fleet of Lynx helicopters. For an overview, see http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/navy-
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programme bears the bulk of the overhead costs of British military shipbuilding 
(this is also a major factor in the continued cost growth of the carrier 
programme).19 It was also a key driver for the Terms of Business Agreement 
(ToBA) signed between Her Majesty’s Government and BVT (a joint venture 
established between BAE Systems and the VT Group for naval shipbuilding) in 
2009.20 The TOBA was intended to realistically downsize industry, following a 
period of expansion to produce the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, in order to be 
capable of producing from the mid-2020s, a frigate-sized vessel every 18 
months.21 The industrial significance of the CVF programme will be discussed 
further below, in particular with regard to decision-making during the SDSR.  
The inclusion of four major naval programmes out of six potential candidates for 
cancellation, however, is also indicative of the developing trend toward calling 
into question the relevance of high-end naval capabilities. This trend, as will be 
discussed below, was also evident in the analysis of British defence requirements 
articulated in some quarters of the think tank community.22 Notably, the 2008 list 
of major projects, although identifying the A-400M transport aircraft, did not 
include the two largest (in cost terms) equipment programmes: the 
Typhoon/Typhoon Future Capability and the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft 
(FSTA). The FSTA contract, which was let in 2008, was valued at £10.4 billion; 
in contrast, the CVF contract, also placed in 2008, was valued at £3.1 billion.23 
The forecast cost of the Typhoon/Typhoon Future Capability programme was not 
disclosed until 2010: projected at £18 billion, this programme was, and remains 
the largest post-Main Gate project by value.24   
The cost of the carrier programme was also subject to criticism in the SDSR, 
stating that: ‘This £20 billion programme was crowding out other important 	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investment in the Armed Forces’.25 The figure of £20 billion however does not 
solely refer to the acquisition of the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers but also 150 F-
35 aircraft, which are intended to form a joint land and sea-based force operated 
by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. In this respect, the use of the combined 
cost of the carriers and the F-35, a closely linked but nonetheless separate 
programme, distorts the perception of the affordability of the aircraft carriers 
themselves. This is perhaps unsurprising given the aforementioned lack of support 
for the carrier programme in the MoD outside the Royal Navy and also the 
centrality of Afghanistan to the SDSR process. The issue of the cost of the 
carriers, in particular with regard to the contract governing their acquisition, will 
be returned to below in order to evaluate the decision in the SDSR to retain the 
ships. 
The most significant shift in British defence policy in the first decade of the 21st 
century, and central to the growing argument against investment in high-end 
maritime forces, including the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, was the 
undertaking of the campaigns in Iraq (concluded in 2009) and Afghanistan. These 
two campaigns have had a pronounced impact on British defence policy due to the 
Armed Forces not being suitably equipped at the tactical level; not having the 
appropriate doctrine at the operational level; and there being a lack of patience at 
the strategic level.26 The effect of those campaigns, especially the enduring 
operation in Afghanistan (due to conclude by the end of 2014),27 in particular with 
regard to the carrier programme and wider perception of the strategic utility of 
maritime forces, has been threefold. First, in terms of the impact on the budget and 
resources available to the MoD; second, as a catalyst for debate on the evolving 
character of conflict and Britain’s military-strategic requirements; and third, 
contributing to a short-term outlook in policy and strategy.   
The 1998 SDR, in addition to the previously cited planning assumption outlining 
the British contribution to a major international crisis (see page 130), articulated 
the following guidelines for smaller-scale and enduring contingencies: 
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undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale (as over the last 
few years in Bosnia) while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial 
deployment - which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and air 
forces - if this were made necessary by a second crisis. We would not, however, 
expect both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them 
simultaneously for longer than six months.28   
The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan vastly exceeded the above-defined 
planning assumptions, but also did not prompt an increase in overall resources 
available to the MoD. That is, the additional costs and resources incurred through 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would have to be met, for the most part, from 
within the existing defence budget. In 2008/09, for example, the net additional 
cost incurred by the MoD of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan was £4 billion.29 
The use of contingency funding outside of the MoD budget, including through the 
Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) mechanism, provided some additional 
funding for resources directly relevant to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but 
as Cornish and Dorman explain, this did not alleviate the pressure on MoD 
resources: 
The number and size of UORs have grown remarkably, raising concerns within 
the Treasury that defence is now acquiring major capabilities through this 
channel, thereby sidestepping the normal acquisition process through which the 
Treasury has traditionally exercised its constraining function. The Treasury has 
also argued that a number of capabilities are not related to existing operations and 
has decided that UORs should be capped at a certain level (£900 million), with 
any further expenditure to be shared equally between the Treasury and the 
existing defence budget.30  
The implication of this was that: 
UOR expenditure for the year to March 2008 was £1.7 billion, which meant that 
the existing defence budget has had a de facto cut of £400 million (the MoD’s 
share of the £800 million excess). With operations in Afghanistan likely to 
continue for some time and with no slowdown projected in UOR expenditure, it 
seems likely that the defence budget will continue to subsidize the war in 
Afghanistan at the expense of other defence capabilities.31 
Further, the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were principally land campaigns 
with the Army as lead service. In this respect, the aforementioned tactical 
deficiencies primarily impacted on the Army, with a commensurate increase in 	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demand from the Army for additional resources to address those deficiencies. This 
had the effect of reducing Army support for the carrier programme; for example, 
both Field Marshal The Lord (then General Sir Charles) Guthrie (Chief of the 
Defence Staff, 1997-2001)32 and General Sir Michael Jackson (Chief of the 
General Staff, 2003-2006) were initially supporters of the carrier programme.33 
This is not unexpected: a constrained defence budget limits the ability for the 
individual services to be joint.34 The naval support budget, as an illustration of 
this, was ‘raided’ to pay for operations in Afghanistan.35 General Sir Michael 
Jackson also illustrates this with regard to the first part of his tenure as Chief of 
the General Staff (CGS): 
… Besides dealing with Iraq, my first eighteen months as CGS were spent 
fighting the Army’s corner in a cost-cutting exercise bizarrely entitled ‘the 
medium-term work strands’ – in effect, a mini defence review. The outcome was 
that the RAF had to shed about 10 per cent of its manpower and the Royal Navy 
lost some of its older ships. In the opinion of the MOD civil servants, the Army 
got away ‘relatively lightly’, losing some 1,500 soldiers from an establishment of 
about 104,000. In fact, we were in some ways ahead of the game: the Army staff 
had already come to the conclusion that the balance of capabilities within the 
Army was out of kilter.36  
This quotation contains two points of significance: first, it illustrates the growing 
resource constraints confronting the MoD whilst the Armed Forces were engaged 
in Iraq (a situation exacerbated by the growing commitment to Afghanistan from 
2006 onward). Second, it refers to the roots of the shift in focus for the Army that 
was to emerge later in the decade as advocacy for a wider change in British 
defence policy, that is, a move toward a greater focus on stabilisation operations 
(see below).  
The budgetary constraints afflicting the MoD had by 2008, as discussed above, 
resulted in the carrier programme coming under increased scrutiny and 
highlighted as a candidate for cancellation. The solution adopted was, instead of 
outright cancellation, to delay, reduce or temporarily cancel programmes: the 	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carrier programme was delayed (the in-service dates for Queen Elizabeth and 
Prince of Wales were moved back from 2014 and 2016 to 2015 and 2018 
respectively)37; the Future Lynx programme reduced; and the FRES utility vehicle 
cancelled.38 This was in order to offset a £2 billion deficit for 2008/9.39 As Nick 
Childs explains with regard to the carrier programme, the implication of this delay 
was to significantly increase cost in the long-term: ‘While achieving short-term 
savings thought to be around £450 million, it was estimated in 2009 that the net 
effect would be to increase the final cost of the programme by more than £900 
million. In 2010 that estimate was revised upwards to £1.56 billion’.40 The delay 
was achieved by delaying construction of the Prince of Wales by 18 months; this 
meant that instead of taking six years to build, the ship would take nine or ten 
years.41 
As noted above, the cost of the carrier programme, and its implications for wider 
investment in defence capabilities was subject to scrutiny in the SDSR. Moreover, 
the rationale for the carriers was questioned. This reflected a debate led by the 
Army on the evolving character of conflict and the extent to which investment in 
high-end capabilities was necessary, especially in light of the continuing campaign 
in Afghanistan. This debate and its implications for the perceived strategic utility 
of maritime power will now be discussed, before considering the SDSR and the 
carrier debate.  
The Army Perspective and Its Implications 
The Army’s perspective on the evolving character of conflict and Britain’s 
strategic requirements were notably elucidated by the then Chief of the General 
Staff, General Sir Richard (now Lord) Dannatt and his successor, General Sir 
David (now Lord) Richards (CGS 2009-2010 and Chief of the Defence Staff, 
October 2010-July 2013). The view articulated by Generals Dannatt and Richards 
focused on a generic future conflict and a ‘single version of war’;42 General 
Dannatt explained thus: ‘We can no longer be prescriptive about taking part in 	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either Major Combat Operations [MCO] or Stabilisation Operations, the boundary 
between them has become increasingly blurred – the antithesis of the beloved 
binary response’.43 The implication for defence policy was as Dannatt explained: 
In a break from traditional defence planning, we would like to see planning go 
from today as the start point and work forward. This may seem slightly at odds 
with current practice, but we must be flexible enough to take account of shifting 
current operations and to veer and haul our capabilities and resources 
accordingly. We must get away from blue skies thinking and from programmes 
that take a generation to introduce – current pressures do not give us that 
luxury.44 
The implication, and central to Dannatt’s argument, was the requirement for a 
larger Army, and one optimised for conducting stabilisation operations: 
… The Army of tomorrow must retain the capability to fight MCO or Stability 
Ops, both simultaneously and sequentially. We have reached the point now where 
the most likely operations are amongst the most demanding. Our operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have clearly demonstrated that even with integrated 
technology and systems, the mass and footprint given by numbers are an essential 
element of the future Army – in other words we cannot get any smaller and I 
would argue strongly that we need to be bigger…. Therefore – and this is key to 
what I am saying – we must continue to optimise for the most likely – which is 
Stabilisation Operations – whilst maintaining our ability to dual role and meet the 
demand of Major Combat Operations …45 
General The Lord Richards further developed the case for a unitary vision of war: 
But if I am right and non-state opponents should be our principal defence and 
security focus, inconveniently we cannot dismiss the possibility of state on state 
warfare either. What would such warfare actually look like? ... If countries like 
Russia or China really want to cause us major problems surely they will employ 
other levers of state power: economic and information effects, for example? … 
Attacks are likely to be delivered semi-anonymously through cyberspace or the 
use of guerrillas or proxies ... In other words, what I am suggesting, is that there 
is a good case for believing that even state on state warfare will be similar to that 
we will be conducting against non-state groupings.46  
The implications of this vision are summarised by Professor Sir Hew Strachan: 
‘The unitary view of war is land-centric. It sees airpower in terms of attack 
helicopters, air mobility and strategic lift, not fast jets; it sees seapower in terms of 	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logistic support, brown-water operations and coastal protection, not aircraft 
carriers’.47 In essence, this vision is a contemporary version of the ‘Continental 
Commitment’, which instead of being focused on Europe, foresees a British 
commitment to enduring, large-scale ground stabilisation and post-conflict 
reconstruction operations in a similar vein to that concluded in Iraq and (at the 
time of writing, July 2014) on-going in Afghanistan.48 Lord Richards points to this 
in his remarks: 
In people focused conflict, whether in Afghanistan or protecting vital sea lanes, 
delivering success will often need mass, whether it is the right number of troops 
and support helicopters, sufficient UAVs or sufficient small ships…in wars 
amongst the people, if you are using a lot of firepower - often delivered from the 
air in extremis as a result of insufficient manpower - you are almost certainly 
losing. One must have enough troops firstly to retain the tactical initiative and, 
secondly, to provide the enduring routine security without which the population 
will not have the confidence to reject the insurgent or spoiler.49 
This vision of future conflict and its implications for the Royal Navy and Royal 
Air Force, described by Cornish and Dorman as essentially making them ‘support 
commands to the Army’,50 did in the lead-up to the SDSR serve to facilitate some 
renewed Royal Navy-Royal Air Force cooperation, after the particularly heated 
Harrier debate of late 2008/early 2009 (see pages 188-189), in order to counter the 
Army’s case.51 However, although the Army’s case for a long-term shift in 
defence policy toward stabilisation operations did not gain traction, the short-term 
requirements of Afghanistan exerted a substantial influence on the SDSR. This 
had a concomitant effect on the perception of the relevance of maritime 
capabilities to Britain’s overall defence needs and thus the force structure 
mandated by the review.    
The SDSR, The Carrier Debate and British Defence Policy 
Before discussing the SDSR in connection with the carrier debate, the wider 
perceived strategic utility of maritime forces, and the extent to which British 
national and defence policy are founded upon a clear conception of long-term 	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requirements, it is valuable to set out the context in which the review was 
undertaken.52  This was dominated at the grand strategic level by, first, the 
economic recession resulting from the 2008 financial crisis and its impact on 
already strained government finances, and second, the creation of the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government in May 2010. The political 
context for the SDSR was particularly complex, as Cornish and Dorman explain: 
There was also rivalry between leading political figures and between departments 
of government. On occasion it appeared that civilian and military cultures and 
perspectives rivalled each other within government. And there were, finally, 
rivalries and tensions within the leading party of government (the Conservative 
Party) and between the Conservatives and their coalition allies the Liberal 
Democrats.53  
The SDSR itself was formulated by the Cabinet Office (due to it being a defence 
and security review), not the Ministry of Defence, and was driven by a 
combination of financial and political pressures with strategy determined by the 
short-term requirements of operations in Afghanistan.54 The government-wide 
austerity measures introduced by the coalition government resulted in the defence 
budget enduring a cut of 8 per cent in real terms until 2014, with a de facto further 
cut of 8-10 per cent arising through the MoD having to resolve the problem of 
unfunded commitments in full.55 Michael Codner, Senior Research Fellow in 
Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), has described the 
SDSR as maintaining the expeditionary approach set out in the SDR, stating that: 
…Britain does indeed have a military strategy. This strategy explains how an 
expeditionary Joint Rapid Reaction Force (in SDR language) with its land, naval 
and air components is intended to make the UK a safer place for its people 
through operations of choice overseas... The SDSR continues and reinforces this 
approach. It has not changed it or come to different conclusions.56 	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However, in terms of execution, as Matthew Savill, a Civil Servant and graduate 
of the Advanced Command and Staff Course,57 has suggested, ‘…the SDSR has 
resulted in what has been called an “eccentric force structure”, especially in 
relative investment in enablers and the overall mix of capabilities’.58 Savill also 
suggests that, in part, this is due to the services seeking ‘… to concentrate on the 
core capabilities they wish to retain, rather than those that they are required to in 
order to maintain a coherent force’.59 Professor Michael Clarke, Director General 
of RUSI, has, in this light, questioned the opportunity cost of the carrier 
programme, stating that the: ‘… the Navy is sacrificing a lot of “flexibility”, 
“adaptability” and other desirable aspects described in the National Security 
Strategy in giving up useful frigates and destroyers to pay for the carriers’.60  
The carrier programme was subject to intense debate in the SDSR, as described by 
Danny Alexander, Chief Secretary to the Treasury: 
These issues [the defence budget as a whole], particularly the issues around the 
carriers, consumed a significant amount of time in our discussions about the 
defence settlement that took place in the National Security Council, and a 
significant amount of time in the conversations between me and my ministerial 
colleagues in the Ministry of Defence and at official level, and in conversations 
between No 10 and the Ministry of Defence.61 
The debate on the carriers was hugely constrained and focused on whether to 
spend around £5 billion on two aircraft carriers or none.62 Ian King, Chief 
Executive of BAE Systems, articulated the cost of only acquiring Queen Elizabeth 
in a letter to the Prime Minister: 
If both carriers are completed the cost will be £5.25bn [sic]. If Prince of Wales is 
cancelled, the direct cost of the programme will be £4.8bn [sic]. However, in 
these circumstances, and under Treasury rules and the agreements I have 
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outlined, there will be consequential costs, including those related to 
rationalisation, which we estimate would amount to £690m [sic].63 
Moreover, the industrial implications of cancelling Prince of Wales would be 
substantial, as King explained: 
The cancellation of Prince of Wales would mean that production in all BAE 
Systems shipyards would cease at the end of 2012. There is no further production 
work planned until steel is due to be cut on the new frigate programme in 2016. 
This means that the business would be unsustainable, and all three yards would 
have to close by early 2013, with the loss of more than 5,000 jobs in BAE 
Systems and many more across the UK in hundreds of companies in the supply 
chain. In practice, that means the end of the UK's capability in complex warships, 
and would bring the sector to a halt. Significant additional rationalisation costs 
would also result for MOD, the BAE Systems element alone of which would be 
£250m [sic]. And a potential termination liability under our agreement with MOD 
would also arise.64 
Even accounting for measures to ameliorate the impact of the cancellation of 
Prince of Wales, such as accelerated production of the replacement frigate 
programme, the implications for the shipbuilding sector would still be significant: 
So, in practical terms, and even after the potential amelioration, the cancellation 
of Prince of Wales would cause the abrupt rationalisation of the industry over the 
next 2-3 years, which will precipitate the closure of at least one of the BAE 
Systems shipyards, and the layoff of production staffs at the others. We anticipate 
that this will require at least 2,500 job losses in BAE Systems in Scotland and on 
the South Coast of England, as well as several thousands in the wider supply 
chain.65 
In military terms, the rationale for the CVF programme set out in the SDR, 
emphasising the provision of offensive airpower, had lost traction by the late 
2000s due to the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan (despite the vital contribution 
of carrier-based airpower, in particular to operations in Afghanistan).66 Arguments 
for the carriers in the SDSR emphasised the flexibility of the ships, in particular 
with regard to their roles supporting amphibious and helicopter operations.67 
Further, in contrast to the SDR, which, as discussed in chapter five (see pages 
179-180) did not consider an LHD, had the UK been starting the carrier 
replacement programme in 2010, the LHD option, rather than a traditional aircraft 	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carrier, would have been pursued.68 This is reflected in the shift to the new 
concept of Carrier Enabled Power Projection, as explained by the National Audit 
Office (NAO): 
Following the SDSR decision the Department has been developing its thinking 
about how it will utilise the operational carrier and the aircraft to best effect. Its 
emerging thinking, building on some pre-SDSR work is called Carrier Enabled 
Power Projection (CEPP). As part of CEPP, the role of Carrier Strike was 
expanded from predominantly focusing on fast jets to “support a broad range of 
operations including landing a Royal Marines Commando group, or Special 
Forces squadron, assisting with humanitarian crises or the evacuation of UK 
Nationals”.69 
The NAO also explained the wider rationale for the SDSR’s eventual carrier 
policy: 
The Senior Judgement Panel had concluded that Carrier Strike supported the 
Adaptable Britain posture; however, in the event of a serious cut in funding it 
would be prioritised below other capabilities such as amphibious operations and 
naval constabulary. This was based on its view of the United Kingdom’s 
requirements over the next decade for Future Force 2020. In September 2010, the 
Department’s assumption was that the likely reduction in its funding would be 
twice as great as the 7.5 per cent reduction financially agreed. Working within 
this funding contraint [sic], the Defence Strategy Group agreed, that cancelling 
both carriers was the preferred military option rather than eliminating amphibious 
capabilities or making significant further reductions in destroyers or frigates and 
asked that the National Security Council be notified of this position. The Group 
acknowledged that this might be unacceptable to the National Security Council as 
cancelling both carriers would give rise to considerable costs in the early years 
and would result in the collapse of the United Kingdom warship-building 
industry. It therefore recommended the construction of both carriers with one 
being operational and one in extended readiness.70   
The Senior Judgement Panel referred to in the above quotation was an ad hoc 
group of one and two star level subject matter experts in the MoD that met to 
support the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (General Sir Nicholas Houghton, now 
Chief of the Defence Staff) in assessing the military significance, and thereby 
ranking of proposed savings measures. The results of those deliberations formed 
part of the evidence brought to higher decision-making bodies. However, the final 
shape of the SDSR was determined by the Cabinet Office, thus reducing the 
impact of the Senior Judgement Panel. 71  The cancellation of the carrier 
programme, in addition to the above-described economic impact, would have 	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resulted in a fundamentally different power projection capability, and the Royal 
Navy ceasing to be a full spectrum navy (the only other full spectrum navies are 
the US, Russian, French and Chinese navies).72 This would also have had a 
concomitant effect on Britain’s international influence and credibility. 
i. The Carrier Debate and the Strategic Utility of Maritime Forces 
The decision to retain the carriers was most likely based primarily on the 
economic effects of cancellation and the follow-on political implications resulting 
from the collapse of the warship-building industry, rather than an appreciation of 
the strategic utility of aircraft carriers. This is not surprising, especially, in light of 
the preceding analysis, considering the impact of Iraq and even more, Afghanistan 
on British defence policy. Those campaigns have also contributed to the perceived 
diminished urgency of the naval case.73 This has been compounded by a sea blind 
nation and politicians lacking an essential understanding of maritime matters.74 
This is reflected in the SDSR, which in addition to the above-described debate on 
whether to procure the Queen Elizabeth-class, also significantly reduced the scale 
of Britain’s amphibious capability.75 Further, despite it being agreed during the 
SDSR process that 23 destroyers and frigates were required,76 the size of the 
escort force was reduced from 23 to 19. It does warrant highlighting that the 
SDSR, despite withdrawing from service HMS Ark Royal and the Harrier force 
and committing to only operating one of the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, did 
reiterate the rationale for carrier airpower,77 albeit whilst accepting a capability 
gap.  
Significantly, the SDSR encapsulated an approach which focuses ‘on preventing 
conflicts and building local capacity to deal with problems [and] maintains a 
broad spectrum of defence and other capabilities, able to deter and contain, as well 
as engage on the ground, developing threats’.78 This approach is one for which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Interview with retired senior military officer. 
73 Interview with Admiral Sir Jonathon Band.  
74 Ibid. 
75 HM Government, SDSR, p.22.  
76 Interview with retired senior military officer. 
77 HM Government, SDSR, p.23. 




maritime forces are particularly suited,79  and although the SDSR itself was 
constrained by the short-term requirements of Afghanistan and the overarching 
economic circumstances, both the then Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam 
Fox) and his immediate successor (Philip Hammond) recognised the naval case.80 
The conclusion of operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and the return to a 
contingency posture for the Armed Forces, in conjunction with the 
aforementioned focus on conflict prevention, may thus provide a more favourable 
context for the articulation of the strategic utility of maritime forces, and more 
importantly, for its acknowledgement by policy-makers. Further, as will be 
discussed below, both Army and Royal Air Force conceptual and doctrinal 
documents highlight the contribution of the maritime environment to the land and 
air domains respectively, illustrating the potential benefits of a maritime-enabled 
approach to Britain’s expeditionary posture.  
ii. National Policy and Defence Planning: Lessons from the Carrier Debate? 
The above discussion of the countervailing influences and their impact on the 
carrier debate and wider perceived strategic utility of maritime forces, has 
highlighted a recurring theme in British defence policy especially from 2003 
onward: that of short-termism. Moreover, the arguments over whether the 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan reflected a fundamentally new paradigm in 
conflict, necessitating a change in national policy and defence planning, or a 
current and pressing challenge but not one requiring a shift in long-term strategic 
direction, has contributed to a debate on the role of national strategy in the UK.81  
Of particular significance has been the increasing resource and budgetary 
pressures serving as a growing constraint on the MoD, and as discussed above, 
resulting in short-term savings measures being pursued which have had the effect 
of increasing costs in the long-term: the CVF programme is a notable example in 
this regard. The problem of short-termism and the issue of an overarching national 	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policy vision (or lack of) is subject to much debate. Codner explains the 
contention thus: 
The argument was well made by Sir John Coles, a former permanent under-
secretary of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He suggests that the 
so-called pragmatic British official approach is to create policy that is devoid of a 
vision of the future, and without any overarching long-term objectives. For 
British policy-makers, existing policy, such as it is, must form the basis for long-
term planning. As this policy is adjusted to meet changing circumstances, long-
term plans can be similarly adjusted.82 
The implications of the lack of an overarching national policy are discussed by 
Lieutenant General Paul Newton, Air Vice-Marshal Paul Colley and Brigadier 
Andrew Sharpe: 
The UK competes for position, power and resources within an international 
system, but unlike some – such as Al Qa’ida, China and Iran – its policies are 
more often driven by near-term expediencies (not least, the democratic electoral 
cycle). Yet, lacking a detailed and enduring ‘grand strategic manifesto’, those 
many departments of state with responsibilities for security are arguably neither 
sufficiently adaptive to events nor agile enough in their responses. Furthermore, 
we have let slip both the mechanisms and more importantly the grammar with 
which to conduct the relevant strategic discourse within and around defence. This 
imbalance is exacerbated by a sense that we are ‘at war in a time of peace’, yet 
despite the intensity of current combat, the reality is one of limited conflict. If we 
are failing to deliver strategy due to ‘intellectual decay’, then the implications 
would extend well beyond the Ministry of Defence, to Whitehall’s machinery and 
culture. The issue would thus be both intellectual and institutional.83 
In defence policy terms, the result is, as explained by Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy 
Blackham, that: 
Serious strategic policy making is trumped by expediency. Budgets trump 
military credibility; and so we are at risk of being trumped by events. In Britain 
today ‘defence policy’ appears to be merely to have a nuclear deterrent and then 
buy whatever else can be afforded, with no informed consideration of how the 
whole strategy fits together.84   
The implications for the Armed Forces are, as Cornish and Dorman explain: 
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… The MOD could continue with the traditional, incremental approach of 
muddling through while Britain’s armed forces decline both relatively and 
absolutely at an ever faster rate. The appeal of such an approach is that it is in 
many ways the easiest option, since it largely obviates the need to make major 
decisions. The problem is that it leads to perpetual short-termism in decision-
making, and in the medium term produces suboptimal results (the delays to the 
aircraft carrier programme and its associated aircraft are a prime example of this). 
This inevitably results in capability degradation at a higher and higher rate, major 
programming inefficiencies (as we have seen over the last few years) and a major 
disconnect between ends, ways and means.85 
It also warrants emphasising that the carrier programme can be cited as an 
example for planning for the mid-to-long term. As discussed in chapter three (see 
pages 122-123), the decision to seek a joint land and sea-based single platform 
solution to Britain’s requirement for a fifth generation offensive air system, with 
the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers providing an additional ‘airfield option’, was a 
pragmatic and sensible means of acquiring a high-end yet high-cost capability. 
Further, due to the industrial importance of the carrier programme, it served as a 
key driver for the ToBA, a notable example of an attempt to develop a long-term 
policy linking a sustainable industrial base with naval strategic requirements.  
At its most fundamental level, the debate on the CVF programme is a facet of the 
enduring debate over what role in the world Britain sees itself having and thus 
what armed forces Britain perceives it requires. The SDSR states that Britain 
should work ‘to shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks 
affecting the UK or our interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power 
and influence to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at 
source’.86 That is, Britain continues to aspire to a major role in world affairs and 
thus requires a commensurate level of military capability. The Queen Elizabeth-
class aircraft carriers, as both the SDR and SDSR pointed out, will provide a 
significant contribution to the role Britain sees itself having, and as the previous 
chapters have discussed, without the constraints imposed by a dependence on 
gaining access, basing and overflight rights. The value of the carriers, as has been 
noted previously in this thesis, is a reflection of the wider utility of maritime 
forces, enabled by the ability to utilise the global commons of the sea. As will be 
discussed below, a maritime-based expeditionary posture is arguably a cost-
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effective means of leveraging Her Majesty’s Armed Forces as a whole in order to 
achieve Britain’s national policy aims.   
As the UK approaches the conclusion of operations in Afghanistan, and with it 
more than a decade of continental garrisoning operations in that country and Iraq, 
whilst at the same time responding to sustained economic challenges and a 
strategic system in flux, the question of the resources available for defence and the 
balance between the Armed Forces will become increasingly pressing. It is to this 
subject that the chapter now turns, and in particular, the question of whether 
Britain requires a Maritime Strategy. 
 
Assessing a British Maritime Strategy: Rationale, Implications and 
Debate  
The purpose of this section is to examine the rationale for, the utility and 
implications of a potential British Maritime Strategy and the circumstances under 
which such a strategy may be adopted. At the centre of the analysis is the 
question: why a Maritime Strategy? In order to answer this question, the analysis 
first considers Britain’s strategic context and interests, plus the evolving character 
of the international system. This provides the basis for assessing the need for a 
maritime strategy, the requirements of such a strategy and the implications for 
British force development and structure, including in particular, the role of the 
Royal Marines and Fleet Air Arm. The Royal Marines and FAA are of 
significance as they are examples of forces that have a cross-domain capability, 
that is, the ability to operate effectively across the physical environments (air, land 
and sea). In this context, it refers specifically to the ability to operate proficiently 
from the maritime environment into the land or air environments, utilising 
amphibious capabilities or carrier basing. It also contributes to a core tenet of the 
analysis; a maritime strategy should not be confused with a naval strategy. A 
maritime strategy would seek to coordinate the aggregate capabilities of Her 
Majesty’s Armed Forces on a joint basis, exploiting Britain’s position as an 
insular maritime state and the attributes of the maritime environment as an 




Marines and Fleet Air Arm) to underpin an agile expeditionary approach to 
operations.  
The British Strategic Context 
The defining feature of Britain’s strategic context is geographic, that is, Britain’s 
position as an island. Professor Colin Gray described the British position in the 
following terms: 
Britain is a maritime medium power whose security and prosperity requires 
unimpeded maritime access and transit. As a maritime trading country, Britain 
requires good order at sea. Britain’s maritime geography, indeed insularity, 
mandates primary economic and strategic significance for the country’s ability to 
use the seas. This is not discretionary. It is not an open issue for policy choice. 
The geopolitical, hence geostrategic, context for British security is both global 
and (broadly) Atlantic. It is not narrowly European.87 
The significance of Britain’s position as a trading nation is summarised by 
Professor Geoffrey Till: 
For us the bottom line (an appropriately economic phrase) is about defending our 
trading interests; for Britain is, and has been for the past several hundred years, 
primarily a trading nation. We are heavily engaged in the processes of 
globalisation. After New York, London is the second most globalised capital in 
the world. Ten per cent of our GDP derives from our international financial 
services; 60 to 70 per cent of the profits of UK listed companies are actually 
earned overseas. Nearly one in ten British people live part or all of the year 
abroad while over four million foreign nationals live in the UK. A very high 
proportion of our GDP derives from international trade. According to the A.T 
Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalisation Index, the UK is the 12th most engaged 
country in the world economy. If one excludes the factors that disproportionately 
skew the calculations towards countries with a very small population, like 
Singapore or New Zealand, the UK rises to third position behind only the United 
States and Canada.88  
Further, as Till explains: ‘Whether we like it or not, we are part of a global trading 
system. What happens in distant parts of the world, sooner or later affects us here, 
and often to a much greater extent than it does most other countries.’89 Till defines 
three types of threat to the international trading system, which require ‘a policy of 
defending trade and the conditions for trade’: 
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Disorder ashore and at sea, especially in areas that produce crucial commodities, 
through which critical transportation routes run or which have clear links to 
British security and/or prosperity. Inter-state war. The disruptions to the world 
economy that a US-China conflict over Taiwan would have are unimaginable. 
The threats of this are currently low, but we need to help keep them so. Deliberate 
attack by forces, both state and non-state, hostile to the intentions, values and 
outcomes of globalisation.90 
The implications for British military strategy are, according to Till: 
Given the difficulties of identifying the bearable costs of kinetic intervention… it 
is worth making the point that one thing we can be sure of is that preventing 
conflicts is much cheaper and much better than winning them when they happen 
and then engaging in long-term repair work afterwards. This suggests that a 
proactive rather than reactive national policy or conflict prevention and 
deterrence is and should remain at the heart of our national efforts to defend the 
system from which we derive so much benefit, at least to the extent that our 
resources allow.91 
It warrants emphasising that, due to its dependence on the global trading system, 
Britain does not have one specific regional focus. In this regard, Till suggests that: 
‘…we need to focus our national attention and our national resources on the places 
that matter, the Gulf (resources), the Far East (trade) and Africa (resources) not on 
places that sadly don’t’.92 The sources of British energy imports illustrate the 
geographic scope of Britain’s trade-based interests. The top three sources of 
coal/solid fuel imports are Russia (38 per cent), Columbia (25 per cent) and the 
US (19 per cent); crude oil is primarily sourced from Norway (67 per cent), Russia 
(8 per cent), Nigeria (7 per cent) and Algeria (5 per cent); whilst gas is mainly 
imported from Norway via pipeline (in 2011, 41 per cent), liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) imports are of increasing significance. In 2011, LNG imports from Qatar 
equalled 40 per cent of total UK gas imports.93 This is represented tangibly by an 
LNG tanker every 300 miles between the UK and Qatar and highlights the 
significance of energy security to wider strategic considerations.94   
Britain also has a diverse range of territorial interests – the Overseas Territories - 
in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean and Pacific and 
alliance obligations, including in the Far East – the Five Powers Defence 	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Arrangements (FPDA). The FPDA, comprising Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New 
Zealand and Singapore, reflects the confluence of Britain’s diplomatic, trading, 
military and historical interests; aside from Britain, the FPDA comprises former 
British colonies or dominions, and members of the Commonwealth – an oft-
overlooked instrument of soft power95 – with the purpose of consulting in the 
event of a direct threat to either Malaysia or Singapore.96 Of most significance, 
particularly for this analysis, is the regional context for the FPDA: the ‘Asian 
Meridian’. This region, defined by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre (DCDC) as:  
…The region from Hong Kong in the North, through South East Asia into 
Australia…. The region sits astride the global trade routes of the Malacca and 
Lombok Straits through which 20% of global oil production is transported, 
including 80% of China’s oil imports. Over 60% of global shipping travelling 
through these choke-points is destined for Chinese ports. Similarly, Japan imports 
over 80% of her energy needs along these routes.97  
Thus, although the Asian Meridian may seem, at first glance, to be at such 
distance from Britain as not to constitute an area of high strategic importance, it 
warrants particular attention and recognition as a major British area of interest. 
This is because of Britain’s historic links to the region, the presence of 
Commonwealth allies, but especially due to the region’s considerable and growing 
importance to the global trading system. The region is also of significant 
economic importance to the UK. Based on figures in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s Monthly Statistics of International 
Trade,98 British imports from the FPDA members in 2012 totalled $1.130 billion; 
with imports from China, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea added, the total 
increased to $7.502 billion. British exports to the FPDA members were worth 
$1.411 billion; and with the addition of China, Hong Kong, Japan and South 
Korea, $4.581 billion. These data illustrate the importance of the Far East for 
British trade. The region, if it were a single state, would be one of Britain’s largest 
trading partners, exceeding the value of British imports from Germany ($6.839 
billion) and the US ($4.143 billion) and the value of exports to Germany and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 For example, See Till, ‘Back to Basics’, pp.13-14. 
96 Ministry of Defence/DCDC, Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 
2040 (Fourth Edition, 2010), p.64, footnote 92. 
97 Ibid., p.64. 




US, worth respectively, $4.315 billion and $5.314 billion.   
The preceding analysis should not be perceived as suggesting Europe holds no 
strategic significance for Britain. Germany is the UK’s largest source of imports, 
with the Netherlands and France third and fifth respectively (China is fourth). 
Norway, in addition to being a major source of energy, is also Britain’s sixth 
largest source of imports; the largest UK export market is the United States, with 
Germany, the Netherlands and France, second, third and fourth respectively.99 
However, it does indicate the extent to which Britain’s interests are, as 
emphasised by Gray and Till, global, and dependent on the effective functioning 
of the international maritime trading system.  
The military implication of this dependence is, as Till emphasises, the requirement 
for British defence policy to be based on the defence of, and conditions for trade. 
This should not be taken as requiring Britain to possess the ability to single-
handedly defend the entire international trading system, nor that ‘defence of trade’ 
is equivalent to a large-scale Battle of the Atlantic-style campaign. Rather, it 
points to the need for Britain to be capable of responding in an agile and flexible 
manner, either unilaterally or in coalition, to potential threats, including at source, 
to those areas ‘through which critical transportation routes run or which have clear 
links to British security and/or prosperity’.  More broadly, it requires an ability to 
project military power in order, with allies and partners, to help to shape the 
international system. Forward deployed, credible maritime forces can particularly 
contribute to this aim through upstream conflict prevention, and where 
intervention is necessary, engagement without embroilment.100 The analysis will 
now turn to evaluate the evolving strategic environment and the character of the 
potential threats and challenges to the international trading system that are most 
relevant to the defence of British interests. 
The Evolving Strategic Environment 
The international system is in a period of flux, marked particularly by the (re) 
emergence of great powers, in particular China and Russia, and to a lesser extent 	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and in the longer-term, India and Brazil, combined with a relative decline in the 
overall position of the US (the long-term impact of the US budgetary 
sequestration process will be a particularly important factor in determining the 
extent of this decline)101. The implications of this shifting balance of power are 
described by DCDC: 
Out to 2040, the locus of global power will move away from the United States 
(US) and Europe towards Asia, as the global system shifts from a uni-polar 
towards a multi-polar distribution of power. This shift, coupled with the global 
challenges of climate change, resource scarcity and population growth, is likely to 
result in a period of instability in international relations, accompanied by the 
possibility of intense competition between major powers.102   
The resurgence of Chinese and Russian power and influence may constitute a 
challenge to British interests. With respect to China, its increasing assertiveness, 
in particular with regard to territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas 
and its potential impact on British allies (Malaysia is one party to the Spratly 
Islands dispute in the South China Sea) and the international trading system, may 
warrant British concern.103 The trajectory of Russian national policy and military 
strategy, especially with regard to its long-term rearmament plans and perspective 
toward European security, especially in light of the crisis in Ukraine, is another 
cause for concern.104  
Hedging against a Russian or Chinese challenge represents the highest-end of the 
threat spectrum for which British strategy should be based. This is not to argue 
that a Russian or Chinese threat will emerge and directly threaten British 
interests, but that the possibility should be accounted for. For example, a 
resurgent Russia reinforces the requirement for broad-based capabilities and 	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globally deployable, credible forces.105 The DCDC ‘Future Character of Conflict’ 
(FCOC) paper does though state: 
Direct conflict between the UK and a major power such as China or Russia is 
judged unlikely. However, wars involving the major power or their proxies are 
probable. It is possible that the UK may be involved in a coalition action against 
a state actor possessing significant military capabilities, with the UK fighting in 
some cases from a position of near-parity or even relative disadvantage.106 
In contrast to the focus on stabilisation and counter-insurgency of the first decade 
of the 21st century, it is likely that a prospective British strategy – whether 
maritime or not – will need to focus on higher-intensity conflict scenarios. This 
may include potentially operating in the face of ‘Regional powers armed with 
precision-guided missiles and anti-access technologies, such as submarines and 
sophisticated surface-to-air missiles….’, which ‘…will make traditional power 
projection strategies more costly’. 107  In addition, advanced fifth generation 
aircraft (those featuring extensive use of low observable technologies, internal 
weapons carriage and advanced sensor systems) such as the Russian Sukhoi T-
50, Chinese Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-31, if exported (India is investing in 
the Russian T-50 programme), could, as Flight Lieutenant Kevin Terrett, RAF, 
explains: 
[An in-theatre VLO [very low observable] threat will] constitute a considerable 
challenge to any joint commander attempting to concurrently protect friendly 
strategic joint force concentrations and conduct an offensive joint action 
campaign. Additionally, the escalation in the potential for friendly losses may 
skew the balance of risk versus reward for our politicians, thereby limiting the 
influence that our nation is capable of bringing to bear.108   
Moreover, the geopolitical context may be characterised by: 
… An unstable transition to a multi-polar world that allows old and new state 
rivalries to emerge; widespread global inequality that heightens associated 
grievances; population increases, resource scarcity and the adverse effects of 
climate change that combine to increase instability; and the increased importance 
of ideology.109 
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In short, the combination of an increased military threat from potential 
adversaries, possibly backed or at least armed by a major power, and a less 
permissive geopolitical environment, may act as a significant constraint on the 
ability to secure access, basing and overflight (ABO) rights for expeditionary 
operations. Further, this may be compounded by an increasing hybrid threat: 
In future conflict smart adversaries will present us with hybrid threats 
(combining conventional, irregular and high-end asymmetric threats) in the same 
time and space. Conflict could involve a range of trans-national, state, group and 
individual participants who will concentrate and operate both globally and 
locally. In some conflicts, we are likely to see concurrent inter-communal 
violence, terrorism, insurgency, pervasive criminality and widespread disorder. 
Tactics, techniques and technologies will continue to converge as adversaries 
rapidly adapt to seek advantage and influence, including through economic, 
financial, legal and diplomatic means.110 
This threat will require countering in a future operational environment that is 
likely to be, according to the FCOC, ‘congested, cluttered, contested, connected 
and constrained’.111 Of particular relevance to this analysis, is the ‘congested’ 
nature of the future battlespace: 
Historically, in a conventional context, the UK Armed Forces have usually 
sought to avoid congested battlespace when we were trying to achieve freedom 
of manoeuvre. While we will continue to seek to dictate the terms of battle to our 
adversaries, our choice in this regard will not be absolute…. In the future, we 
will be unable to avoid being drawn into operations in the urban and littoral 
regions where the majority of the World’s population live and where political 
and economic activity is concentrated.112 
The significance of, and the requirement to influence the littoral is emphasised 
when it is considered that: 
By 2020, over 80% of the world’s population will live within 100 miles of the 
sea. At present 147 (over 75%) of member states of the UN, are coastal states. 
Most of these states have extended their jurisdiction out to sea, in many cases as 
far as 200 nautical miles or more. Most human maritime activity – shipping, 
fishing, hydrocarbon exploration etc – is currently conducted within a 300-mile 
zone. This means that a substantial proportion of the world’s economic and 
political activity is being conducted in a narrow strip of land and sea (the littoral) 
on average no wider than 300 miles.113  
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In addition, eight of the ten largest cities in the world are situated on the coast,114 
and there is a developing trend toward oceanic competition: 
The high seas, the deep ocean and the polar regions, as well as the airspace 
above, will become areas of increased competition as advanced technology, 
greater accessibility and growing resource pressures encourage more intensive 
exploitation by states and commercial interests. Competition will centre on 
fishing, deep sea mining and the extraction of oil and gas, and will extend to 
transportation and rights of passage.115 
Responding to such an operational environment will, as the DCDC Global 
Strategic Trends paper suggests, require ‘far-sighted and agile strategies’.116 The 
FCOC paper describes the requirement thus: 
The West is now reacting to our adversaries’ attacks, rather than setting the 
agenda; if we are to regain the initiative, and win, we will have to operate in a 
different asymmetric or hybrid manner that can give us an edge against our 
enemies. To do this we may have to adopt responses that may well be currently 
unfamiliar to us, and some we do not understand particularly well, for example: 
prevention, stabilisation and cyber-operations.117 
Major General Buster Howes has suggested an approach to meeting the 
challenges of the prospective strategic environment and reconciling the British 
defence resources-capability dilemma in which ‘we might move away from 
configuring fixed solutions to “certainties” and instead pursue an expeditionary 
path – in every sense – based around versatile forces that can react to the 
uncertain realities of our environment’.118 This expeditionary approach would be 
maritime and: 
…. Rests on the training and retention of high-quality people, not through 
greatly increased spending or smarter technologies per se. It rests on soldiers – 
and Marines – who are intellectually supple, emotionally strong and physically 
resilient and who belong to organisations that are versatile and agile, and which 
can react and deploy where they may not be invited. Crucially, they can change 
the nature of events when they arrive.119  
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In this respect, versatile, high-quality personnel who can operate with agility in 
response to emergent threats and challenges would provide the asymmetric edge 
necessary to gain the initiative against potential adversaries, without being 
dependent on ABO.120 Moreover, as Major General Howes explains, a maritime 
approach would reflect continuity in British strategy and more importantly, 
contribute to the prevention of conflict: 
We have 500 years of experience of using the sea to our advantage. We already 
own the hardware to continue to do so. It can be projected forward without 
commitment and poise – if needs be, almost indefinitely, as a subtle and 
responsive instrument of coercion, conventional deterrence and force on mind. It 
can engage across the spectrum of interest, activity and conflict, ranging from 
building political trust and support through partnering, and from constabulary 
tasks to kinetic engagement.121 
This quotation contains key elements of the argument for a maritime strategy; the 
chapter will now examine in detail the military utility and implications of such a 
strategy. 
The Military Utility and Implications of a Maritime Strategy 
From the preceding discussion, four major points emerge, which point to the 
potential utility of a Maritime Strategy for Britain. First, Britain is, relative to 
most other major economies, highly dependent on the global trading system for 
its prosperity and access to resources. Secondly, the international system itself is 
in a period of long-term transition with the potential for significant instability, the 
(re) emergence of major powers and rivalries and competition for – possibly 
leading to rivalry over – access to strategic resources. Third, and deriving from 
point two, the future operating environment is projected to be complex, 
congested and one in which traditional Western military supremacy is contested. 
This may include in some circumstances, British forces operating from a position 
of relative disadvantage, either due to the adversary employing hybrid means to 
constitute a complex threat, or via the backing of a major power that has provided 
advanced weapon systems that confer a technological edge (such as fifth-
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generation combat aircraft). In such a context, gaining access to a theatre of 
operations may be difficult either due to the military threat, including the 
potential utilisation by an adversary of anti-access strategies, or politico-
diplomatically (including as a possible result of the adversary’s coercive 
influence). Fourth, Britain requires a ‘far-sighted and agile strategy’ and versatile 
armed forces capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict and gaining 
access to ‘where they may not be invited’. This is in order to respond effectively 
to the evolving strategic environment and increasingly adaptive, and potentially 
well-equipped future threats, and most importantly, defend trade and the 
conditions for trade (especially vis-à-vis regional powers who may seek to 
disrupt or threaten to disrupt, for example, regional resource markets, in order to 
coerce or deter Western support for regional allies).  
The latter requirement in particular, combined with the increasing importance of 
the littoral regions of the world as population and economic centres (and the 
growing importance of aquaculture),122 along with Britain’s dependence on the 
global trading system, all point to a maritime strategy. Major General Howes is 
especially clear in this regard: 
There are only two means of theatre entry when not invited, and they are by 
exploiting the global commons of either the sea or air space. The latter would 
require massive new investment by this country and would only ever partially 
meet the need to lift combat units let alone sustain them. There is a reason why 
92 per cent of the world’s trade is moved by sea. The force of twenty-four US 
Apache helicopters that deployed to the Bosnian conflict required 6,200 
protective troops and command and support personnel, 550 C-17 flights and 
26,000 tons of supporting equipment. Further, air insertion is binary not 
rheostatic – you cannot loiter. It forces your hand. You are either in or you are 
out.123  
Such a strategy would place:  
An emphasis on mobile expeditionary forces rather than large garrisoning ones. 
Since, the sea remains at once the world’s largest manoeuvring space, a major 
source of reduced vulnerability and also provides the basis for the globalised 
trading system on which our peace and prosperity depend, it makes sense for 
these to be ‘maritime’ in the sense that Sir Julian Corbett … used the term – that 
is in relation to the activities of joint forces in circumstances in which the sea is a 
significant factor.124 	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This quotation contains two essential points; first, the sea constitutes a 
manoeuvring space – in other words, it can be utilised to gain access and to use 
the mobility it permits for operational advantage; second, a maritime strategy 
links the sea with joint forces – it is not a naval-centric strategy. In this respect, 
the purpose of a maritime strategy is to enable access to, and shape the 
battlespace across the environmental domains in order to secure a positive 
outcome for the country’s national policy aims. The Versatile Maritime Force 
concept (see chapter two, pages 93-94) of the early 2000s reflected this thinking, 
and made a particularly valuable point: the need for maritime forces to be ‘fully 
interoperable with the Future Army [and] Future Air Force’: this issue will be 
returned to in more detail below. First, however, it is useful to briefly examine 
the roles of each of the three services in a maritime strategy. With regard to the 
Royal Navy, as discussed in chapter five (see page 166) Corbett defined the 
‘functions of the fleet’ in terms corresponding to international engagement, sea 
control and power projection in the contemporary lexicon. By placing 
international engagement as the first function of the fleet, the role of the Royal 
Navy in providing forward presence is emphasised. This would call for a:  
… Strategy of engagement and presence in areas where we are sure we need to 
be. We should be part of the scenery in all areas of particular concern 
helping…to massage the environment ‘in a nice way,’ to influence events, help 
stop them go bad, monitor what is going on, provide continuous insight and 
early warning that something more serious may need to be done and to help 
build local capacities to do what does need to be done. Above all, this requires 
presence of a non-committing sort. This means recognizing that ‘stabilisation’ 
operations which mean, in effect, picking up the pieces after a conflict are, in 
fact, a recognition of failure.125   
Moreover, maintaining a forward presence, and undertaking maritime security 
tasks (such as counter-piracy operations) provide valuable training opportunities 
for ships’ companies, with long deployments enhancing warfighting capabilities 
and engendering sustainability and resilience.126 Further, global deployments also 
support Foreign and Commonwealth Office requirements.127  
A major role for the Royal Navy in those sorts of operational circumstances 
would be one of facilitating the deployment of ground forces by reducing the 	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efficacy of enemy ground and seaward defences (precursor operations) and also 
through securing control of maritime communications, in order to allow their 
exploitation for the purpose of projecting power (at sea or from the sea) whilst 
denying their use to an adversary.128 From this, theatre access can be secured, 
even if ‘not invited’, thereby enabling the deployment of, and provision of 
support to the Army. In this regard, the significance of providing a credible 
forward presence can be highlighted. The presence of credible naval forces in a 
region may be sufficiently reassuring to convince neighbouring states that a 
regional power can be successfully confronted, and therefore grant ABO for land-
based forces. The Coalition response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is a 
valuable example of this occurring, as Tim Benbow describes: 
The aim of the initial Coalition deployment of military forces in response to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was to contain the conflict, and particularly to prevent a 
further advance into Saudi Arabia and hence keep free the ports and air bases 
needed for subsequent reinforcements. Naval forces played a leading role in this 
initial deployment, along with light ground forces and quick-reaction air forces: 
an hour after the start of the Iraqi invasion, one carrier group was ordered to the 
Gulf of Oman and another to the eastern Mediterranean. Most importantly, 
carrier air power arrived in the theatre ready immediately for combat and with its 
own logistical support….129  
This meant, as Benbow states: 
…Without their availability, Saudi Arabia would have been taking a huge risk in 
allowing in Coalition forces, given the size of the Iraqi army on its border. 
Maritime forces therefore played a critical part in establishing a force capable of 
deterring an Iraqi push into Saudi Arabia…130  
The Coalition response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait illustrates the role of 
maritime forces in securing theatre access; it also indicates the utility of carrier 
airpower as an integral component of an expeditionary strategy. That is, without 
the presence of carrier-based aviation, theatre-entry forces – including those 
required to facilitate the deployment of land-based aircraft – would have had to 
deploy into the region in the face of the Iraqi Air Force and a nervous Saudi 
Arabia that might not have opened up its air bases. Had the Coalition been 	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dependent entirely on the Royal Saudi Air Force as the means of guarding against 
Iraqi attempts to deny theatre access, Iraq may have felt emboldened to attempt 
some form of disruptive action (such as offensive counter air operations against 
Saudi airbases). The presence of two US carrier battle groups in theatre meant 
credible tactical airpower would be available to the Coalition in the event of Iraqi 
action. This type of threat is likely to increase as Russia and China develop and 
export increasingly sophisticated precision-guided surface-to-surface missile 
systems,131 fourth and fifth generation combat aircraft, advanced air-to-surface 
and air-to-air weapons, and as potential adversaries use such capabilities to 
develop anti-access strategies.  
The roles of the Army and RAF under a maritime strategy would not be 
significantly different to what they have traditionally been. They would, 
however, involve a departure from the recent decade-long focus on garrisoning 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq – and the Cold War focus on West Germany – 
to an expeditionary mind-set, leveraging sea and airpower. This type of approach 
is already apparent in Army forward-looking thinking. The Future Land 
Operating Concept (FLOC), for example, states: 
…. An army without an expeditionary mindset and capability will reduce its 
relevance as an instrument of power. History points to an enduring requirement 
for the UK to project power abroad…. The UK’s island status confers two main 
means of theatre entry; both require the exploitation of the global commons of 
either the sea or air space. Significant strategic mobility rests on the freedom to 
use the oceans, and major military operations, especially in the littoral demand 
sea power on a significant scale. Control of the air remains an essential 
prerequisite of the manoeuvrist approach… This is the joint context in which a 
potent land contingency force must be generated.132   
Within this context, operations in the littoral will be particularly valuable: 
There is an increased likelihood that the joint force will be engaged in littoral 
operations given the predicted future operating environment. The denial or 
unavailability of ports, land routes, airfields or airspace may necessitate littoral 
manoeuvre. If so, future littoral operations in the joint operational area are likely 
to be founded on joint (or integrated) action. Amphibious forces will seek to 
realise simultaneous effects directly against objectives through ship to objective 
manoeuvre using unexpected penetration points and landing zones to avoid 
established defences. The seizure or denial of key terrain to the enemy may be 
required to facilitate the introduction of follow-on forces.133     	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If necessary, heavier land forces can subsequently be projected.134 In this regard, 
it warrants mention that over 95 per cent of all UK military equipment deployed 
for Operation Telic – the 2003 invasion of Iraq – was transported by sea (in 60 
chartered British merchant ships).135 The priority for the Army, according to the 
FLOC, will be the conduct of agile, combined-arms manoeuvre, utilising highly 
mobile air and ground forces.136 The importance it attaches to potential littoral 
operations, in particular as a means of gaining operational access, also points to 
the requirement for an amphibious capability; it is in this regard that the role of 
the Royal Marines is of significance, and will be discussed below. The FLOC 
also marks a significant change in thinking in the Army compared to the vision of 
future warfare articulated by Generals Dannatt and Richards and discussed 
above. 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the balance of British airpower has been 
subject to much debate; experience, however, particularly in the Gulf, indicates 
the utility of a mix of land and sea-based aviation.137 The requirement for an agile 
strategy, focused on conflict prevention, points to the need for a credible carrier-
based air capability. Where an airpower capability may be required on a longer-
term basis, or in multiple locations (either due to the need to disperse in the face 
of an adversary’s capabilities or in response to a number of crises), land basing 
will also be required. Moreover, for high-intensity conflict situations, the number 
of fixed-wing combat aircraft required, and the scale of operations to be 
undertaken, could in some cases also require the use of land bases. This is 
contingent on securing ABO. 
The role of the Royal Air Force would be similar to that of the Royal Navy, that 
is, to secure access to an operational area, enabling the deployment and support 
of the Army.138 UK airpower as a whole, within which the RAF is the major 
contributor, requires aircraft capable of providing air defence and the means to 
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promote airpower at range. 139  This requires capabilities including air-to-air 
refuelling, stand-off attack, ISTAR,140 electronic warfare, and air transport.141 
The lack of a maritime patrol capability is a notable gap in air resources, the 
decision to remove the Nimrod being perhaps the most damaging of the SDSR.142  
With regard to the provision of sea-based airpower, although the experience of 
Joint Force Harrier was less than ideal (see chapter five, pages 189-190), a joint 
Royal Navy-Royal Air Force approach to the delivery of maritime aviation is 
sensible. As discussed in chapter five (see page 189), a joint force is necessary 
due to the Royal Navy’s difficulties in maintaining a cadre of fixed-wing 
aviators, but the concept also offers significant opportunities. This is especially 
with regard to the potential for the FAA to act as a bridge between the Royal 
Navy and RAF, and facilitate cross-pollination, including through exchange 
tours, via exposure to and immersion in the respective service cultures.143 This 
approach would be a valuable conduit for developing a cross-domain capability, 
which as will be discussed below, can facilitate a more flexible and agile military 
posture. The requirements of operating from an aircraft carrier call for sustained 
extensive and intensive training and application by the aircrew and support 
personnel by day and night, in all weathers, in order to develop a fully credible 
and effective capability.144 This is essential to the successful development of 
personnel, the ship-air interface and the integration of the aircraft carrier into a 
wider task group.145 This importantly also requires the mind-set of a sea-going 
aviator.146        
The RAF and the FAA, and for rotary-wing operations the Army Air Corps 
(AAC), should seek to develop the maximum level of commonality across fixed 
and rotary-wing aircraft in order to achieve efficiencies in logistic support, 
training and minimise the number of aircraft types in British service; the latter 	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would also offer the advantage of generating economies of scale. This would 
require the acquisition of maritime-capable platforms, and contingent on the RAF 
and AAC developing a certain level of maritime proficiency, the potential to 
utilise sea-basing for short-duration operations such as staging into a theatre, the 
provision of specialist niche capabilities or Special Forces support, could be 
developed.147 The development of advanced unmanned air systems, in particular 
maritime-capable systems, may offer the potential to generate interoperable land 
and sea-based squadrons, that is, land-based squadrons capable of deploying to 
sea (maritime units are inherently capable of detaching and operating from 
ashore). For example, a maritime-capable unmanned air system under RAF 
control could, contingent on the ship possessing the necessary ‘ground’ control 
system and interface for the unmanned aircraft, deploy to and operate from a ship 
alongside FAA assets either to augment the embarked air-group or to provide a 
specialist capability.  
The rationale for a maritime strategy is, as Corbett explained: ‘to determine the 
mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war’.148 In essence, the 
principal focus for a maritime strategy is not equipment (albeit accounting for the 
requirement for maritime-capable systems as an enabler), but rather, conceptual. 
It is in this regard that the role of the Royal Marines and FAA is especially 
significant; they are examples of forces with an extant cross-domain capability. 
British experience in the Falklands War and in many Cold War-era operations 
where Royal Marine and FAA units were augmented with Army and RAF units 
sheds light on this: 
In general, the greatest effect was achieved where incoming Joint augmentee 
[sic] units reinforced pre-existing and properly worked-up organisations. 
Examples of this are the integration of 2 and 3 Para into 3 Commando Brigade 
and 1 Sqn within the Air Group and Air Department of HMS Hermes…. These 	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was utilised as a Special Forces platform for operations in Afghanistan in 2001. See Jay Miller, 
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organisations were best able to absorb and assist the reinforcements in 
integrating, providing the professional and physical basis for effective operations 
in an unfamiliar environment.149 
The above quotation is taken from a DCDC paper on the lessons of the Falklands 
campaign for joint operations. This paper also highlights the value of embedding 
‘domain experts’ within units operating ‘outside their normal environment’ and 
suggests: ‘These embedded experts should have an in-depth understanding of 
both environments, able to bridge the language and experience barrier and ease 
the integration of the unit into an unfamiliar environment’. 150  Moreover, 
‘“domain expertise” is vital, especially for units trying to work across domain 
boundaries’.151 The Royal Marines and FAA have ‘domain expertise’ in the 
maritime, land and air domains respectively and thus can provide the required 
domain expertise to enable joint maritime-based operations, or as the Versatile 
Maritime Force concept suggested, full interoperability with the Army and RAF. 
The deployment of AAC Apache attack helicopters on-board HMS Ocean during 
Operation Unified Protector, the 2011 campaign against Libya, provides a 
practical example of cross-domain interoperability:  
This deployment highlights the need for our force elements to train and equip to 
operate within each other’s command and control structures and physical 
operating environments… This example reinforces the need to design cross-
domain interoperability into our platforms, sensors and weapons to provide the 
greatest agility across Defence.152    
It warrants mention that both the land-focused FLOC and UK Air and Space 
Doctrine refer to the importance of the sea in future operations. The FLOC, in 
addition to the above-quoted statement on the value of littoral manoeuvre, refers 
to the importance of an air manoeuvre capability,153 which has: ‘the ability to 
transition between roles and operate across the range of operational environments, 
most notably from the sea (via the littoral) to the land and back again’.154 
Significantly, UK Air and Space Doctrine, which has superseded the RAF’s AP 	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3000 doctrinal document, describes the role and importance of air-sea integration 
as: 
The orchestration and application of air and sea capabilities to create desired 
joint warfighting effects within a defined area of operations in accordance with 
the commander’s intent. Air-sea integration is necessary for many potential 
contingent operations, particularly where we face complex anti-access and area 
denial threats that we must counter with effects that we cannot create in a single 
operating environment.155   
This quotation, in particular its reference to the need to create ‘effects that we 
cannot create in a single operating environment’, points again to the utility of a 
maritime strategy. Maritime power can be utilised effectively as a form of 
leverage to create a disproportionate effect on an adversary. For example, Corbett 
highlighted, in the context of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), that the ‘army of 
a sea-power … if employed amphibiously in combination with the fleet … could 
produce results out of all proportion to its weight as a mere military force’.156 A 
notable contemporary example is that of the impact of sea-based US Marines 
Corps forces in the Gulf War (1991), where: 
It is understood that during Operation DESERT STORM a substantial number of 
Iraqi divisions were held in Kuwait, unavailable to assist in countering the allied 
advance along the coast from Saudi Arabia, specifically to defend against a much 
smaller US Marine Corps landing force poised at sea and threatening to assault 
Kuwait City.157  
This effectively illustrates the ‘fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your 
army to do’, and of maritime leverage (and demonstrating poise as a credible 
contingency force-in-being). It also points to the cost effectiveness of maritime 
forces, in particular with regard to their ability to limit liability in conflict 
(especially limited conflicts) and achieve effect at the decisive point. Corbett 
succinctly described the connection between limited conflict and maritime power 
(and again highlighting the influence of Clausewitz in Corbett’s thinking) thus: 
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It would be difficult to state more pithily the ultimate significance of 
Clausewitz’s doctrine. Its cardinal truth is clearly indicated – that limited wars do 
not turn upon the armed strength of the belligerents, but upon the amount of that 
strength which they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive point.158 
Moreover, Corbett explained its historical significance for Britain, in that it 
provided: 
…. An explanation of one of the most inscrutable problems in history – the 
expansion of England – at least so far as it has been due to successful war. That a 
small country with a weak army should have been able to gather to herself the 
most desirable regions of the earth…and…at the expense of the greatest military 
Powers….159 
In this respect, a Maritime Strategy would not, in essence, mark a radical 
departure for Britain, but rather as Till states, ‘marks a return to Britain’s 
traditional strategy, wherever possible, of offshore balancing and limited 
engagement for maximum effect’.160 Codner, in an analysis of British military 
strategic options, suggests that two hard choices confront policy-makers regarding 
the future of Britain’s expeditionary capability: 
The first is on the scale of capability for expeditionary operations of choice, 
which is a matter of acceptable affordability. The second is that between 
continental or maritime prevalence in such capability. Continental prevalence 
allows for a continuation of capabilities post-Afghanistan; that is, once fresh 
commitments are made to sustained ground operations, a greater ability to 
influence through scale and permanence is possible… Maritime prevalence, on 
the other hand, allows for a rational expansion of the requirements of operations 
of obligation … and a greater ability to influence through inducement operations 
early in the emergence of crises. A smaller army would offer fewer opportunities 
for participation in enduring coalition ground operations, and a de facto lower 
risk of embroilment… Only the maritime option will preserve vestiges of full 
national autonomy to serve purely national military obligations and interests 
abroad.161    
This points to the circumstances in which a Maritime Strategy may be adopted. 
The experience of Iraq and Afghanistan is likely to act as a deterrent to further 
enduring ground operations (the 2013 Parliamentary vote against intervention in 
Syria is suggestive of a deeper concern regarding intervention operations), whilst 
the SDSR, as discussed above, places emphasis on conflict prevention within a 
national policy context which continues to emphasise a commitment to 	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maintaining the means to project power and influence globally. That is, a set of 
circumstances pointing to a preference for maritime prevalence. Moreover, the 
adoption of such a strategy (or an alternative strategic concept)162 would facilitate 
a closer harmonisation of national policy, military strategy and defence industrial 
policy, thus addressing the issues of short-termism and the lack of a ‘grand 
strategic manifesto’, as discussed earlier in this chapter.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to combine an analysis of the debate concerning the 
Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers within the context of wider British defence 
policy and its implications for the perception of the broader utility of maritime 
power, with an assessment of the rationale for and utility of a potential British 
Maritime Strategy. The analysis of the carrier debate particularly focused on the 
influence of countervailing factors on the programme and the perceived relevance 
to British strategy both of aircraft carriers and of maritime forces more generally. 
This highlighted the growing resource and budgetary constraints affecting the 
MoD as a consequence of an inherently unstable equipment programme, the 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and latterly, the economic environment 
following the 2008 financial crisis. It also highlighted the Army-led debate on the 
changing character of warfare in light of the enduring counter-insurgency 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and whether this required a more fundamental 
shift in defence planning, including whether investment in high-end maritime 
platforms was necessary.  
This formed for the basis for evaluating the SDSR, in particular with regard to the 
debate within that review concerning whether to proceed with the procurement of 
the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. This debate was intense and went 
beyond a consideration of the military utility of the carriers, and focused 
especially on the industrial implications of cancelling or proceeding with one or 
both ships. This analysis also raised the issues of short-termism and whether 
Britain has a clearly conceived, long-term approach to national policy and 
strategy. Again, the carrier debate has highlighted both occasions where policy has 	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been determined by short-term pressures resulting in mid-to-long-term negative 
implications, in particular with regard to cost; conversely, the carrier programme 
also highlights aspects of a long-term approach, especially in terms of articulating 
a sustainable maritime industrial base and the acquisition of a joint fifth 
generation airpower capability.     
Proceeding from the analysis of the carrier debate, the question of a British 
Maritime Strategy was examined, considering in turn, Britain’s strategic context, 
the evolving nature of the international system, the utility and implications of a 
maritime strategy and the circumstances under which such a strategy may be 
adopted. The analysis has indicated that based on Britain’s dependence on the 
international trading system, its significant globally-distributed economic and 
territorial interests, an evolving international system that is increasingly multi-
polar and unstable, and emergent military trends, a Maritime Strategy would 
provide the ‘agile and far-sighted’ strategy required to protect and project 
Britain’s interests in an uncertain strategic environment. Such a strategy would be 
consistent with British national policy as it is currently articulated and aids in 
placing the carrier question into context. British national policy calls for the 
capability to shape the international environment and project power globally, 
albeit on a limited scale; aircraft carriers enable Britain to do this without the 
constraint and cost associated with being dependent on land bases. It must be 
emphasised that aircraft carriers are not a military panacea for Britain, nor should 
the preceding discussion on the potential utility of a Maritime Strategy be seen as 
arguing for a naval-centric approach to Britain’s defence requirements. Rather, it 
is suggested that a maritime-enabled expeditionary approach to Britain’s defence 
and national policy needs may constitute an affordable, effective and credible 
solution for British national policy. The nexus of the role of aircraft carriers to 
British strategy, whether and to what extent such a strategy should be maritime, 
and the connection with national policy constitutes the core of the analysis in this 






The core purpose of this thesis has been to examine the connection between 
British national policy and maritime strategy. It has, to this end, focused on the 
debate concerning the rationale for and design and development of the Queen 
Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. This programme constitutes a valuable case study 
as it ultimately concerns an assessment of the strategic utility of maritime forces 
and their role and importance to wider British military strategy and national 
policy.  
Underpinning the analysis throughout the thesis is the question: what is the 
strategic utility of maritime forces? This question provides the connecting skein of 
thought linking the analysis of the nexus of seapower, maritime strategy and 
national policy, the development of British maritime thinking and contemporary 
doctrine, with the debate on the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and 
whether Britain requires a maritime strategy. Further, the debate on the Queen 
Elizabeth-class, especially with regard to the value of aircraft carriers to British 
strategy and the balance of UK airpower, plus the wider debate on a maritime 
versus continental strategy, sheds much light on British perspectives on the utility 
of maritime forces. In this respect, the competing claims of the various parties to 
the debates, for example, between those who advocate a continental approach to 
Britain’s defence needs rather than a maritime strategy, provide valuable counter-
arguments and perspectives against which thinking on the value of maritime 
forces can be tested.  
From the analysis, three principal issues assume a particular prominence; the role 
of aircraft carriers in British strategy; the strategic utility of maritime forces and 
whether there is a requirement for a Maritime Strategy; and the connection 
between British national policy and maritime strategy. Each of these issues will be 
reviewed below, drawing especially upon the lessons of the CVF programme and 
their implications for British military strategy and national policy. This approach 
also facilitates the analysis by moving progressively up through the levels of 
strategy, that is, from the operational through the military-strategic to the grand 




are aircraft carriers an essential component of British strategy and what would be 
the implications of foregoing the capability they provide? Why would a Maritime 
Strategy be of utility to the UK, and what would be the implications for British 
national policy? Finally, how does national policy influence the development of 
strategy and the requirement for particular military capabilities: for example, why 
does British national policy as currently defined, call for high-end warfighting 
capabilities as represented by such assets as aircraft carriers and fifth generation 
combat aircraft? 
The Role of Aircraft Carriers in British Strategy    
The role of aircraft carriers in British strategy, and their utility to it, has been 
subject to much debate (see particularly chapters three and four), especially with 
regard to whether such ships are a vital capability for Britain; the level of carrier 
capability to be sought (if any); and how, more broadly, maritime aviation fits into 
Britain’s overall airpower requirements. Further, this is an enduring debate with 
both a long-term influence on, and implications for, British thinking on aircraft 
carriers. In this respect, the Royal Navy’s thinking on the nascent CVF 
programme in the late 1990s was shaped, to arguably quite a significant extent, by 
the experience of the 1960s debate on, and ultimate cancellation of the previous 
Queen Elizabeth-class (CVA-01) aircraft carrier programme. This is particularly 
evident in naval efforts to convince the Royal Air Force (RAF) that CVF would be 
‘their carrier as well’ and that the ships would be ‘joint defence assets’,1 in order 
to secure acceptance of the replacement carrier programme and avoid the inter-
service tensions associated with CVA-01.  
The legacy of the CVA-01 debate was also a major factor in the decision to 
combine the Fleet Air Arm’s Sea Harrier and RAF Harrier forces to form Joint 
Force Harrier.2 The concept of an interoperable land and sea-based joint force, 
although commendable in theory, has proved flawed in execution, most notably 	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due to tensions between the Royal Navy and RAF, the RAF’s reluctance toward 
embarked operations and the focus on land-based deployments in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Moreover, despite the creation of Joint Force Harrier in 2000, and 
with it the commitment on the part of the RAF to an interoperable land and 
carrier-based force, the RAF had sought to shape the Joint Combat Aircraft (the 
joint Harrier replacement) and CVF programme in such a way that would restrict 
the level of airpower capability that Britain could generate from the sea. The 
RAF’s attempt to scrap the Harrier force in 2008, and the context within which the 
SDSR was undertaken also highlighted the challenges confronting the future of 
British maritime airpower at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. 
However, as discussed in chapter five, the prospects for cooperation between the 
Royal Navy and RAF appear to be increasingly positive and with it, for Joint 
Force Lightning.  
The UK’s National Security Strategy states that Britain requires the ‘capability to 
act well beyond our shores and work with our allies to have a strategic presence 
wherever we need it’.3 In order to fulfil this aim without being dependent on 
foreign-controlled access, basing and overflight (ABO) arrangements, Britain 
requires credible carrier airpower. Such a capability, founded upon the attributes 
of maritime forces (particularly access, mobility, versatility, sustainability and 
leverage), combined with those of airpower (namely, speed, reach, height, 
ubiquity, agility and concentration) provides the means to project power and 
influence effectively at the strategic level. This is based upon the aircraft carrier’s 
ability to provide sovereign, forward deployed and self-sufficient combat-ready 
airpower. Moreover, maritime-based assets are relatively less vulnerable to attack 
than land-based forces (taking into account their exposure to maritime-specific 
threats such as torpedoes and naval mines but also their low or non-existent 
exposure to many conventional and irregular threats that affect land-based forces), 
and importantly, through not being deployed on land, limit liability in a crisis or 
confrontation. In short, the utility of an aircraft carrier is its ability to provide 
choice and a flexible, scalable response to a very wide range of dynamic 
situations. If combined with a forward presence, this may deter conflict from 	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breaking out or, if it should break out, permit an early response that could prevent 
escalation and make a later, heavier commitment unnecessary. In this respect, 
aircraft carriers can provide a central component of a conventional deterrence 
strategy.4  
The range of options open to policy-makers, and the ultimate strategic utility and 
credibility of an aircraft carrier, will be to a significant extent dependent on the 
size, composition and credibility of its embarked air group. As discussed in 
chapter three, and evident in the development of the CVF programme, larger 
carriers provide greater flexibility, versatility and military capability than smaller 
vessels. Most significantly, larger carriers enable the embarking of larger air 
groups, potentially also allowing the deployment of specialist capabilities, that can 
deliver a greater level of combat power and enhancing the ability of the ship to 
provide influence. For the UK, the decision to develop the Queen Elizabeth-class 
as large carriers, capable of embarking 36 fast jets, plus an airborne surveillance 
and control system (initially to be helicopter-based) and helicopters, was 
motivated by the experience of operations in the Balkans and Persian Gulf during 
the 1990s where the need for a greater capability than that provided by the 
Invincible-class was highlighted.5 In addition, and emphasising the influence role 
(in this case, vis-à-vis allies) of carriers, a larger air group was sought in order to 
enable the UK to have the largest possible role within coalition planning via a 
significant contribution to the Air Tasking Order for day one operations.6  
The credibility of the air group and wider ship-air interface is contingent on the 
aircrew and support personnel being proficient in operating on-board and from the 
carrier. This requires sustained embarkation in order to generate the experience 
and level of proficiency necessary to underpin maritime air operations by day and 
night in all weather conditions. This aspect of maritime aviation has itself been 
subject to significant debate in the UK and a source of tension between the Royal 	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Navy and Royal Air Force. The RAF has argued that airpower is indivisible and 
that all British airpower resources should be under its ownership. This argument 
was especially prominent in the inter-war period, the 1950s and 1960s and more 
recently, appears to have formed a key element of a serious inter-service dispute 
in 2008-09 (see chapter five, pages 187-188). In this respect, the RAF has argued 
that maritime aviation is not fundamentally different to land-based airpower and 
can be effectively delivered under its control. However, historical experience has 
shown this argument to be flawed and resulting in a sub-optimal capability.7  
The role and contribution of maritime aviation to wider British airpower has also 
been an area of much debate. Again, this has been an area of contrasting 
perspectives between the Royal Navy and RAF. The debate concerning the variant 
of F-35 to be selected for the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement is a 
notable example in this regard. Although the Ministry of Defence’s own analysis 
indicating that the catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) 
variant of the F-35 – the F-35C – constituted the more capable aircraft as well as 
being cheaper over the longer term, the short take-off and vertical landing 
(STOVL) variant, the F-35B, was selected. As discussed in chapter four, this was 
not the decision recommended by the MoD. However, industrial support from 
BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, and RAF lobbying for a STOVL-based carrier 
capability, in part motivated by the desire to protect its own Future Offensive Air 
System (FOAS) programme, were major factors in the variant decision. FOAS 
was an ambitious project to develop a replacement for the Tornado and was 
possibly intended to provide a level of capability a step-up from that provided by 
the JCA. In other words, the RAF sought to ensure that the UK’s principal combat 
air capability would be provided by a land-based air system as opposed to, had the 
F-35C been selected, an aircraft capable of operating from both land and sea. 
More importantly, the acquisition of the F-35C would have marked a significant 
qualitative increase in the Fleet Air Arm’s contribution to British airpower (half of 
the originally planned F-35 buy was to be for the Fleet Air Arm, that is, 75 
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aircraft)8 and arguably, made the sea-based element of British combat airpower 
just as significant as that of the land-based element provided by the RAF. It 
warrants highlighting that this would be contingent on the ability of the Fleet Air 
Arm to maintain a sufficient cadre of fixed-wing pilots and associated skill set for 
CATOBAR operations, which could pose a significant challenge. 
The issue of the balance of British airpower leads to the fundamental question of 
the extent to which aircraft carriers are a required component of Britain’s defence 
posture. As discussed in chapter six, Britain is a maritime trading nation 
dependent on the global trading system for its prosperity and economic security, in 
particular with regard to strategic raw materials, which are principally sourced 
from the Middle East and southern Africa. Moreover, Britain has territorial 
interests and treaty obligations in the Caribbean, South Atlantic, Mediterranean 
and Far East. In other words, the UK has to, as the National Security Strategy and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review state respectively, be capable of having a 
strategic presence wherever necessary in order ‘to shape a stable world, by acting 
to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or our interests overseas, and 
applying our instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment 
and tackle potential risks at source’;9 that is, to contribute to ensuring a stable 
international system and thus the conditions for trade. Unless the UK is prepared 
to accept the political, military and logistical constraints associated with securing 
ABO rights for land-based forces, aircraft carriers are, as Tim Benbow suggests, 
‘essential for a viable British strategy’.10 This is because, the UK, as Professor 
Colin Gray argues, has to broadly follow an expeditionary approach to warfare.11 
This necessitates sea-based aviation in order to provide affordable, independent 
and strategically credible deployable airpower, 12  and ensure that British 
expeditionary forces have sufficient control of the air, to enable: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Interview with Captain Jock Alexander OBE Royal Navy, (then) Naval Staff – Assistant Head 
Carrier Strike and Aviation, London, 3 May 2012. 
9 See Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National 
Security Strategy (NSS), Cm 7953 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010), p.4; and Securing 
Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), Cm 7948 
(London: The Stationery Office, October 2010), p.9.  
10 Benbow, ‘British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships’, ‘Key Points’.  
11 Colin Gray, ‘Britain’s National Security: Compulsion and Discretion’, RUSI Journal, Vol.153, 
No.6 (December 2008), pp.12-18. 
12 Interview with Rear Admiral Tom Cunningham CBE, Rear Admiral Fleet Air Arm, Portsmouth, 




… Military freedom of manoeuvre in the air, land or sea environments. This 
allows our commanders to seize the initiative while denying it to the enemy. 
Control of the air is a relative condition and depends on available resources and 
the risk that a commander is prepared to accept.13    
As the quotation also makes clear, control of the air is relative and in most likely 
contingencies, British forces would be operating in concert with allies such as the 
US, France and other NATO members, deploying either land or sea-based fast jets 
(or a combination of the two) capable of contributing to the attainment of air 
superiority; in addition, anti-air warfare-focused Type 45 Daring-class destroyers 
would be providing escort for a British aircraft carrier thereby providing a 
substantial air defence capability. The principal role for the Queen Elizabeth-class, 
from inception, is intended to be power projection (as discussed in chapter three, 
see pages 124-126). Although the Carrier Enabled Power Projection approach is 
primarily intended to offer a combined carrier strike and littoral manoeuvre 
capability, the ability to employ the Queen Elizabeth-class in a traditional fixed-
wing focused role is to be retained, and if required, a 36-strong F-35B air group 
could be embarked.14 Whilst noting the caveat mentioned in chapter three (see 
page 116) regarding the need for the additional pilots and support personnel to be 
proficient in carrier operations, thus necessitating regular and sustained 
embarkation, the ability to deploy a force of 36 carrier-based fifth generation 
strike fighters will provide a most valuable military capability and contribution to 
British strategy. Moreover, and of greatest significance is the long-term growth 
potential and versatility that the Queen Elizabeth-class offer policy-makers, a 
point effectively conveyed by Rear Admiral Chris Parry:  
…. Large hulls (and in particular, aviation-capable ‘flat-tops’) are inherently 
flexible and adaptable in their potential for use, because of their size, shape and 
stowage arrangements, together with the lift and shift virtues of their aviation 
assets. This means that carriers can operate throughout the spectrum of crisis 
from combat operations to humanitarian relief….15   
This flexibility was also important in ensuring the ships ‘survived’ the SDSR 
process, by enabling an emphasis to be placed on their role in support of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 MoD/DCDC, UK Air and Space Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30, July 2013), p.3-3. 
14 HM Government, SDSR, p.23.  
15 Rear Admiral Chris Parry, ‘The United Kingdom’s Future Aircraft Carriers: What Are They 




amphibious and rotary-wing operations (more akin to an LHD), which were seen 
as more relevant than the originally-intended medium scale offensive fixed-wing 
strike capability. 
Does the United Kingdom Require a Maritime Strategy? 
The roles and utility of maritime forces, and maritime strategy, have been a 
significant factor in British strategic debate for more than a century. As discussed 
in chapter two, there is a discernible British school of maritime thought, dating 
back to the late 19th century and still highly relevant to contemporary British 
maritime thinking and doctrine. The core tenets of this school are; a maritime as 
opposed to naval approach to the exploitation of the sea; a focus on linking 
maritime power to grand strategy and national policy; and a pragmatic approach to 
the securing and exploitation of the control of maritime communications, in order 
to enable the projection of power from the sea. A significant factor in the 
development of British maritime thought, and one that is of enduring importance, 
is that of the influence of strategic context, history and identity. As an insular 
maritime nation, the control of maritime communications was and continues to be 
of paramount importance to Britain. This also explained the difference in 
emphasis between, for example, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, US Navy, 
and British contemporaries such as Vice Admiral Philip Colomb. Mahan, focused 
on explaining the general role and importance of seapower because his audience – 
the policy-makers of a large continental power - had to be educated in why 
seapower mattered at all, before debating how it could be exploited. In contrast, 
British thinkers such as Colomb, Sir Julian Corbett, and Admiral Sir Herbert 
Richmond all lectured to an audience already familiar with the concept of 
seapower, that is, the officers of the Navy of a maritime state. For Britain, as an 
island state, the role and influence of the sea was central to developing an 
appropriate strategy; moreover, such a strategy would, as discussed in chapters 
two and six be inherently joint. 
The utility of maritime forces derives from their ability to exploit the sea as a 
means of communication, and thus gain access to an area, even if uninvited. 
Conversely, maritime forces can similarly deny an adversary the use of maritime 




enables in certain circumstances (for example, if the conflict area can be isolated 
from one of the belligerents), a conflict to be kept limited.16 In addition, maritime 
forces enable the state deploying them to tailor very precisely, or if necessary limit 
liability in a conflict, thus potentially providing a more cost-effective approach to 
operations than deploying larger-scale land-based forces.17 The ability of maritime 
forces to operate forward, providing presence in a region of interest, without being 
dependent on ABO, and logistically self-sufficient and combat-ready, makes them 
especially valuable as a ‘force for influence’. The US Navy for example, sees its 
carrier strike groups as national assets for influence.18 In this respect, maritime 
forces can contribute significantly to the prevention or containment of conflict; 
notable examples of this are the British response to an Iraqi threat to Kuwait in 
1961, the Coalition response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the US 
response to Chinese attempts to coerce Taiwan in 1996.  
Significantly, as shown in the Coalition response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the 
forward presence and responsiveness of maritime forces can also provide the 
necessary reassurance for regional states to grant ABO for land-based forces. This 
reflects a central tenet of the British maritime school: the need to coordinate at the 
strategic level, the actions of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force 
(albeit, a later addition), a point well-articulated by Vice Admiral Sir Peter 
Gretton.19 Professor Geoffrey Till, moreover describes the historical connection 
between the Royal Navy and the Army, in particular with regard to the role of the 
Army in preserving and extending British maritime strength: 
Strategically, the two services were seen as complementary; both could serve the 
interests of the other. Historically and strategically the Army could be used to 
protect the Low Countries, preventing their vital ports from falling into the hands 
of hostile navies – an imperative ranging from Elizabeth’s war against Spain in 
the sixteenth century to the Passchendaele campaign in the twentieth. Indeed 
interventions on the mainland were occasionally justified on the grounds that this 
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would protect Britain’s position at sea by preventing the emergence of a hostile 
power or coalition strong enough to generate a dangerous maritime threat.20  
In terms of the current and prospective strategic environment, as discussed in 
chapter six, the need for the three services to harness their complementary 
capabilities to the maximum possible extent in order to operate successfully in an 
increasingly unstable and contested operational environment, will be of significant 
importance. As Professor Colin Gray ably summarises, this points to the 
requirement for a maritime approach to British military strategy: 
British defence strategy needs to be maritime, because this orientation covers our 
ability to respond effectively to most of the menaces to our survival and vital 
interests. ‘By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in 
which the sea is a substantial factor’, to quote the still pertinent formula crafted 
by Sir Julian Corbett a century ago. This translates as a strategy that has maritime 
control at its core, but which enables power and influence to be projected inland, 
albeit hopefully briefly and in modest quantity. For geopolitically and 
geostrategically insular Britain, next to acting maritime in godliness is the 
necessity to think, strategise, buy, train and act truly in a joint as well as in a 
‘combined’ manner. It is foolish to debate whether the RN and RAF exist 
primarily to support the Army, or vice versa. In common with war, warfare, peace 
and crisis, military power is a unity.21 
This quotation contains three significant points. First, it explicitly links Britain’s 
geopolitical and geostrategic position as an insular nation to the need for a 
maritime approach to national military strategy. Secondly, such a strategy requires 
both the means to secure maritime communications and project power from the 
sea into the land environment. This points to the requirement for a navy that can 
undertake both ‘at sea’ and ‘from the sea’ warfighting roles.22 This requires the 
investment in high-end naval capabilities that was questioned, in particular by the 
Army, as the Labour government under Gordon Brown sought to overcome 
growing budgetary pressures and the impact of the enduring campaigns in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (discussed at length in chapter six). Third, the requirement to 
project power and influence inland, and the emphasis on developing joint 
capabilities (conceptually, operationally and in procurement) points to, as 
discussed in chapter six, the value of cross-domain capable forces, in particular, 
the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Marines, which can provide the domain expertise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Geoffrey Till, ‘Corbett and the Emergence of a British School?’ in Geoffrey Till (ed.) The 
Development of British Naval Thinking (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp.60-88 (quotation, p.84). 
Emphasis original. 
21 Gray, ‘Britain’s National Security’, p.16. 




necessary to enable Army and Air Force operations from the maritime 
environment.  
The above quotation from Gray refers to the requirement for British defence 
strategy to be maritime in order for it to be capable of responding effectively to 
‘most of the menaces to our survival and vital interests’. This raises the issue of 
British national policy aims and what constitutes Britain’s vital interests. Such a 
discussion is necessarily subjective and open to diverse interpretation. The 
discussion in chapter six, however, focused on Britain’s dependence on the 
international trading system and access to foreign sources of strategic raw 
materials as key drivers for a national policy that would seek to protect trade and 
the conditions for trade. The former could be accomplished via an approach 
focusing on the constabulary use of maritime forces to protect the ships 
themselves that convey goods to the UK. In addition, such a task could be fulfilled 
by maritime forces contributing to a wider alternate strategy, for example, as the 
Army advocated, one focused on stabilisation or as was the case in the latter part 
of the Cold War, a continental strategy. The latter in contrast, requires the capacity 
to both undertake the ‘at sea’ protection of shipping role and more importantly, 
project power from the sea in order to ‘shape a stable world … and tackle 
potential risks at source’. It is this proactive, shaping role that requires a robust 
maritime core to British strategy in order to underpin the agility and flexibility 
needed to respond to an inherently dynamic and uncertain strategic environment. 
A strategy that was based predominantly on land-based forces would not, for the 
reasons discussed (namely, securing ABO, the logistics involved in deploying 
land-based forces and providing force protection, and most significantly, the costs 
involved) in the preceding chapters and in this analysis, fulfil the objectives set by 
national policy. The influence of national policy on, and its implications for 
British strategy will now be assessed.    
The National Policy-Maritime Strategy Nexus 
The analysis in this thesis, in particular with regard to the development of the 
Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and the investigation of potential 
alternatives (see chapter five), has been based on the national policy baseline set 




an internationally active posture, working in concert with allies and maintaining a 
capacity to project power globally where and when necessary.23 Moreover, as 
examined in chapter six, Britain is heavily engaged with, and dependent (relative 
to comparable economies) on the globalised trading system and based on trade or 
access to resources, has a particular interest in the Far East, Persian Gulf and 
Africa. This, as Professor Geoffrey Till suggests, points to a policy focused on the 
defence of, and conditions for trade.24 The combination of Britain’s strategic 
context, the evolving character of the international system and the versatility and 
agility of a maritime-based expeditionary posture25 point to the utility of a 
Maritime Strategy. Such a strategy would contribute to the stated national policy 
aim of being capable of acting ‘well beyond our shores’, maintaining a ‘full and 
active engagement in world affairs’ and fulfil the requirement to project power. 
The latter is significantly couched in terms of Britain’s position as an ally of the 
US, a member of the EU and NATO and a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council. This suggests that Britain continues to see itself as a 
major power, thus requiring a commensurate level of military capability.  
The implication for a notional maritime strategy is that a certain level of 
warfighting capability is required both for operations at and from the sea, thus 
necessitating investment in, for example, aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, 
strategic airlift and expeditionary ground forces, in order to provide the means to 
project power, including the insertion of land-based forces. It is in this regard that 
the connection between national policy and maritime strategy – or a continental or 
other potential alternative strategic approach – is significant. As discussed in 
chapter one, national policy provides the ends for which strategy – the ways – 
must aim to fulfil. The analysis in chapter five, specifically noted that, with regard 
to potential alternatives to aircraft carriers, without radical change in British 
defence and foreign policy objectives and with it a shift away from a power 
projection capability, aircraft carriers provide a cost-effective and flexible means 
of providing such a capability.  
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This is relevant at the strategic level. Whilst British national policy remains 
committed to what is effectively an expeditionary posture and a limited global 
power projection capability (including a potentially enhanced east of Suez role)26, 
the case for a maritime strategy, as articulated by, for example, Till, Gray and 
Howes (see chapter six, pages 223-234), is compelling. Moreover, it warrants 
mention that both the Army’s Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC)27 and the 
joint (though Royal Air Force-led) UK Air and Space Power Doctrine 28 
documents, as cited in chapter six, discuss the importance of the maritime 
environment to land and airpower respectively. However, although the FLOC may 
speak favourably of joint force capabilities and refer to ‘sea power on a significant 
scale’, would, for example, Army support be forthcoming for an expansion of 
financial resources – at the possible expense of the Army – to fund an increase in 
the size of the Royal Navy, in particular as economic constraints are unlikely to 
allow a substantive increase in the overall defence budget? Similarly, in the 
context of developing joint capabilities, can enduring agreement between the 
Royal Navy and Royal Air Force be achieved on the balance of UK airpower? The 
creation of Joint Force Harrier was intended to underpin a closer Royal Navy-
Royal Air Force relationship, but ultimately failed. Most importantly, could 
consensus be achieved between the three services on the extent to which, as Gray 
argues, strategic thinking, training, procurement and action need to be approached 
in a joint, maritime manner, and ‘whether the RN and RAF exist primarily to 
support the Army, or vice versa’?  
Questions such as those above illustrate the inescapable influence of politics –
broadly defined (that is, whether from government, industry, inter-service, intra-
service) – on the development of strategy. It is likely that, as notable examples of 
‘strategic maritime assets’, the debate on the maritime contribution to British 
strategy and national policy will focus to a significant extent on the value of the 
Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers when one or both ships enter service. 
Whereas in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Royal Navy thinking on the Maritime 	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Contribution to Joint Operations, the Future Navy and Future Navy Operational 
Concept, and the associated Versatile Maritime Force concept, were utilised to 
provide an intellectual framework for the development of CVF (see chapter two, 
pages 93-94), it may be the case that the Queen Elizabeth-class will achieve as 
great an effect, not in an expeditionary operation against a putative adversary, but 
in influencing debate in Whitehall via a tangible demonstration of the strategic 
utility and relevance of maritime forces.   
In this respect, the Queen Elizabeth-class will be adding to an already substantial 
body of knowledge and experience of the contribution of maritime forces 
(including a century of maritime airpower) to British national policy. Corbett drew 
upon the lessons of history, linking Britain’s national context and identity in order 
to elucidate why Britain required a maritime strategy. This enabled Corbett to 
articulate a vision of British strategy – with maritime power at its core – that has 
an enduring relevance, as explained by Professor Andrew Lambert: 
Corbett found in the past a British strategy that was unique, specific and 
appropriate, It blended naval and military action, political direction, and 
economic interests into an almost seamless whole…. One way or another his 
ideas survived the ill-informed attacks of Cold War historians who failed to see 
the temporary and anomalous nature of the major British military commitment in 
peacetime being an Army and Air Force on the Rhine. When the Cold War ended, 
Corbett’s work was still the only intellectually coherent explanation of why 
Britain requires a unique, distinctive maritime strategy. British Maritime 
Doctrine, published as BR 1806 in 1996, and the Strategic Defence Review of 
1999 [sic] were Corbettian documents.29  
Although history cannot predict the future, ‘it helps us by providing the evidence 
from which we develop our own ideas’,30 thus, hopefully, guiding and improving 
future practice. In this regard, there is much evidence demonstrating the value of a 
maritime strategy for Britain, and the lessons from where alternatives have not 
met expectation. Although the future operating environment and international 
system may be uncertain, the case explaining the role and contribution of maritime 
power in serving British national policy in the face of myriad challenges is based 
on a solid foundation. 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
 
A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial 
AAC Army Air Corps 
AAR Air-to-Air Refuelling 
AAW Anti-Air Warfare 
ABO Access, Basing and Overflight  
ACE Allied Command Europe (NATO) 
AEW Airborne Early Warning 
AMRAAM  Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile 
ARRC Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps  
ASAC  Airborne Surveillance and Control 
ASBM Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASTOVL Advanced Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ASuW Anti-Surface Warfare 
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System 
BMD Ballistic Missile Defence 
BROACH Bomb Royal Ordnance Augmented Charge 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance  
CAH Helicopter-carrying Heavy Cruiser 
CATOBAR Catapult-Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery 
CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability 
CEPP Carrier Enabled Power Projection 
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CVF Carrier Vessel Future  (the designator for the Future Aircraft 
Carrier programme resulting in the Queen Elizabeth-class) 
CVN Nuclear-powered Aircraft Carrier 
CVNF ‘Nuclear-powered Future Aircraft Carrier’ 
CVS Anti-Submarine Support Carrier (applied to the Invincible-class) 
CVSG(R) Replacement Guided-missile-armed Anti-Submarine Support      
Carrier (the original lexicon for the projected Invincible-class 
replacement) 
CVTOL Carrier Vessel Take-off and Landing 
CVW Carrier Air Wing 
DCDC                 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (Ministry of        
Defence) 
DPOC Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability (post-2005 Tornado    
replacement) 
EMALS Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System 
EMCAT Electro-Magnetic Catapult 
FAA Fleet Air Arm 
FCBA Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (the Sea Harrier replacement) 
FCOC Future Character of Conflict 
FLOC Future Land Operating Concept 
FMOC Future Maritime Operational Concept 
FNOC Future Navy Operational Concept 
FOA Future Offensive Aircraft (predecessor to FOAS) 
FOAS Future Offensive Air System (the pre-2005 Tornado 
replacement) 
FPDA  Five Powers Defence Arrangement 
HCDC   House of Commons Defence Committee 
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IPPR  Institute of Public Policy Research 
ISR  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
ISTAR   Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and    
Reconnaissance  
JAST  Joint Advanced Strike Technology 
JCA  Joint Combat Aircraft (succeeded FCBA) 
JFH  Joint Force Harrier 
JSF  Joint Strike Fighter 
LHA  ‘Landing Ship Assault’; an amphibious assault carrier with the 
primary role of supporting the air lift of forces ashore (via fixed 
and rotary wing V/STOL aircraft) 
LHD  ‘Landing Helicopter Dock’; an amphibious assault carrier 
incorporating a floodable landing dock to support landing and 
hovercraft for the purpose of amphibious operations in addition 
to fixed and rotary wing V/STOL aircraft    
LitM  Littoral Manoeuvre  
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
LPH  ‘Landing Platform Helicopter’; a helicopter carrier (for example, 
HMS Ocean) 
MASC  Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control 
MCJO  Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations 
MoD  Ministry of Defence 
MoD (N)  Ministry of Defence (Navy) 
NCADE  Network-Centric Airborne Defense Element 
NGS  Naval Gunfire Support 
NSS  National Security Strategy (2010) 
RAF  Royal Air Force 
RFC  Royal Flying Corps  
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RNAS  Royal Naval Air Service  
SDR  Strategic Defence Review (1998) 
SDSR  Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) 
SNEB  Airborne 68 mm rocket pod 
SRVL  Ship-borne Rolling Vertical Landing 
SSBN  Nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-armed submarine 
SSGN  Nuclear-powered, guided missile-armed submarine 
SSN  Nuclear-powered attack submarie 
STOBAR  Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery 
STOVL  Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing 
TDCC  Through Deck Command Cruiser (original designation applied 
to Invincible-class) 
TIALD  Thermal Imaging Airborne Laser Designator 
TLAM  Tomahawk Land Attack Missile 
UAS  Unmanned Air System 
UCAS  Unmanned Combat Air System 
UCAV  Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 
UCLASS  Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike  
USMC  United States Marine Corps 
USN  United States Navy 
UV  Unmanned Vehicle 
VLO  Very Low Observable 
VLS   Vertical Launch System 
VMF  Versatile Maritime Force 
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